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I. Introduction:
The SouthwQst Asian region, for ordinary AmQricans, has taken
on significance only recently with the actions of Islamic revolutionarigs
in Iran, the supposed Iranian support of terrorist actions throughout
the world and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. To Americans
observing the Soviet Union and not cognizant of history, it would seem
that Russian intQrests in this area have developed only recently with
the advent of their intervention in Afghanistan. It would also seem that
with southern boundaries distant from the Russian republic and seat of
Soviet power, there should be little interest in this region. US Policy
makers are prepared to involve our nation in guaranteeing a
compromise peace settlement in Afghanistan. They state that the
UnitQd States has a significant stake in the development and
maintenance of peace in South Asia and the Gulf region. Conditions of
stability and attitudes of the policy makers of Iran and Afghanistan
significantly effgct our ability to influence affairs in the region.
Compared to the Soviet Union, U.S. involvement in Southwest Asia has
a short history. Soviet interests are intense, originating during Tzarist
times and evolving to today's conflict.
On Saturday, 28 December 1985, President Reagan announced
that "the United States is willing to serve as 'garantor'" of a peace
settlement" 1
. The same day the Manchester Guardian (England)
^s reported by the Mew York Times . 29 December 1 985, 5. and by the major television
networks during their evening broadcasts 23, 29, and 30 Dec. 1 985. The MacNeil/Lehrer News
Hour on the PBS Network carried an interview with Mr. Nicholas A. Veliotes, Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Dept. of State, in which he discussed the significance of
the President's comments pertaining action as an agent in the Afghanistan conflict.
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reported that Soviet policy in Asia as a whole continues to be
hampered by the Afghan war, stating that Moscow observers feel that
the Soviet Union is hinting at 'broadening political dialogue' aimed at
ending six years of war, In the Soviet Union the costs of involvement in
this Muslim sphere of the world are becoming visible. US News and
World Report detailed the domestic costs and responses by the Soviet
state, inaicating that there are signs that Soviet citizens are growing
steadily tired of casualties as the diplomatic and economic costs of
maintaining the war effort continue,2 What motivates the Soviet Union
and the United States to involve themselves in this region of the world?
Why should the President seek to guarantee a peace settlement in
Southwest Asia? At the same time, why does the Soviet Union
continue to press onward?
This thesis examines the national interests of the United States
and the Soviet Union in South West Asia. First, this analysis will
examine the concept of National Interest and develop a framework for
analyzing and comparing the interests of the Soviet Union and the
United States in the region. Second, using a case study format, the
development of superpower interests in the region will be analyzed.
Finally, a focused comparison of the U.S. and Soviet concerns as they
have developed to this day will be made, keying on the intensity of
various types of interests. Islam is a significant factor in both Iran and
Afghanistan; this region could be described as Islamic South Asia.
Therefore, the importance of this variable will be carefully considered.
2 U3 News and World Report J 6 Dec 1 985, 42.
In 1984, SQth SinglQton wrote that "Americans confuse themselves and
thQ issues with politically inspired debates which misunderstand Soviet
thinking.
"
3 This study will attempt to avoid confusing the issue by
critically analyzing the question from both the American and Soviet
perspective and considering the influence of Islam to both
supenpowens.
Since Inan and Afghanistan occupy only a portion of this diverse
region, it is useful to consider bniefly the complete context of policy
toward the area. Recently, Lawnence Ziring wrote that Southwest
Asia "has become in the 1980s, what Southeast Asia was in the 1960s."
He described the nonthern tier buffer as a primary interest for the
United States because its strategic and geopolitical position places
United States and Soviet interests in head to head competition. "The
northern tier states may form the historical pivot for the remaining
decades of the twentieth century." He continued to illustrate the
recent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, revolution in Iran, and recent
instability in Turkey, as actions which have forced the United States to
pullback from its former forward position on the Soviet border and
relook at our policy options in the region. Ziring writes. . ."There can be
no mistaking a shift in forces that favors the Soviet Union'"4
Yet, since the Afghanistan invasion the Soviet Union has been
unable to either resolve the conflict or win a complete victory.
5Seth Singleton, "Defense of the Gains of Socialism: Soviet Third World Policies in the




, and Afghanistan: A Political Chronoloq u.(New York:
PraegerJ 981) J vi1.
Additionally, while entrenched in Afghanistan, the Soviets find
themselves in a number of difficult positions throughout the rest of
Southwest Asia. In Iran, the Soviets are described as the 'lesser satan'
vis a vis the United States. They find themselves challenged in their
Central Asian republics with the general growth of a Muslim population
as the Slavic representation decreases. In Pakistan, the historic
J6reat Game' continues as the United States has assumed the
challengers role in the vacuum of British withdrawal after the Second
World War. If perhaps there has been a shift in the correlation of
forces to the Soviet advantage, is it a permanent shift?
The thread linking all the nations of this region, despite the
diversity of Islamic belief as characterized by Sunni and Shi Ja sects, is
Islam. The significance of the Muslim factor in the past has been
overlooked by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Michael
Rywkin in Moscow's Muslim Challenge and Bennigsen and Broxup in The
Islamic Threat to the Soviet State5 have examined the growing
importance of the Islam to the Soviet Union. One of the major factors
responsible for the continuation of resistance in Afghanistan is the
consistent opposition of the Mujihaddin. The importance of Islam is also
evident in Iran, where it remains a significant factor of legitimacy for
the revolution. Some authors have argued that our failure to
understand its role contributed to our loss of influence in Iran with the
fall of the Shah and the success of the Islamic revolution. In Pakistan,
^Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State . (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1 983). and Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central
Asia. (New York: Sharpe, 1 982).
thQ Zio nggimQ bases its stability and continuation on a continuing policy
of 'Islamization' to sqcupq domestic support. While it can be argued
that Islam can be as divisive as it is unifing, it would be myopic to ignore
its significance in this region of the wonld. Certainly, it must be
considened as a challenge to Soviet intennal control, just as acnoss its
southern bonder. For the United States it is important to understand
how Islam contributes to the legitimacy and stability of governments in
the region and the potential challenges or support this religion provides
for our own policies in the region.
Soviet presence in this region is the legacy of its Tzarist past.
Since the time of Peter the Great, an important Russian goal has been
the acquisition of warm water ports. Hegemonistic territorial
expansion is only one of several possible theories put forward to
explain Soviet moves on its Southern frontien, Other theories include: a
historic preoccupation with security and fear of encirclement by foes,
opportunity for economic imperialism, an attempt to offset potential
challenges internally by Islamic fundamentalism (either on an official
basis or by sufi orders), a goal to establish a regional presence to set
the global correlation of forces in their favor, and an attempt to fill the
vacuum of power created with the retreat of British power.
As pointed out earlier, US interest in Southwest Asia is relatively
recent. American interests became evident with the announcement of
the Truman Doctrine in 1947. This was the point of departure for
10
American foreign policy in thQ cold war. 6 By 1947, thQ United States
had come to take Britian's place in the struggle for pro-western
influence in Southwest Asia. U.S. goals in this region are multi-leveled.
Economically, the protection of the Persian Gulf oil lanes is significant.
Strategically, this region of the wonld is the soft underbelly of the
Soviet Union. "The stnategic value of the flank (the Northern Tier)
should be viewed in terms of (1) the key note in the Mediterranean; (2)
the region's geostrategic relationship. . . and (3) its contribution to
NATO. . . "'' . Politically, this region has significance fon the safe keeping
and maintenance of the wonld onden. Since the Inanian revolution and
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this region has taken on renewed
importance for the US.
Before examining the development of Soviet and American
national interests, it is important to define the concept of 'national
interest'. The second section of this paper seeks to review the
literature on the national interest and build an analytical framework
useful in explaining interests in South West Asia.
6John L. Gaddi3. Strategies of Containment: A Critical A p praisal of Postwar American
National Securitu Policu
.
( Nev York; Oxford University Press, 1 982) contains a detailed
discussion of this point a3 does Part IV of Erik P. Hoffmann/Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. The Conduct of
Soviet Forei g n Policu , (New York: Aldine Publishing, 1 980).





A. •'•//HAT IS A NATIONAL INTEREST?
What is a national intQPQSt? Is there a standard definition for this
concept? Is the national interest of the United States the same as that
fon the Soviet Union? These are difficult and often unanswered
questions. Before continuing, two points should be considered. First, a
precise, universal operational definition of 'National Interest' quite
possibly is an unreachable goal. And second, comparing and
contrasting American and Soviet national interests can be a difficult
and confusing task. This chapter will attempt to briefly review the field
of literature on the national interest and having done so to develop an
operational framework by which to explain and compare the interests
of the superpowers.
Various methods have been used to attempt to analyze the
national interests of the Soviet Union and the United States. Methods
have been developed to determine what these interests are, how they
interact and how they compare and contrast. Authors differ greatly in
their approaches and in their models. However, few attempts to
devise a system which compares and contracts the interests of the
Soviet Union and the United States have been devised. Valenta and
Butler in 1981 examined the interests and objectives of Soviet Policy in
South West Asia using a conceptual frame work adapted from K.J,
Holsti's International Politics: A Framework for Analu sis . In "Soviet
National Security Decision-making: What Do We Know and What Do
We Understand?", Stephen M. Meyer summarizes various methods and
12
models for the analysis of Soviet decision making, Likewise, Hannes
Adomeit in 1982 looked at Soviet risk, taking in crisis situations using the
factons of ideology, security and state interest, military power and the
effects of domestic politics on their decision making process. Adam
Ulam in much of his writing uses a more histonical and descriptive, yet
less scientific and nigonous method of analysis. 1 Yet these methods
attempt to examine only the Soviet interest.
Soviet analysts tend to fall into various schools of thinking which
describe the nature of Soviet political decision making but discount the
role of legitimate state interests. The Soviet system has been
described by Spino, Friedrich, Bnzezinski and Anendt, as a totalitarian
system with several distinct features; an imposed organization, forced
participation, unpredictable due to the personal control of a dictator,
violence and suppression of opposition. Analysts have used variants
of Kremlinology, Bureaucratic Politics, Interest Group analysis and
1 Jiri Valenta and S ha no n R. Butler, Soviet Interests , Ob j ectives , and Polic y O ptions in
Southwest A3ia
,
(Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
1 981): K.J. Hobti . International Politics: A Framework for Analusis , (Englevood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice- Hall, 1 983): Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet National Security Decision Making: What Do We
Knov and What Do We Understand?", Soviet Decision- making for National Security (London: Allen
andUnvin, 1984), 255-297: Hanne3 Adomeit. Soviet Risk-Taking and Cri3is Behavior: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analusis. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1 982).
^Herbert J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach", American
Political Science Review . 1962, 56:577-595. Carl
..J. Friedrich and Zbigm'ew K. Brzezinski,
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy . 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1 965). Hannah Arendt, The
Origins of Total iarianism , 2nd ed. ( New York: Meridian, 1 958)
.
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Political Culture 'to explain why the Soviets act in their chosen manner. ^
However, the above methods opq hindered in this type of study
because of their self imposed limits. They tend to analyze the Soviet
Union fnom one side, are sometimes controversial in thein
interpretations or definitions, and have little utility in the comparison of
Soviet and US positions.
Similarly, the examination of United States- national interests qpq
as varied as the- a basic definition for the national interest. Hans J,
Morganthau in In Defense of the National Interest and Henry Kissinger
in Problems of National Securitu attempt to analyze the components of
our national interest. Morganthau examines the national interest in
strictly terms of foreign policy. He looks at three main periods of US
foreign policy; the realistic period, the ideological period and the Utopian
period. Morganthau's thesis is that American post-war foreign policy
has been marked by four intellectual errors; legalism, utopianism,
sentimentalism and neo-isolationism. While Morganthau sees the
national interest as a major force guiding the formulation and execution
of foreign policy, he never develops the concept into an operational
definition. Furthermore he does not attempt to analyze the national
J For examples see: For Kremlinology; George W. Breslauer, "Political Succession and the
Soviet Policy Agenda", Problems of Communism . May- June 1 980. William G. Hyland, "Kto Kovo"
in the Kremlin", P ro bl e rns of Comm u ni s
m
.
Jan- Feb 1 982. Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Succession:
Signs of Struggle", Problems of Communism
. Sept -Oct 1 982., For Bureaucratic Politics Raymond
Tanter and Richard H. Ullrnan ed, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy
Implications", Theoru and Policu in International Relations
.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1 972); For Interest Group and Elite perspectives see William Zimmerman, "Elite
Perspectives and the Explanation of Soviet Foreign Policy", Journal of International Affairs
.
XXIV: 1 1 970, 84-98. For Political Culture see Nathan Leites, A St udu of Bolshevism . (Glencoe,
111.: Free Press. 1 953) and Alexander lv George, "The "Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to
the Study of Political Leaders and Decision- Making", International Studies Quarter! u. XI 1 1:2
(June, 1969), 190-222.
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interest of our principle foe, the Soviet Union.4 Graham T. Allison's
Essence of Decision uses the respective positions of the United
States and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as the
basis for analysis. He examines the procQss of decision mal-iing from
three perspectives, from the national acton model, from the
organizational process model and from the bureaucratic politics model.
Allison deals with the procQss and motivations of decision making
rather than the underlying interests which motivated their decisions.
Allison's models attempt to explain rather than compare intensity of
interest of both superpowers in the Cuban situation. He does not deal
with interests as a separate concept.5
Blendon Schubert, in The Public Interest , attempts to arrive at a
theory of national interest. His primary assumption is that the public
interest is the central concept of democratic theories of government,
This immediately excludes the possibility that the Soviet Union could be
analyzed using the same concept since their's is not a democratic
government in the same sense as the American context. Schubert's
analysis of the national interest concentrates upon the actons involved
in the process of interpreting the collective public will into goals and
objectives of public interest. Schubert categorizes the body of
literature on the national interest into three types.: Rationalist theory.
Idealist theory and Realist theory. His conclusion is that there is not a
single unified or consistent theory which describes how the public
4Hans J. Morganthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of
American Foreign Policu
.
( New York: Knopf, 1951).
^Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co. 1971).
IS
intGPQSt is dQfined in tQrms of govgrnmental decision-making. His
analysis focusQS solely on thQ United States.® Carl Friedreich's The
Public Interest , is a gathering of various writer's short works on the
national interest. Each of the nineteen contributors to this edited piece
attempt to build a framework from which to analyze and describe
public interest. Each of the writers agrees that the public interest is
vital to the formulation and execution of policy. Again, no one theory is
derived which encompasses an operational definition for the national
interest or that can be used to compare the interests of the United
States with the Soviet Union.7
The above authors describe many factors which must be
considered in an examination of the interests which compel a given
nation to respond or act in a specific situation. However, a comparison
of interests of the Soviet Union and the United States must be
undertaken carefully and must consider the inherent differences. The
most difficult problem is attempting to compare two distinctively
different political worlds, one pluralistic and fluid, the other ensconced
in the philosophy of Marxist-Leninism and traditional Russian political
culture. Any analysis seeking to compare the interests of these two
superpowers must be careful not to mirror-image the respective
actors.
In a Summer 1984 Foreign Policu article, Dimitri Simes pointed out
the problem of perspective in comparing the interests of the US and
USSR. Referring to the 1979 Soviet invasion, he explained that in the
6Glendon Schubert, (Glencoe, 111. The Free Pre$3, 1 960).
7Carl Friedrich, The Public Interest . (New York: Atherton Press, 1 962).
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•Qyes of Americans, it is a preposterous thought that an independent
Afghanistan is an intolenablQ threat to Soviet security concerns. Most
Americans supported President Reagan in his decision to involve U.S.
forces in the Gnenada invasion because the tiny island nation was too
politically close to Cuba and therefone a threat to the security of the
United States. As described in Allison's booh, Khrushchev's decision to
send missiles to Cuba was seen in the U.S. as a '"brutal provocation",
Americans ''contemptuously dismiss" the Soviet position that
deployment of Pershing II and Gnound Launched Cnuise Missiles
(GLCMs) in Eunope is a threat to Soviet national security. On the othen
hand, the Soviets become very sensitive to any possibility of American
influence in the Polish crisis, while at the same time continuing to send
aid to guerillas in El Salvador, the Sandinista regime in Nicaruaga,
maintaining a de facto alliance with Cuba and building 'fraternal socialist
relations' with Grenada. . ."night in Amenica's backyard. The difficulty in
undenstanding each othen's concenns also neflects the stnong
American and Soviet belief in the righteousness of thein nespective
causes..."8 , While the intenests of the Soviet Union and the United
States ane similan given diffenent perspectives, they remain different
given the context of each nations political culture and decision making
process.
'While carefully seeking not to mirror-image the national
interests of the Soviet Union and the United States, their
8 0imitri K. Simes, "The New Soviet Challenge", Foreign Policu , 55(5ummer 1 984):
129.
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developmental background is important to keep in mind . Bruce R,
Kuniholm astutely points out that there is at least one significant
parallel between the superpowers. This deals with ideology. He explains
that as American interests in South West Asia grew from the
traditional British-Russian rivalry they tooM on a different character.
The British-Russian rivalry concerned spheres of power influence.
However, the United States and Soviet Union compete on a different
plane. "The ideological baggage which accompanies them tends to
confuse the conflict by portraying their rival national interests as a
clash between world views, rooted in the different philosophies of
Wilson and Lenin." Kuniholm continues with a particularly appropriate
guote from George Kennan. . .Both Russians and Americans have
a tendency to attribute to their own political ideology a potential universal
validity- to perceive in it virtues that ought, as one thought, to command not
only imitation on the part of other peoples everywhere but also the moral
authority and ascendency of the respective national center from which these
virtues are proceeding.
9
KQQping in mind the pnoblQms of comparing and contrasting thQ national
intQPQsts of the Soviet Union and the United States, it becomes
important to choose a framework which allows for the explanation of
these differences and compensates for them.
9Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East
,
(Princeton, New
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1 930), xviii. Kennan is quoted from an article in the
Saturday Review... George Kennan, "is Detente Worth Saving?" Saturda u Review , 6 March 1 976,
12-17.
id
B. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS.
This Qssay will use a variation of the 'Focused Comparison
Method'' of analysis developed by Alexander L. George in '-"Case Studies
and Theony Development: The Method of Structured Focused
Comparison". 1 George's method requires that general but standardized
questions be formed and asUed for each case in a focused comparison
study. Donald E. Nuechterlein, in National Interests and Presidential
Leadership: The Setting of Priorities , developed an analytical
framework for the examination of national interests which can easily
be adapted for the purpose of this study. Nuechterlein's framework
provides a systematic method of analyzing the national interest of an
international actor. By considering each actor separately and
determining his level of interest in the region, it is possible to avoid the
pitfall of mirror-imaging. This study will combine Nuechterlein's
variables in a systematic manner as recommended by the 'Focused
Comparison Method' to examine the interests of Soviet Union and the
United States in South 'West Asia.
One additional variable which is not required by the Nuechterlein
method, but which is critical to the development of this study, is how
each actor responds or reacts to the dominant religious and cultural
values of the area. In this case, Islam. Since Islam is the common thread
linking the nations in the region, it is important to consider how or if the
Soviet Union and the United States deal with Islam. Do they
'Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured
Focused Comparison", in P.G. Lauren ed. Di plomacy New A pproaches in Historu . Theor u and
Policy, (New York: Free Press, 1 979), 44-68.
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accommodate for it, on ignorQ it, in dQVQloping policies toward the
region? In both nations under study here, Islam has historically played
an important role. Today, Islam continues to be a critical legitimizing and
unifying factor in both Iran and Afghansitan. Although differing
somewhat in implementation, to ignore its utility and intensity in 5outh
West Asia would be to significantly underestimate its impact on the
political and cultural way of life in the area.
To avoid any misunderstanding or ambiguity in examining the
concerns of the actors in this study, it is necessary to define the term
—national interest. According to Nuechterlein the national interest is
"the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to
the sovereign states comprising its external environment."2
Nuechterlein further gualifies this definition to include several
important assumptions. First, he says that the national interest of a
nation deals with the environment external to the given state. Problems
dealing with the domestic situation are discounted. To totally discount
the domestic challenges a state faces could be naive, because they do
affect the perceived needs of a nation. Simple examples of this are
readily available. One example is the enraged spirit of the American
people following the initiation of the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979.
Another is the pervading hostile public sentiment toward the Japanese
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. In these instances, the
attitudes of the American public certainly affected the perceived
^Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of
Priorities
. (Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1973), 3.
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dQsirQS of thQ nation as intQrppQtQd by policy makers. NuechtQPiein
accounts for tnis factor with nis second considGration.
ThQ definition of the national interest should seep, to incorporate
more than a simple objective analysis of fact. Nuechterlein points out
that "the determination of a nation's interests is the result of a political
process in which conflicting private interests, bureaucratic politics and
the so-called dispassionate view of the facts by planners play a role-
and should play a role." Third, this definition implies that decisions,
which concern the perceived needs of the state are results from a
political process. The end result of this process is a decision about the
relative importance to the nation of an external event. Since this study
will examine two entirely different political systems, it is important to
realize that although the details of the process may differ, the end
result is a decision. In other words, it is the decision itself which
counts, not the process. In this case the end interest is more important
than the pnocess by which it comes about.
There is one additional assumption. The term state can refer only
to a sovereign nation. It cannot be used to define an international
organization, a multinational corponation or other non-sovereign
international actor. This is despite of the fact that extra-national
actors in today's world do play an important role in the international
milieu. According to the author.. ."for better on worse, we live in a world
where decisions to use force, to impose trade restrictions, to enter
21




The national interest according to the analytical framework
which will be used in this paper is divided into five types of interests.
These five basic categories of interest are: Defense of homeland,
Economic well being, Favorable world order, Ideological goals and Islam.
Their combination, competition, and balance result in the policies of a
nation's political system. Each of these interests is analyzed in terms
of intensity. Nuechterlein assumes several facts about the relationship
among variables: (1) There is no priority among variables, (2) variables
are "not mutually exclusive and policy makers must accept trade- offs
among them" (3) While one variable may not at all times be stnictly
adhered to, all variables are assumed to be important components of
the national interest, and (4) The balance among variables is dynamic,
changing over time as measured in months and years. 4
Accordingly, the variables that will be analyzed are defined as
follows:
Defense of Homeland
Incorporates the defensive interests or security needs of the nation.
This variable accounts for the need for protection of the state and its
members from the threat. The threat is analyzed differently by various




capablQ and in a constant statQ of flux. This variable also excludes
alliances.
Economic well being
Considers the economic condition of the nation. It is assumed that each
actor will try to maximize his economic condition by protecting his
trades routes, establishing tariffs, quotas, embangoes, arranging loans
and credits on the world market, op using any number of othen
instruments to maintain or improve his position. This variable considers
a nations need to defend its own relative economic interests.
World Order
Accounts for the relationship of a nation in the balance of power as
part of the world system of states. Nations will attempt to develop and
operate in a world system which is balanced or in which the balance of
power is in their favor. For the Soviet Union, this variable discounts
the existence of an international communist movement, highlighting
instead the Soviet role as an independent superpower.
Ideological Goals
Seek to account for the tendency of states to protect their own
ideological system while spreading their system of values to others.
The Soviet Union, using Marxist-Leninist ideology, openly admits to
seeking to further the goals of their ideology. In recent years as
western analysts have argued that Soviet ideology is dead, however,
references to the ultimate victory of the socialist system over the
capitalist system have not stopped in the Soviet press. Marxist-
Leninist ideology continues to be a pervasive banner in the Soviet
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Union. In contrast, the United States does not always openly admit that
we seek to spread our system of values, but similarly American
ideology is at the forefront of foreign policies.
Islam
Since Islam is such a pervasive force in South West Asia, this variable
refers to how an acton nelates to on accounts fon the dominant fonm of
neligious and monal values in the negion. Wheneas ideology refers to
how an actons own beliefs and values ane considered, Islam as a
variable seeks to accommodate the ideological system of the subject
nation toward the acton. This facton could be referred to as ethnicity,
or reaction to native nationalism.
Each of the above variables is rated according to the its intensity
of interest. Intensity of interest is determined by subjectively
accounting for value and cost factors as shown below. Intensity is
defined as the "stake which the political leadership of a country
believes is involved." It is in detenmining the degnee of interest, that
trade-offs among the interest variables become evident. For example,
at this stage, the policy maker may determine that while thene is a high
degree of potential for economic gain in a given situation, there may be
an equally high degree of risk to the security of the nation, Therefore,
since there is a high degree of risk, it may not be an advantage to
maximize economic gain.
In this study, four varying degrees of intensity will be judged. A
variable interest may be considered: (1) A survival issue , "when the
very existence of a nation-state is in jeopardy, as a result of overt
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military attach on its own territory, or from the throat of attach if an
enemy's demands are rejected." (2) A vital issue , "when serious -harm
will very likely result to the state unless strong measures are employed
to counter adverse action. . ." (3) A ma jor issue , "when a state's
political, economic and ideological well-being may be adversely affected
by events and trends in the international environment and require
corrective action in order to prevent becoming serious threats (or vital
issues)."5 (4) A peripheral issue , if intensity is minimal and not
threatening.
In determining whether an interest is a vital or a survival issue it
is necessary to assess trade-offs of value or benefit and cost or risk.
Nuechterlein has outlined -sixteen factors which must be considered
and subjectively balanced against one another in determining the
degree to which a variable is significant. These essential factors are:
Value/ Benefit factors Cost/Risk factors 6
Proximity of danger Economic cost
Nature of threat Potential casualties
Economic gain Risk of protracted conflict
Sentimental attachment Risk of enlarged conflict
Type of Government Cost of defeat/stalemate
Effect on balance of power Riskof public/party opposition
National prestige at stake Risk of UN opposition
Policies of key allies Risk of congressional
opposition or loss of legitimacy.
To avoid mirror-imaging the Soviet Union and the United States each of
these factors must be assessed individually and in context with the
political system of the nation. Also, it is necessary to consider each of
5 Nuechterlein, 1 1.
6Table adapted from Nuechterlein, 20.
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these factors in relation to the others to get the overall 'big' picture
involved. Using the method outlined above it will be possible to
determine the intensity of variables which comprise to the national
interest of each nation.
National Interests are subject to change over time. Both in Iran
and Afghanistan, the history of U.S. and Soviet interests is important to
developing an understanding of present day interests. Over time both
superpowers have changed their policies towards this region
according to immediate concerns. A brief analysis will show that
Soviet concerns appear to have a much longer and more intense
history than those of the United States.
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HI. IRAN AS A PAWN: A CASE 5TUDT
Iran has a long history of foreign influence in its internal affains
as a result of competition for power. Located along the British route
to its eastern empire and to the south of Russia's soft underbelly, Iran
has always been positioned as a challenge to the great power control.
This challenge was not so much a threat by Iranians to assume control,
but a struggle by the great powers to prevent complete domination by
the opposition. As its oil grew more important to the economies of the'
great powers, and Iran's own weaknesses were exploited, this region
grew to even greater significance as a pawn in the great power
struggle. An examination of Iran's role in the international balance of
power game is highlighted by five periods. These are: (A) The early
struggle before 1307. (B) the Anglo-Soviet struggle in the inter war
years. (C) The Allies in WWII. (D) The evolution and struggle of the cold
war, (E) The Islamic revolutionary struggle. 1
A. The Early Struggle
Great power concern over the control of Persia stems from the
nineteenth century. Although, as early as the 14th century Russia had
established trade routes and commercial ties with Iran. Richard Pipes
1 While authors differ in their approach to the great power struggle in Iran according to
their interpretation of events, I have chosen this periodization because I feel that it best describes
the evolution of current dag significance of the Iranian case study in light of the US and Soviet
competition for influence in this region. Bruce R. Kuniholm in The Qri gi ns of the Cold War i n the
Near East points out the significance of the name 'Persia' vs. "Iran*. He explains that Iranians have
always called this country Iran but that the British did not adopt the tradition until 1 935
following the insistence of the Shah of Iran. This study will use the term interchangeablely.
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noted the importance of eastern ties with Iran during the Tzardom of
Moscovy. After the early ties Moscovy, . .
remained oriented towards the east even after the Golden Horde had dissolved and
Moscow had entered into commercial relations vith western Europe. The conquest in
the 1550s of Kazan and Astrakhan, both of them important entrepots of oriental and
Middle Eastern goods, increased Russian involvement with eastern markets. Until the
eighteenth century.. Russia's foreign trade was directed primarily towards the middle
east, especially Iran; of the three bazaars in Moscow in the second half of the
seventeenth century, one dealt exclusively with Persian merchandise.^
If one accepts the thesis that the European great powers
controlled the development of more "backward countries" in the late
1800s, then the fate of Persia, Afghanistan and the Indian Empire can
be more clearly explained. Gordon A. Craig writes that the period from
1871 to 1914 was the 'European Age of Imperialism'. During the early
nineteenth century most of the European powers were interested in
only consolidating their own power bases, being concerned mostly by
domestic problems and immediate neighbors, Only Britain was
concerned initially with "accumulation of dependencies". During the
latter part of the century motivations changed. ". . .the 1880s and
1890s were years in which the European powers not only consolidated
their existing non-European possessions but sought feverishly to add
to them, with little regard for expense or for political dangers involved
. , .empire building became the accepted policy of all major powers and
was supported by public opinion with a fervor that cut across class
and economic lines."3
^Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime , (New York: Charles Schribner and Sons,
1974), 204.
^Gordon A. Craig, Euro pe. 1815-1914
,
3rd ed. (Hinsdale, 111: The Dryden Press,
1972), 400.
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Russian and British competition came to a head in South West
Asia during the period from 1836-1907. Although primarily dealing with
Afghanistan, competition for power and influence did involve Persia,
The Anglo-Russian rivalry continued until and beyond the signature of
the Anglo-Russian entente in August 1307. Russia, weakened by its
losses in the Russo-Japanese war and concerned by German
advances into Persia during that period, was willing to seek a way to
maintain its gains. An alliance with Britain seemingly provided several
advantages. Britain was allied 'with both the Japanese and the French.
France could provide badly needed capital for duelling the degenerating
domestic situation in Russia. The British on the other hand, were also
concerned about German advances in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, for
the British lessening the tensions over the situation in Afghanistan
provided the opportunity to solve a dispute which had almost erupted
into open warfare several times in the past.4
The Anglo-Russian Entente was concluded on 31 August, 1307. It
provided for zones of influence. Persia was divided into three zones:
the northern portion being reserved for the Russians, the southeast
for the British and sandwiched between them, "a belt left open for
concessions between them".5 The Persians were not included in the
agreement but both Russia and Britain agreed that the country's
integrity should be respected. Gordon Craig writes,
As for Persia, while emphasizing their intention of preserving the country's
independence and assuring other nations that their commercial rights would be
^Craig, 434. and Bruce R. Kuniholm, 131.
^William L. Langer, An Encyclo pedia of World Historu , 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1972), 897.
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respected, they proceeded to divide it into three zones. The British were acknowledged
to have a virtual protectorate over the southernmost of these.... Each power agreed not
to seek economic concessions in the area allotted to the other; and together they tacitly
agreed to bar Germany from Persia as a whole The Anglo- Russian agreement was
one more example of the high-handedness of the imperialistic powers when dealing
with backward countries.
By the time of the signature of the Anglo-Russian Entente, there
were sevenal trends obvious in the great powen competition. The
Russians were interested in expansion to the south for trade,
territory, and to offset the interests of the Germans. At the same time
their domestic situation was in difficult balance, having undergone a
revolution in 1905 the Tzar's power base was tentative.'7 ''After 1905,
however, the Russians pressured internally, and reacting to the
alliance of the Central Powers in Europe, began to reassess their
policies in the Near East and the relationship with Great Britain.
"
a The
British also had several reasons to be concerned about the region.
First was the protection of their interests in India. A safe and secured
Persia was considered a vital interest. Second was the control of
Russian expansion to the south. And, as indicated above, a third
concern was the control of German influence. Although Iran had
granted an oil exploration concession to an Australian in 1901, it was
not considered critical at the time of the Anglo-Russian Entente since
there was no certainty of oil in the area. Oil was not discovered in the
6Craig, 434.
^Theodore YonLaue in YYh u Lenin? Whu Stalin?: A Rea p praisal of the Russian Revolution .
1 9Q0- 1 950
,
(New York: Lippincott. 1 971 ) treats the 1 905 revolution as a minor event.
However he hastens to point out that even though there va3 no transfer of power, the Tzar's regime
came to the brink of collapse and Nicholas II was forced to grant concessions to the people. He was
forced to grant basic civil liberties and form the Duma.
8Masch, 33.
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region until 1908, at that timQ the British became grateful because thy
all reserves were located in their zone of influence.
^
American policy toward Iran during this period was very limited.
Aside from a Presbyterian Church founded in 1835, the United States
had little contact until its first diplomatic mission in 1883. "The American
government had no intention of challenging Britain's primacy in the Near
East ana the American mission in Persia assumed only a passive
role." 10 The Persians, on the other hand, were interested in obtaining
American support. Iran maae -numerous attempts to develop ties with
the US. William Morgan Shuster headed the first financial mission to
Iran. The State Department went to great effort to downplay the
Shuster mission. "Shuster unfortunately managed to irritate the
Russians by doing a good job in Iran ana finally was forced out by
Russian pressure on Tehran. The Russian demand for the ouster of
Shuster was supported by London which still needed Russian
cooperation in European politics." 1 1
B. Anglo-Soviet Competition; Communists on the Scene
The second period that should be closely examined is the era
which followed the Bolshevik seizure and consolidation of power and
the building of the Soviet Union. The 'Great War' and the events
surrounding it had great significance for Britain, Russia and Persia.
^Discussed at length in Arlyn B. Wasserberg, Politics of Soviet Interference: Soviet
Foreign Policy Towards Iran /Ph.D. Dissertation: City University of Hew York, 1 979) and in






Needless to say, the signature of the Anglo-Russian Entente did not
herald the end of competition in Persia. Russian and later Soviet troops
vvene to occupy portions of Iran. The British, with the discovery of oil
did not seek to nelinguish any form of control. In fact the formation of
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company served as a mechanism to secure
control. Iran, for- its part, continued to seek third party involvement
from the United States to offset the British and the Soviets. For- the
newly created Soviet Union, the addition of Marxist-Leninist ideology
became the newest element in the traditional J6reat Game', 'Persia
was now seen as a key to a general Marxist revolution in Asia. Soviet
Policy toward Persia (Iran) from 1317 to Stalin's death in 1953 can be
characterized as a series of attempts to gain control of Iran through
the use of local Communist groups, at times with the backing of Soviet
military force." 12 By the end of this period Soviet and British forces
were to invade, and install leadership favorable to thein occupation,
British fears of Russian subversion and interference in internal
Persian affairs were coupled with the fear of expansionist aims. The
Persian revolution which had begun in 1905 and led to the formation of
the first national assembly or maji'fs in July 1906, erupted into civil war
by 1908. The Russians were opposed to reforms, brought by the first
Persian constitution which the Shah was fonced to sign on 7 October
1906. To Russia, this meant that there might be a loss of influence. The
Shah, with Russian assistance, attempted a coup d'etat in December
1
^U.S. Ccmgre33. Joint Economic Committee. "The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the
Soviet Union" , by William H. Cooper , Congressional Research Office, Joint Committee Print,_A
Compendium of Papers dealing with the Economic Consequences of the Revolution in Iran .
Was hi ngto n D .C. : Gove r nme nt P ri nti rig Offi ce , 1980.
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1907, A second attempt was successful in June 1303. Russia reversed
its position and with British support invaded northern Persia in March
1909. The civil war had centered around the Azerbaijan city of Tabriz
which the Russians liberated for the nationalist forces. Royalist forces
supported the 5hah. In July, he was deposed when nationalist forces
took Tehran. Russian troops remained in Persia for two more yearsJ 3
The outbreak of the World War in Europe found Persia weak,
defenseless and unable to enforce her own neutrality. The war in Iran
is described as "... a hotbed of intrigues of Russian, British, and
German diplomats and agents. In the northwest of the country Turkey
and Russia maneuvered for position, and a Turkish force advanced half
the distance from Baghdad to Tehran before being defeated by the
Russians." 14 The revolutions of March and October 1917 in Russia
marked a significant change. The Bolsheviks now assumed the role of
new tzars under Lenin. Following the second revolution in November,
the Bolsheviks began a withdrawal of all troops. This coincided with
the 'The Decree of Peace' issued by the All Russian Congress of
Soviets on the same day as their assumption of power.
In terms of Soviet foreign relations the transfer of power from
the Tzarists to the Bolsheviks is significant, in that it marked the
withdrawal of Russia from the traditional practices of diplomacy
followed by the Great Powers. The Bolsheviks called for a just and
democratic peace without annexations. Instead of relying upon
1 %asserberg, 45. Langer, 966. and Masch 35. Each of these works discusses this period
in detail although there i3 3ome minor deviation in precise dates.
1 4Dona1d M. Wilber, Iran: Past and Present , 9th ed. (Princeton NJ, Princeton University
Press, 1981), 72.
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treaties and the maintenance of status quo, the ideological orientation
of the Marxism-Leninism was an appeal for continued revolution, Adam
Ulam explains that the Decree emPodied two themes: "a general appeal
to all governments on Pehalf of peace, couched in democratic
phraseology; and a revolutionary appeal, going over the heads of
governments to the working masses of the warring countries, and also
by implication, to the imperial possessions of the great powers" 15 The
Bolshevik withdrawal from the war marked the beginning of a period of
consolidation under the new Soviet regime.
The Soviets considered the Near East an important factor in
their policy considenations and issued statements by which they
sought to co-opt the Persian government. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
contained pnovisions for the withdrawal of Russian troops fnom
Pensia. Further guarantees came later, by denouncing all Tzarist
privileges in Persia and releasing Persia fnom debts. Motivation for
these actions were both short and long term. It is obvious that the
Soviet Union sought to gain the confidence and sympathy of the
Persian government. Short term requirements called for undermining
the British and French participation in the Russian civil war by winning
o\'qp the Persian government. For the long term, the intention was to
1
^Adam B. Ulam, Ex pansion and Coexistence. Soviet Foreign Pol ion . 1 91 7- 1 975 ,2nd ed,
(New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1 974), 52. Also helpful in examining the early period of
Soviet Foreign Policy is George Kennan's Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin
,
(Boston:
Little Brown and Co., 1961).
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create a buffer between the British and Soviet territories in South
West Asia. ] 6
There is another significant factor. Moscow's interest in Iran
intensified because ideology was now added to the long range goals,
After the communist revolution, a spirit of increasing disillusionment
evolved in Moscow, which led to increasing interest in the east. "Lenin
and his supporters had assumed that the socialist revolution in
Moscow would encourage socialists elsewhere to revolt thereby
toppling the capitalist regimes in Western Europe within a matter of
months. Instead, the communists in turn were defeated, and toward
the end of World War I the allies joined forces to invade Russia and
intervene on behalf of the White Forces." 1 -7 Extending the revolution
to the east was a way of legitimizing their ideology and of undermining
the British presence in Persia.
The British sought to protect their interests in India, Afghanistan
and southern Persia in several ways. First, they hoped to pressure the
Soviets through the intervention in the Russian civil war. Second,
through the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement they sought to co-opt the
Persians. However, the majlis refused to ratify this agreement. This
effort was consistent with the British method of operating throughout
the period of great power diplomacy.
1
^Masch, 46. and Kennan, 37-50. Kennan discusses the significance of the Allied
intervention in the north where the American contingent wa3 deployed. It is important to consider
the significance of the Allied intervention in total context to the Soviets. They were challenged in
the north and Archangel and Murmansk, in the south and in the far east at Vladivostok. The Allied
intervention remains a significant Soviet propaganda tool.
1 Avasser berg, 49.
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The Persians, pragmatically, cooperated with both the Soviets
and the British. British oil Interests continued to be recognized as an
important factor in the countries economic development, and continued
through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Relations with the Soviets
continued to be built. Following Reza Khan's seizure of power, one of
the first actions was to sign a treaty of Friendship on 26 February
1926. Although this treaty formally renounced Soviet ambitions in Iran
by repudiating all Tzarist rights and agreements, it left a loophole for
Soviet intervention. 18
In summary, this second period is noteworthy because of the
fundamental change in Russia's approach to its foreign relations, not
only toward Persia, but on the entire spectrum of interstate relations.
This change was primarily due to the Bolshevik revolution and seizure
of power. British policy consistently sought to protect its holdings in
India and exploit, through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the natural
resources in Iran. The United States, consistent with its isolationist
stance in general, was not a major player. Although the U.S. did provide
advice. Internal developments in Iran centered on the rise of the
Pahlavi dynasty, as Reza Shah slowly consolidated power and
attempted to build a nation. "One writer has described the situation in
1 8 Kuniholm and liasch both discuss this treaty. Masch quotes Articles Y and Yl which
state.
. . "if a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurptation by means of armed
intervention in Persia, or if such power should desire of use Persian territory as its base of
operation against Russia. . .and if the Persian government should not be able to put a stop to such a
menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russian troops shall have the right to
advance into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operation necessary
for defense. Russia, however, shall withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the
danger has been removed." pp.47. This clause was latter U3ed to justify the intervention of Soviet
Forces in 1941.
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Iran betwQen 1925 and 1941 as an 'armed truce' between the powerful
forces of Iranian nationalism, conservative British imperialism, and
dynamic Soviet communism, Better than anyone, the Shah understood
that he had to rely on third powers as counterweights against
them/' 19 The 5hah managed to successfully involve thind panties. This
is evidenced by the Millspaugh mission fnom the US and the expansion
of economic ties with Genmany. He continued attempts to consolidate
his powen base in the Muslim nationalities.
C. World War II: Intervention and the Rise of US Interests
The significance of this period is the increasing involvement of
the United States in Iran. From an isolationist stance in the pre-World
War II period, US foreign policy developed to a position where Iran, as
the pivot point of South West Asian power, became a key in our
strategy of containing Soviet expansionism in the Cold War. This
period also marks the end of British preeminence in its former colonies,
Soviet foreign policy, under Stalin's hand and in the wake of the
formation of Peoples democracies in Eastern Europe, turned decisively
more aggressive in obtaining and holding territory. Iran continued to be
influenced and controlled by outside powers.
The first important factor which must be examined is the growth
of German influence in Iran. The Shah, as stated above, was interested
in controlling third power influence in his nation. One way to do this
was to expand ties with other nations. Whereas the Americans were
19Kuniho1m, 136.
37
reluctant to break their post VVVVI isolationist barrier, the Germans,
restricted by the settlements of VVVVI, were eager to extend ties.
Faramarz S. Fatemi details the expansion of German-Iranian economic
ties before the Second World War. He explains how German
companies developed into important resources for Iranian economic
development from the signature of The German-Iranian treaty of
friendship in 1929 to collaboration in muntions production in 1941, In the
last days of the Weimar "Republic, the German share of Iranian foreign
trade was only 8 percent. This percentage increased guicWy from 27
percent in 1936-37 to 40 percent in 1939-40, "During this same time,
Soviet Iranian trade fell into a slump. The Soviet Union accounted for
35.5 percent of all Iranian Foreign trade from 1936 to 1937; by 1939-40
the Soviet share had diminished to 0.5 percent, a result of the lapsing
of the commercial treaty in June 1938. . ,".20
As a result, the British most certainly watched these
developments carefully as a threat to their interests. The Soviets on
the other hand were concerned in several ways. The Soviet signature
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1940 was primarily motivated to
secure the sovereignty of the state and buy time. Moscow's strategy
as "directed at enhancing its security, spreading communism, and
diminishing the influence of others in Persian affairs. . . security along
its southern flank still loomed large in its relations with Iran as did to
secure a warm water port in the Mediterranean and/or Persian
Gulf."d1 The Non-aggression Pact allowed for Soviet basing close to
20 rgramarz 5. Fatemi , The USSR in Iran
,
(Cranbury, NJ: Barne3 and Co, 1 980) , 1 6.
^Wasserberg, 63.
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the Turkish Straits and recognized the Soviet interest in the Persian
Sulf area. On 22 June 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union; Stalin soon
became concerned about the German presence in the south.
The joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of Inan was triggered by the
Shah's failure to comply with Allied reguests to depont the Senman
specialists living in the countny and working for the Trans-Iranian
railway. Moscow had joined with London following the Nazi invasion of
the Soviet Union. Even though Iran had declared its neutrality in 1939.
The Anglo-Soviet intervention was designed to end Nazi influence in
Iran. Several additional factors warrant mentions as well. No doubt,
the Trans-Iranian railway was also considered an important objective
as a supply route. So was protecting the strategic Iranian oil fields and
shoring up protection of British interests in India. 22 The invasion also
forced the Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son.. Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi. Terms of the invasion and occupation were agreed upon with
the signature of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, 29 Jan 1942. Iran
acknowledged the presence of foreign troops, while both Britain and
the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw within 6 months of the end of
hostilities.
It is the Tripartite Treaty that became the significant tool for
American involvement in Iran at this stage. Iran could no longer use
German involvement use as a buffer for Anglo-Soviet competition in its
territory. The Iranians, keeping in mind the 1907 partition of the nation
llh number of authors cover tm'3 period in detail. Kenneth L. Hetrick, The United Nation;
as a National Foreign Policu Instrument: The Iranian Case of 1 946 , (Ph.D. dissertation: Rutgers
University, 1979), 43-50. Fatemi, 17-23. Kuniholm, 138- 140. and Langer, 1309.
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into three spheres of influence, were concerned with the long term
possibilities of the Anglo-Soviet occupation. In concent with ear-lien
tactics the new Shah sought Amenican assistance to guarantee
favorable tenms of the Allied occupation. The United States was
reluctant to become involved in the tnaditional balance of power
stnuggle. The US pnefenned instead to suppont only the wan cause with
its lend-lease pnognam. The United States was providing 40,000
troops, sent to work the supply noute into the Soviet Union for- wan
lend-lease items. As the siege of Stalingnad continued throughout the
winter- of 1942-43 international effonts to suppont the Soviet defense
continued. No US resolution to influence the Inonian situation was made.
It was not until the Tehnan Conference in November, 1943 that the
United States reacted. "It is obvious that the declaration (/nefenning to
the 'Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran' signed at the
Tehnan Conference) sprang from American initiative, that it
uneguivocally bound the US to safeguard Iran's independence, and that
it was gneeted (by the Inanian people) with gneat enthusiasm."23
Thenefone it was by the end of 1943 that the US had committed itself
to helping Inon.
Tnacing the pattenns of influence of the superpowers in
international relations, Rouhollah Ramazani offens a different
perspective. His dnalysis is that "the young Shah, however, had every
intention of involving the US power and influence in Iran. The '-.van, he
P.new had bneached the tnaditional US isolationism . . . between then and
23 Hetrick, 57.
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the rise of Musaddeq to power in 1951, the Shah single-mindedly used
every possible method to deepen the US stakes in Iran.''24 While this
may be true from the Shah's perspective, the national interest of the
United States was not strictly influenced by his efforts, In 1342,
Cordell Huil, the Secretary of State, wrote in a memorandum.:
"American Policy is in no way motivated by considerations of self
interest but solely toward the furtherance of the common foundations




Perhaps it is true that in the early stages the national interest of
the United States was motivated by a general concenn for world order.
To Roosevelt, idealistically, a strong post-war inan was an additional
hope for a lasting peace and secure world. However, with the granting
of oil rights to American companies later in the war and the option for
increasing the number of contracts with the British withdrawal in the
post-war period, American interests developed more in the economic
realm. American oil interests were not all centered in Iran. During the
interwar period, American investment centered in the the Saudi
kingdom. A balance of power in the region which would secure the
American economic interests was seemingly important. Iran became
one facet of the balance. The other facet became containing the
Communist threat from the Soviet Union.
24Rouhollah K. Ramazani , The United States and Iran: Patterns of Influence , (New York:
Praeger, 1982), 8.
25q uotedin Kuniholm, 157.
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During the occupation of Iran, the Soviet Union had established a
troop presence in the northern territories, specifically Azerbaijan. In
retrospect, it is easy to see that with the occupation the Soviets
began to establish in Azerbaijan some of the same mechanisms which
were later used in the creation of the 'People's democracies' in
Eastern Europe. It appears that the Moscow's aim was to eventually
Sovietize the region. Measures which were later to be effectively
used in ensuring Soviet control in East Europe included; the
establishment of the Communist Party, establishing a joint stock
company and stationing the Red Army in the region. At the close of the
war in 1945, the Iranians insisted that the Soviets withdraw their
troops. They also made the same demands of the British and American
forces. The Americans and the British complied, but the Soviets did not.
In fact, it was quite the reverse as they strengthened their troop
presence. This Soviet attempt to gain control was not resolved until
January 1946, when Iran finally brought the matter to the UN Security
council for resolution.2^
By the end of the Second World War the United States was
firmly committed to a position in Iran, due to both our evolving strategy
of containment and because of invitations from the Shah. The Soviet
Union, as in other border areas, attempted to assert control by the
^Thomas Hammond, in Anatomu of a Communist Takeover
.
(New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1971). 1-47,638-644 identifies several features which are typical in cases of Soviet
style communist takeovers. They include: the use of the Red Army, attempts to win over the local
population through building a communist party, and attempts at building a broad based coalition
government or national front. As show in Alvin 2. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy toward Turkey . Iran
.
and Afghanistan
. (New York: Praeger, 1 982), 62-65. The Soviets attempted to employ some of
these methods in Iran to consolidate their power position.
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building ngutral pro-Soviet buffers. The Soviets initially accepted US
presence in Iran as a matter of wartime need; the US was a key
ingredient in their turn at Stalingnad with lend-lease equipment But as
the war, drew to an end the United States presented a challenge to
the traditional problem of offsetting third power involvement. In the
ideological realm, Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology was shifting from
the theory of 'socialism in one country' to Stalin's 'two camp' theory. In
the Soviet context, the 'two camp' concept meant that there was no
actor -who could remain neutral.27 In Iran, this meant that either the
country would become a member of the camp, or it would be a member
of the opposition. If Iran belonged to the Capitalist camp, then it was
considered an enemy posed to strike at the southern flank.
D. The Cold War
This section will examine the machinations and changes of
Soviet-American-Iranian relations from the end of the Second World
War until the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy. The consolidation of
positions and drawing of battle lines for the cold war was a process
which lasted from the end of WWII until the 'war' was in full swing by
1947. The Cold War between the Capitalist and Socialist camps, in the
terminology of Marxism-Leninism, continued until detente between the
superpowers in the early 1970s. This section will examine the positions
and competition between Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States
27wasserberg, 72.
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from the end of the Second World Wan until the beginning of the
Islamic revolutionary period.
Thene are a number of trends which developed during this period.
First, is the retreat of the British from South West Asia. Second, the
internal changes, in Iran as the Shah grew more knowledgeable and
consolidated power. Iran developed from a constitutional government
back to the state of monarchy, while most other nations in the post
WWII world were doing the opposite. Nationalist sentiment
factionalized and eventually was destroyed as the Shah managed to
disassemble the Nationalist Fnont Government. U.S. interests slowly
surged to a peak as a new President came to the nation's helm in the
post-war period and successive administrations each considered Iran
an important pivot point in our strategy of containment of the
communist threat. For their part, the Soviet Union initially was
defeated in her attempt to takeover in Azerbaijan and remained an
outcast until after Stalin's 1953 death. A period of normalization
followed until 1963 and the beginning of a new era of cooperation and
friendship, based primarily on economic ties.
The first event to highlight the head to head rivalry over Iran
following the war, was the 1946 Azerbaijan crisis. According to the
assurances of the Tripartite Treaty, the Armed Forces of the
occupying nations were to depart Iran shortly after the settlement of
hostilities. The Soviets refused to do so, or more properly refused to
answer while waiting to consolidate socialist power in the region. The
newly created United Nations, legacy of the pre-war League of
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Nations, had been formed and was about to meet its first test in
international diplomatic crisis mediation, Iran brought its complaint to
the U.N. against Soviet presence in March 1946. Although it could be
disputed that the United Nations was responsible fon the Soviet
Union's withdrawal fnom its position in Iran, it did become the forum for
the mediation of this settlement. Some form of cnedit must be given to
Iran's new premier, Ahmad Qavam, who negotiated with Stalin and in
the United Nations. In February 1946 Qavam spent time in Moscow
trying to deal with the Knemlin. Adam Ulam says that he was forced to
listen to "Soviet intimations as to how the crisis might be resolved. . ,
They no longer wanted an oil concession in northern Inan but would be
satisfied with a 'joint company' of the type now being installed in their
Eunopean satellites, 5 1 per cent of the shares being owned by the
USSR and 49 by Iran/ 128 Qavam's goal during this visit was most likely
totry and placate Stalin. He did acguiesce to their demands for a joint
oil company. Furthermore, he assured Moscow of the reauired support
in the majlis to pass approval for a joint stock company. Qavam's style
of diplomacy was also backed by the Bnitish and Americans bilaterally
to the Soviets and in the United Nations.29
Iran's tactics in the United Nations were successful and the
Soviets pulled out of the northern province. Azerbaijan was returned
to Iranian control on 13 June 1946. Several implications were evident in
this action. For Iran, who continued to be plagued by outside
28Ulam, 426.
29Rubiri3tein, 62-65. Discussion of the effects of Stalin's "Imperialist Policies" tovard
Iran.
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intervention in its internal affairs and by a relatively weak internal
government, the success marked the support of various nationalist and
tribal factions internally and the suppont of the US and Britain
externally. The Iranian communist party, the Tudeh, as might be
expected, opposed thwarting Moscow's attempts.30 As one author
commented,
Allied negotiations demonstrated that high-minded principles and diplomatic
conferences were ineffective in deterring the Soviet's ambitions to secure their
southern flank and acquire a springboard to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle
East. Just as historical aspirations there had resulted on Britain's many attempts to
limit them, so contemporary evidence that Russia was pursuing its traditional goals
had the same effect upon the United States. 3
1
The US was becoming mone aware of the full impact of dealing with
the Soviets. The end nesult of this cnisis also demonstrated how
effective American suppont and aid could be in dealing against the
Soviet thrust.
In Iran, the results of this confrontation became apparent in 1947,
First, the Majlis voted down the Soviet joint stock oil venture. Stalin
down played the crisis, preferring instead to emphasize Soviet goals on
to other fronts. The Soviets were deeply involved in China and Eastern
Europe. Second, the beginning of the Marshall plan and Truman
Doctrine added to Soviet problems of control in the satellites. Iran was
in the process of developing closer ties with the United States seeking
*"U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Iran's Foreign Policu: Perspectives and
Pro j ections , by Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Congressional Research Office, Joint Committee Print, A
Compendium of Papers dealing with the Economic Consequences of the Revolution in Iran.




security and assistance. The United States continued the efforts by
sending a Military mission and extending new arms sales to man.
It was obvious that Iran was tilting more and mone toward the
United States, especially after the publication of their seven yean
economic development plan in 1949, The Shah increasingly saw
Amenican support as a way fon Inan to become powerful. However, as
this tilt became mone obvious, thene were those in Iran who were
against such moves towand foreign influences. Meanwhile, the Shah did
not understand the growing resentment of the majlis. Forming the
basic opposition to the ShalVs plans, the National Front favored
nationalization of the nation's oil resources. Among them, as leader of
the coalition, was Mohammed Mossadea who was named premier in
1951. Lawrence Ziring describes him as experienced and dedicated, but
furthermore . . .''Sensitive to foreign penetration, he had made the
elimination of foreign influence in the country his main preoccupation.
Thus his intense desire to Iranianize the country's oil industry."^ on
30 April 1951, the majlis ashed Mossadea to take the seat of premier.
He quickly and with full approval of the parliament began to nationalize
the oil resources.
Nationalization of the oil resources had grave affects on the
British. "The British had made the mistake of treating the oil dispute in
commercial terms, believing that the demands for nationalization were
staged by the Iranian negotiators in a clever move to strengthen their
hand . . . For the Iranian people the conflict with the British was a
32Ziring, 62.
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national revolution against foreign Qxploitation and domination."00 In
soma ways this was a precursor to the fate which befell the United
States yeans later. Alienated, extremist and strongly nationalistic
forces were at work in Iran. Internal opposition to the Shah, and his
policies of relying upon foreign resources, was developing into a major
stumbling block. Britain brought their case to the International Court of
Justice, arguing that the Iranian moves were unfair. Premier
Mossadeq spent time in the United States and at the World Court
stating the position of his country. Their position was that
nationalization of the oil industry was an internal matter, and therefore
did not fall under the jurisdiction of the world court, In July 1952 the
Count ruled for the Iranians. Iran followed laten by breaking diplomatic
relations with Britain.
The British position at this point was tenuous. One of their
options was to enlist the assistance of the United States- which they
did. Under President Truman the U.S. course had been to resist strong
reactions. Truman's option was to send Averell Harriman to attempt a
mediated solution. This aroused the anger of the Soviet supported
communist party, the Tudeh, causing fur-then domestic political
problems in Iran.
President Eisenhower's election henalded a new course in US
Foreign policy. His 'New Look' strategy had several features, but his
basic belief was . . /'the world balance of power- (is) so delicately poised





, .As Elsenhower put it . , ,'As there is no weapon
so small, no arena too remote, to be ignored; there is no free nation too
humble to be forgotten."34 President Eisenhower's Secretary of.State
was John Foster Dulles. In the Eisenhower administration, Dulles was
to set the tone for foreign policy. Dulles believed that it was possible
to know and understand Soviet intentions by understanding the
writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. To Dulles, the Soviet plan was clear,
orchestrated and finely tuned, the goal of which was to take over
countries one by one.
Given the administrations proclivity to see the Soviet Union at
work behind the Mossadeq government, it is not difficult to understand
their actions in support of the British position and against the Iranian
government. US ideological and world order interests deemed vital the
overthrow of the Iranian constitutional government. Eisenhower moved
to cut off aid to Iran until the oil dispute was settled. When this action
did not work, a boycott of Iranian by the British and Americans was
instituted. Iranian financial assets in London and in the United States
were frozen. Rouholah K. Ramazani writes,
As a result, Dr. Musaddiq's inability to compromise with the British; the
deteriorating economic conditions of Iran; the rise of the Tudeh pover; the American
cold war fear of the possibility of a 'communist coup in Iran; and particularly the
coming into power of Conservatives in Britain and the Republicans in Washington, the
long standing British call for the overthrow of the Musadiq government began to find a
more sympathetic ear in Washington. The CIA assisted the Shah and his supporters in
overthrowing the Musadiq government and bringing back the Shah who had fled the
country.35
34Gaddis, 130.
35|J.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, by Rouhollah K. Ramazani , p?2.
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On 22 August 1353 thQ Shah was restored to power by loyalists, the
Military, the Police and with outside assistance from the US
government. The Eisenhower administration moved to continue a $45
million economic assistance program.
There are several lessons which can be learned from the 1953
overthrow of the Mossadeq government. First, the United States
began a build up in Iran, with economic development and military
assistance programs. This was considered a way of securing our
containment policy. Second, domestic opposition to the Shah was
shattered. The Tudeh was outlawed, its cells broken and those
supporters in the military eliminated. The American CIA began a period
of close association with the Shah's security force, the 5AVA.K. For
the American Central Intelligence Agency, this alignment would later be
a potential blind spot during the Islamic revolution. Perhaps most
significant was the development of the Shah's personal power base,
supported by the secret police, the massive military build up and, of
course, the silenced vocal opposition. A number of authors have
identified one more significant factor. As Lawrence Ziring 'writes, "In
the minds of the people SAVAK symbolized the hated monarchy, as well
as the role played by the United States in sustaining the Shah."36 This
symbolism was later to extend beyond just the SAVAK, and as Iranians




SoviQt interests in iron rQmained consistent throughout this
period. However, with the emergence of a authoritarian, pro-American
Shah at the head of the Iranian government, it became increasingly
difficult fon the Soviets to penetnate Iran. Oddly, for some reason
neither the Soviet Union nor the Tudeh, provided Mossadeq with
support during the closing days of his regime.37
For the nemainden of the 1950s and until 1963 the Soviet goal in
Iran was similar to their position with the west, one of ""peaceful
coexistence". Moscow made moves towards the Iranian monarchy, but
Inan was tilting further and further into the western camp. In 1955, Inan
became a member of the Baghdad pact and in 1959 signed a biiatenal
defense pact with the United States.38 Throughout this period the
Soviet's chief fear was that Iran would allow the United States to
establish bases for nuclear weapons on Iranian soil. In turn, the United
States strengthened the Shah's power and helped build his confidence.
In 1955, '/./hen the Soviets criticised Iran's signature to the Baghdad
pact, Iran was unmoved. Later, in 1959, Iran made it known that it no
longer necognized the 1921 pact it had signed with the Soviet Union.
The Iranian policy of maintaining distance from the Soviet Union
changed in 1962. According to C.D.S. Dnace-Francis, a member of the
British Diplomatic service in Iran from 1967-71, the assurance of the
Iranian Foneign Ministry to the Soviet government in September 1962,
that Iran would not serve as a potential missile base of any type, was




relations. It should also be noted, that at the same time as relations
with the Soviet Union were improving, the Shah was taking a more
independent course from the United States. The United States began to
phase out economic and military aid. Irano-Soviet agreements which
followed fell into three categories: "Soviet assistance for development
projects In Inan; Iranian gas and oil exports to the Soviet Union; and the
promotion of Irano-Soviet trade."39
While there are numerous reasons for the rekindling of Soviet
and Iranian relations, there are four basic categories which led to their
rapprochement. First, the Soviet Union had broken with China. This
was a major event. Given traditional Russian fears of encirclement,
Soviet strategy was to seek ties with Iran to offset possible challenges
from China. Second, the Shah had been strengthened by his relationship
with the U.S. Like his father, he was concerned about becoming too
closely linked with any outside party. Given the spirit of peaceful
coexistence and followed by the new period of detente, the Shah had
the opportunity to seek a separate course from the U.S. Third, the
Shah set upon a course of rapid internal modernization that required
industrial support. The Soviets, always looking for sources of hard
currency and consistent with the Soviet development model, were
willing to provide this support. Fourth, the Soviets needed an additional
source of energy. Iran, with massive natural gas reserves, was able
to provide this support. Natural gas from Iran and Afghanistan was
used in the Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. To the
39C.D.S. Drace- Francis, "Irano-Soviet Economic Relations 1962-1983" . Asian Affairs:
Journal of the Roual Societu for Asian Affairs XVI (February 1985): 54.
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Soviets, it became cheaper to import this energy than to pipe it in from
their own sounces in Siberia.4u
The chart below illustrates the growth of trade between the
Soviet Union and Iran during the period 1970 to 1977.41
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As the Soviet Union managed to improve its ties with Iran, so too
did some of the Eastern bloc nations, notably Czechoslovakia. Eastenn
European goals also concerned the Iranian natural gas reserves.
When it became impossible in the late 1950s and early 1960s to attempt
to further political measures the Soviets turned to economic
cooperation. Economic cooperation was beneficial to both the Soviet
Union and to Inan. The Soviets may have been trying to lure Iran away
from the United States. However, the Shah preferred to stay in the
'
40Cooper, 163.
41 National Foreign Assessment Center. Communist Aid to the Les3- Developed Countries.
1 977. Central Intelligence Agency. Washington D.C. November 1 978, 8- 1 0. as quoted in Cooper,
165.
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western camp at least for the time being. Drace-Francis calls this
rapid development of economic ties a paradox, given the Shah's
avowedly pro-Western stance. It came about partly because he was
dissatisfied with American aid performance under President Kennedy
(who was demanding internal reform as a price for continued US help).
The Shah also wanted to assert his independence at a time of
increasing detente, and demonstrate that he was as eleven as othen
thind world leadens in playing off the supenpowens against one another
fon his country's benefit.
Alvin Rubinstein points out that Soviet-lnanian relations reached
thein apex between 1968 and 1978. This was especially tnue in the
economic sphene. While politically the counse of Inano-Soviet relations
improved slowly but steadily, economic agneements brought both sides
profits at a faster pace. The only exception to this amenable counse of
economic relations was an incident oven natunal gas in 1974-75.
Politically, nelations wene both peaceful and antagonistic. But
considening the long 1,200 mile bonden between the nations, relations
continued relatively safe and peaceful. The main destabilizing aspect
dealt with the Soviet arms build up in Inag and Soviet designs towands
Afghanistan. The Soviets wene dismayed with Inan's massive US
supplied anms build up, thein stnategy towands becoming the policeman
of the Pension Gulf, and granting penmission to the US fon intelligence
gathening sites on Inanian tennitony. It is Rubinstein's thesis that
Despite different systems and antithetical ideologies, theg (Iran and the USSR)
developed valued economic relations, kept their border quiet, and handled their
regional rival rg pragmatically and prudently. Each derived benefit from the
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normalized relationship, and Moscow must have watched the fall of the Shah with
mingled uneasiness and expectancy. **2
U.S. strategy for coping with the Soviet threat moved from
containment to detente through the 1960s and into the 1970s. The U.S.
continued to build its relationship with Iran, slowly becoming closely
identified with the Shah's regime. When the United States and Iran
signed the 1959 bilateral agreement it was agreed that . , ."the
Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the preservation and integrity of
Iran. •''43 From this point on the relationship between the United States
and Iran became increasingly complicated in a web of intertwined and
difficult issues. As the Shah gained and consolidated his personal
power, he also was able to exert more pressure on the United States.
The national interest on the United States is the product of a complex
series of decisions made in a pluralistic democratic political process. In
contrast to Iran, under the hand of the autocratic Shah, and to the
oligarchy of the Soviet Union, the national interest of the U.S. in the
period preceding the revolution was a product of several factors,
American strategy towards the Soviets and the Persian Gulf was
complicated by (Ij The strategic importance of Persian Gulf oil to the
United States and its allies. (2) Our increasingly complex interest in
arms transfers to Iran as she became the foundation of U.S. Persian
42 Rubinstein, 73-96.
43 U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. "The United States and Iran: An Overview"
,
by Bernard Reich. Congressional Research Office. Joint Committee Print, A Compendium of Paper;
dealing with the Economic Consequences of the Revolution in Iran . Washington DC: Government
Printing Office, 1980, 6.
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Gulf sQcurity. (3) The issue of economic aid and economic reform in Iran.
(4) The domestic political process of the United States considering the
effects of Administration changes and the Vietnam War on American
policy.
It is beyond the scope of the discussion to examine, in detail, each
of the above factors. However, it is important to examine the subtle
changes in the national intenests of the United States as defined by
subsequent Pnesidential administrations. While the Eisenhower
administration deemed the relationship of Iran and the United States as
'vital' in 1959, our relationship was never so vital that it would have
involved escalating to the resolute use of military force.44 The
Kennedy administration did mone to define the intenests of the United
States in terms of self determination individual states. Shortly before
his death, President Kennedy said, "The interest of the United States
of America. . .is best served by preserving and protecting a 'world of
diversity in which no one power or one combination of powers can
threaten the security of the United States." In other words, by this
definition the job of American foreign policy was to pnovide for a
balance of power in the world. Nationalism, "so long as it reflected the
^4Ramazani in The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence . argues that the
United States was reluctant to enter into any military alliances which would have aggravated the
cold war or anatgonized its relationship with Israel. Instead of treaties the U.S. signed executive
agreements with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Rarnazani argues that this agreement "did not mean
any automatic U.S. defense of Iran. Iran's disappointment was only slightly tempered by the U.S.
pledge to continue economic and military assistance. It resented the strings attached to U.S. aid-
Washington called for effective "economic development" by the Shah's regime." (p 39) This clearly
agrees with Nuechterlein's explanation of how a state should seek to maximize its ideological
interests by spreading its system of values to other states. It was also in the security interest of
the U.S. to seek these agreements because it lessened the threat to the nation by avoiding the
escalation.
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45 The Kennedy administration, and the Johnson
administration which followed it, adopted the strategy of 'Flexible
Response', meeting force with equal force, This strategy was to
receive its first test in Vietnam.
Economic aid to Iran was slowly phased down. The phase out did
not effect the Iranians to a great extent, due to thein increasing
economic stability. In 1960, Iran joined dn oil consortium. OPEC, in an
attempt to control the price of oil. The Shah began to consolidate his
power bose, economically and politically. Domestic political opposition
was oppressed. SAVAK was used ds the principle tool to repress
opposition. Opposition continued with the activity of religious forces
opposed to the Shah's internal reforms. In 1363, Ayatollah Khomeini,
allied with nationalist forces, opposed the central government.
Increasingly, the opposition felt that the Shah was bowing to American
pressures. In 1964, Khomeini was sent into exile. When the U.S. ashed
for and received a Status of Forces agreement in 1964, it was cited as
further evidence of foreign control and strongly opposed by nationalist
and religious forces.46
By 1967, the Shah's 'White revolution' was in full swing. He had
managed to olmost completely drive out the opposition. Politically and
economically the country was seen as a successful example of third
world development in the United States. The Shah felt himself in total
control. U.S. economic aid was brought to a halt. Due to Iran's success
45Gaddis, 201.
^Ramazani, Influence . 39.
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and U.S. involvemont in the Vietnam war, the administration felt that
priorities were elsewhene. President Nixon was elected in 1968, and
with his administration the course of Iranian-American relations was
to change.
In July 1969, at a press conference on 6uam, Nixon announced
what was to become a Uey element of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy.
"The Kennedy and Johnson administrations had erred by making
Vietnam a symbol of American power and commitment throughout the
world. The Nixon administration, taking "advantage of its more
ecumenical definition of power, would seek to reduce Vietnam to its
proper perspective. . . and concentrate on global commitments."47 The
national interest of the United States previously had been
'universalisrn', it now became important to move away from committing
American troops to do battle in specific regional disputes. Evidenced by
public opinion in America as expressed on college campuses across the
nation, it seemed important to the Nixon Administration to remove
America from spheres of conflict. Vietnam was the most obvious
sphere.
The Nixon doctrine held that America should undertake fewer
direct commitments. We would maintain our treaty obligations and the
nuclear umbrella over the free world. At lower levels of conflict,
America would seek to assist economically and as reguired by our
treaties, but the subject nation would have to become directly involved
in self-development and self-defense.
47Gaddis, 277.
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In Vietnam this meant a policy of Vietnamization and graaual
withdrawal of American troops. In Tehran, this indicatea that based on
the country's tnemendous aavances, Nixon now considered Iran to be
the strongest and most advancea nation in the region. Inan and Saudi
Arabia were seen as the pillars of strength in the Gulf. According to
Henry Kissinger, "There was no possibility of assigning any American
fences to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam War ana its
attenaant trauma. Congress would t\a\/Q tolerated no such commitment;
the public would not have supported it. Fortunately, Iran was willing to
play this role.'"48 Iran became the shield for U.S. and western oil
interests in the Bulf. The western world was willing to pay for this
shield in oil price hikes. Subseguently, and in agreement with the new
doctrine, the U.S. ended military aia; Iran was now fully capable of
paying for its arms purchases.
Iran, however, wondered if the United States wouia be willing to
stana up to its treaty commitments, especially following the 1365 and
1971 wars between Inaia and Pakistan. The Unitea States in the South
48Henru A. Kissinger. White House Years , (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 1263.
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West Asian perspective had failed to support Pakistan.49 The Shah
sought to avoid this problem through a policy of building up his own
military forces, President Nixon did not object and upon visiting Tehran
in 1972, agreed to further- massive military sales to Inan. These
arnangements included the latest in American weapons technology,
with technical and military advisors to accompany the new systems.
Following the Shah's nationalization of oil resources in 1973 and
subsequent raise in the oil prices, the U.S. continued willingly to provide
weapons systems as a price for regional security. Between 1972 and
1975 Iran ordered $10 billion in military sales from the United States.
Ramazani describes the U.S. position as,
. . .But the point 13 that the Shahs veil -known insatiable appetite for arms was
whetted by the behavior of the Nixon Administration, not to mention the pressures of
several private arms contractors. The secretary of state kept justifying U.S. arms
49jhe question of U.S. reliability and the durability of U.S. assistance i n times of trouble
still remains in the minds of some Pakistanis. Recently the question arose following the
cancellation of sales of anti-aircraft missiles to Saudi Arabia and Jordan, members of the Islamic
Conference Organization. An editorial in a Lahore newspaper commented on open prejudice directed
against Pakistan by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee related to Pakistan's nuclear program
and human rights concerns. The article charges that a campaign sponsored by Zionist lobby
members was directed at annulling the aid program approval by the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee in 1981. ( Foreign Broadcast Information Service: South Asia ( 1 1 April 1984): F1.)
Islamabad's fears about U.S. credibility began in the 1 960s prior to the U- 2 incident and
were exacerbated during the Indo-Pak wars of 1 965 and 1 971 . The Rann of Kutch incident and the
following war in the Kashmir between Pakistan and India left Washington out in the cold. Both
warring parties felt abandoned by the deliberately planned three week limit of U.S. supplies. It is
quite possible that the 1 965 war was a boon for Soviet presence in South Asia. The Soviets played
the peacemakers by inviting Pakistan and India to the Tashkent Conference. This became the Soviet
Union's first major diplomatic initiative toward South Asia as a whole and proved remarkably
successful. The US had only played the role as arms supplier to both sides and was not visible in
settling the peace or resolving the resultant problems. The Soviet Union helped solve problems
while America was "too busy worrying about South Yietnarn and the Congo "(Stanley Wolpert, Roots
of Confrontation in South Asia
,
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1 982), 1 47.
Again, in the 1 971 war, both sides blamed Washington for "im potently refusing to take
action to avert war in South Asia" Islamabad, in reference to the 1 959 US-Pak executive
agreement, scorned the US for not acting more forcefully. According to Wolpert, "...the US3
Enterprise arrived too late, after all, and then did nothing but steam about within range of India's
eastern coastline, never launching a single nuclear missile or war plane." (Wolpert, 1 55.)
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sales primarily in broad strategic terms without regard to their adverse economic,
social, psychological and political effects.
. .In spite of his well known fondness for
linkages, Kissinger refused to link the U.S. arms sales to oil prices in a way that
would discourage the Shah's hard line oil pricing policy. . .50
US policy towards the Soviet Union beginning with the Nixon
administration and continuing to the Ford and Carter Administrations
was detente. In relations with Iran, policy nemained virtually unchanged.
Iran became an increasingly important pillar in the US strategy.
Following the closure of Turkey to CIA intelligence gathering sites in
1974, Iranian sites became of increased importance. Similarly,
increased Iranian orders for weapons systems meant U.S. jobs and
economic cooperation. U.S. industrialists took increasingly attentive
looMs at Iran. In 1975 Iran placed another $10 billion worth of orders
for American military equipment.
Ledeen and Lewis characterize the American policies as an
attempt to fill the strategic void left by the British withdrawal east of
the Suez canal in 1968. They analyze the situation as a two way
street.
Ir3n became the recipient of unprecedented amounts of American material as well as a
parallel transfer of American businessmen, families, and plants. From the American
standpoint, the goal was to make Iran the military bulwark of the region, guaranteeing
stability and ensuring that American interests would be protected. For the Shah, the
special relationship would increase the stability of his regime, add an extra dimension
of grandeur to hi3 position, and give him the opportunity to play a major role. . even
in influencing the United States. . .For every dollar the United States spent on Iranian
oil, the Iranians turned around and spent two in the United States on military material
and other goods. And the increase in Iran's level of spending in the United States
became particularly dramatic following the Nixon- Kissinger visit to Tehran in May
1 972. . . and the next year's leap in oil prices." 51
5Q Ramazani . Influences , 48.
51 Michael A. Ledeen and William H. Lewi3, "Carter and the Fall of the Shah: The Inside
Story", The Washington Quarterly , (Spring 1 930), 3.
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At thQ apex of the Iranian-American relationship in 1978 and
before the revolution a number of trends can be discerned as to the
importance of the association. Iran, as a strong military force in the
region, aided American regional influence. A strong Iran also was seen
to limit Soviet influence. Whether the fall of the Iranian monarchy led to
reduced risk for the Soviets and increased confidence of their success
in Afghanistan remains to be seen. Iranian spenaing in the U.S. was
certainly welcomed by the government and private inaustry. Given the
pronouncements of the Nixon and Carter administrations it became
almost impossible to limit arms transfers to Iran. This leads to the
conclusion that the Shah almost had a 'blank check' when it came to
spenaing in the United States. The Carter administration, aiffering
from the policies of the Nixon and Ford administrations, attempted to
link U.S. connections to human rights concerns. This policy tended to
aggravate the Iranian perception of the United States. The Iranian
opposition began to make comparisons with earlier periods of outside
interference a close analogy with the developing situation. The
pronounced American presence in Iran caused a series of internal
social and economic problems. This led to a decided anti-American
attitude there. Finally, an almost fatalistic mental attitude developed
among U.S. policy makers, which read that it was impossible to deny
Iran anything.52
In Iran, factually opposea to the perception of the relationship as
seen in the U.S., several groups opposed the Shah. Their position was
52|_edeen and Lewis discuss these issues at length in the above article and in their book
Debacle: The American Failure in Iran
,
( New York: Knopf, 1931).
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bolstered by increased emphasis on the Shah-American relationship, A
coalition of the communist party (the Tudeh), the National Front, and
religious fundamentalists, encouraged by Khomeini, formed.
Unfortunately for American geopolitical policies, U.S. remained oblivious
to these developments. In 1977, the Shah visited the United States.
President Carter "reaffirmed United States support fon a strong Iran
and pledged continued aid for Iran's economic and social progress and
programs to help meet Iran's security requirements." In January 1973,
President Cdrter returned the visit, stopping in Tehran. At that time
Carter described the Shah's leadership ds great and Iran as " . .an
island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world."53
The revolution began in earnest shortly afterwards.
E. Revolution
A brief review of the chronology of the Iranian revolution reveals
a period of increasing violence and virtual civil war throughout the
country until the Shah's depdrture in Jdnuary 1979. Both the Shah and
the United States were to suffer some form of myopia in forecasting
the growing opposition to the Pahlavi regime. The symptoms of growing
dissent hdd long been present. Yet, the Shah refused to recognize his
loss of legitimacy. The effects of the Islamic revolution and Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini's assent to power marked a major change in Iran, in
Iran's foreign policies, in the regional balance and in the relations of the
superpowers in South West Asia. The effects of the revolution
53 Reich, 8.
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extended into all spheres; political, economic and military. The
traditional monarchical power structure eroded and was destroyed.
Rather than the traditional bi-polar powen relationship in the region
there now was cleanly a tni-polan nelationship. man, linden the Islamic
councils, established itself in opposition to both the United States and
the Soviet Union. Both the U.S. and U.5.5.R. had lost their influence in
the nation by the conclusion of the cnisis. However, given the intensity
of U.S. suppont for the Shah and considening the measures of Carters
human rights pnognam, which acconding to the Inanians did little to bring
about any actual change in Inan, it appeans that the United States came
out on the shont end of the stick.
Lawnence Zining descnibes the Shah's opposition as,
"The universality of hatred tor the Shah was mirrored in the disparate, ideologically
diverse groups that coalesced to destroy him. Shiite religious leaders, tribal
minorities, bureaucrats, bazaar merchants, students, professionals, and
intellectuals; communists and liberals; laborers and peasants, sophisticated urbanites
and conservative agrarians were melded into a united front dedicated to the single
objective of liquidating the monarchy and its trappings."54
The signs of the crisis had been visible fon quite some time.
Evidenced by a senies of factors;. These included; 1) demognaphic
dislocation, 2) a lack of adequate social services, 3) the growth of a
hostile middle class, 4) the growing vacillation of the Shah, as he
consistently changed his mind about neligious freedoms and economic
pnognams, 5) concentration of strength in the hands of neligious
leadens, beginning in 1976 with pno-lslamic demonstrations, 6] the
hostility of the bazaanis, traditional merchant class; and 7) the
54Ziring, Political chronology, 167.
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noticeable capital flight as liquid assets of the upper and middle classes
were invested outside the country.55
An analysis of the effects of this revolution must consider the
three dominant perspectives involved. Iran, in the hands of Khomeini's
religious fundamentalists, the Soviet Union and the United States are
the principle actors to be considered. For Iran, the most significant
cohesive figure in the post-Shah situation is the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Khomeini is the symbolic center of the revolution. Numerous authors
have speculated upon what the future of Iran will hold once Khomeini is
dead. Ideologically, one of the most powerful influences is the Shi'i
interpretation of the contemporary world. Khomeini, as well as other
Shi'a leaders use this religious belief to base their actions in
consolidating and controlling the masses in Iran. 56 Khomeini holds that
both the United States and the Soviet Union are evil. Therefore, the
Foreign Policy of Iran is now both anti-Soviet and anti-American.
Obviously, we must asU how pragmatic it is for Iran to oppose the
Soviet Union given their 1200 mile common border and the example set
by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
Iran holds that it does not need the United States or the Soviet
Union. Economically, Iran does not need to trade with Soviet Union to
survive. The likelyhood of Soviet economic penetration in Iran is low
S^These factors are discussed at length in Ledeen and Lewis.
56j homas H. Greene in Comparative Revolutionar y Movements: Search for Theoru and
Justice
,
( Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. Prentice- Hall , 1 984) , 80. descri bes ideology as one
factor which provides the legitimacy and continuity necessary for a revolution to succeed.
Rouhollah K. Rarnazani, in "Iran's Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Projections", from which this
material was taken further explains how Shi'i Muslim interpretations of the Koran are used by
Khomeini and his followers.
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given thQir needs and current trading patterns. Iran can go around the
United States in trading equally as well. Today, Japan and West
Germany are Iran's Piggest trading partners. "More than 70% of Iran's
total imports in 1983-84 came from Canada, Japan, and Western
Europe, and more than 50% of its total exports went to these same
areas. By comparison, in the same year only 10 pen cent of man's
imponts came from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and 26 pen
cent of its exports went to the Soviet bloc."5 ' Politically, Iran has
sought to expand its ties in the third world as well as with Western
Eunope and Japan. Militanistically, Ipan acquires weapons and
ammunition on the world market, independent of eithen the United
States op Soviet Union.
Dnace-Fpancis sees the Inano-Soviet economic relationship as
having come full circle since the revolution. The napid development
seen in the last yeans of the Shah's negime has ended. Soviets experts
still work in some Soviet installed facilities; the Isfan steel mill, the
Ahwaz and Isfahan power stations and grain silos. But the growth
tnend has stopped.58 An additional facton in the Inano-Soviet
relationship is the treatment of the Tudeh. Despite the Tudeh support
given while the revolution was in full swing, the fundamentalist neligious
regime has repressed Tudeh's activities. This has caused Soviet
concern and earned Iran, Soviet criticism.
The Iran-Iraq war is another factor which must Pe considered. In
the short term this war helped build Islamic fervor in Iran. But the costs




of the war are becoming obvious. Long term these costs are taping
effect greatly exceeding the short term benefits. This war is also
cause for Soviet concern. The Soviet main goal is to prevent further
U.S. influence in the region. A long drawn out conflict provides further
opportunity for American diplomatic initiatives to bning the conflict to
an end. If this were to occur, then there would be the potential for
American political influence if the region to regenerate.
The Soviet position towards post-revolutionary Iran has both
gained and lost. It is a matter of deciding whether the Soviet Union has
come out ahead or behind. Initially following the revolution, Moscow
was one of the first nations to formally recognize Khomeini's regime.
The Soviets welcomed Khomeini and sought to establish economic and
foreign policy ties with the new government. From about the midway
point in the revolution the Soviets had determined that their own
interests would be best served if they supported the revolutionary
position. The Soviets "used every opportunity to emphasize anything
which would enhance the USSR's image while simultaneously
reinforcing the linPage between the Iranian monarchy and the United
States in an attempt to tarnish both Washington and the Shah,
Conversely, anything which would damage Moscov/s image or enhance
that of the Shah or Washington was ignoned or guicPly dismissed."59
^Howard M. Hen3el, "Moscow's Perspective on the fall of the Iranian Monarchy", Asian
Affairs: Journal of the Ro ual Society for Asian Affairs , X1Y (October 1 983) , 307. In this article
Professor Hensel discusses the changing attitudes of the Soviets based upon their press and
propaganda releases during the revolution. He concludes a distinct change from a hands off strategy
to one of support for the Islamic revolutionaries. In part I of this article in the June 1 983 issue of
Asian Affairs he states, ". . .by late autumn, Moscow seems to have concluded that the unrest in
Iran was more than a passing phenomenon and consequently decided to capitalize upon it in a
manner involving little risk to the USSR." page 1 57.
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Additionally, the Soviets were quicU to warn the United States not to
interfere. The Soviet position toward the Iran-Iraq war, though
seemingly ambivalent initially, turned less indulgent following the
commencement of hostilities.
The Soviet Union lost in several areas. As pointed out above,
economically their penetration was severely constricted. Diplomatic
relations were strained as well. The traditional instrument of Soviet
political penetration, the communist party, was initially pant of, but
subsequently cast out of the revolutionary movement. An additional
vital issue was the threat to the legitimacy of Marxist-Leninist ideology
in the Soviet Central Asian republics, which are predominantly Muslim.
Soviet losses must be balanced against their overall gains. If one
accepts the thesis that the primary Soviet goal in this region is to
offset the strength of American influence, then the revolution was a
definite gain. In terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology a loss for the
capitalist side is a gain for the socialist side, this generally strengthens'
the 'correlation of forces' on the global scale so that theoretically the
socialist side comes out ahead. Certainly, at a minimum, it can be
concluded that the revolution could be constructed as a boon for
Soviet international propaganda ploys.
Analysts have concluded several Soviet goals in the Persian Gulf
ana in relation to the Iranian revolutionary situation. The main Soviet
concern is blocking American gains. This overshadows the import role
of the revolution in undermining ideological legitimacy in Central Asia, It
is the Soviet perception that a strong American presence is designed
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to neutraiiZQ soviet presence in south west Asia and tne miaaie east.
The collapse of the pro-American Iranian monarchy thus limited the U.S.
position. The loss of American influence is also suggested as the
elimination of a potential risk for Soviet intervention in another
potentially sensitive area, Afghanistan.
Potential Soviet future objectives can therefore be determined
to be, 1) To control the future Iranian relationship with the U.S.,
through support of anti-American themes in the Iran's foreign
relations. This would be similar to Soviet actions following the crises in
the 6ilan Republic in 1920-21, the Azerbaijan crisis in 1946-47, the
Kurdish rebellion ond supporting the Baluch question in Pakistan, 2) To
control the Shi'a factor in Iran, in order to maintain legitimacy in the
Central Asian republics. This becomes a very difficult question
considering the ndture of the Islamic religion. Although Shfa factions
exist in the Central Asian Republics, they are in the minority. 3) Control
of the energy question, while Iran is a potentially good source of
energy import, given the numerous problems In Soviet domestic control,
it is difficult to see how they could effectively control Iranian
resources. However, Soviet influence in the Iranian oil question could
have far reaching impact on the world oil monket.6n
The bottom line is thot the Americcn loss become a Soviet gain.
Even considering the erosion of the Soviet position following the
•^Francis Fukuyama, "The Soviet Threat to the Persian Gulf", Rand Corporation , P-
6596 A Paper prepared for the Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific, March 1 981
.
; Fred
Hal li day, "The Middle East, Afghanistan and The Gulf in Soviet Perception", RUSI: Journal of the
Roual Services Institute for Defense Studies , 129:4 (December, 1984), 13- 18; and Lawrence
Ziring, "Political Dilemmas and Instability in South and Southwest Asia", Asian Affairs: An
American Journal
,
14 (Spring 1983), 37-47.
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DecQmber 1979 Afghanistan invasion which temporarily offset their
position vis a vis Iran, the Soviet position remains firm. Furthermore,
the American position in the 6ulf, following the Iraqi attack on Iran in
1980, the deployment of a naval task force to the Persian Gulf and
Indian Ocean, the build up of CENTCOM and the RDF, and prepositioning
equipment on Diego Garcia, is perceived to be an instrument aimed
against the Soviet Union, rather than to help the cause of peace in the
region. The Soviets want to be perceived as the peacemakers and will
undertake any strategy to see that this occurs, especially considering
their international image following Afghanistan.6 '
From the American perspective, the tramatic changes brought
by the revolution had numerous consequences. Politically, the U. S.
suffered a loss of influence in what was conceived to be a pillar of oun
strategic plan in South West Asia and the Sulf. This loss of influence,
obvious in Iran , also extended to other relationships. Several authors
hasten to point out that our failure to forcefully support the Shah may
have influenced the perception of American credibility in other regions,
Saudi Arabia and again in Pakistan.62 In U.S. domestic politics, the
collapse of US influence could be seen as decisions occasionally were
muddled by confusion in the US legislative process. For example, bitter
controversy erupted over the sale of the F-14 and advanced
technology items. Militaristically, the loss of sensitive equipment and
information is overshadowed by our loss of strategic position on the
Soviet southern frontier. The subsequent pronouncement of the
61 Halliday, 18.
62 Halliday, 18 and Reich 20.
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Carter Doctrine, following the Afghanistan invasion, and reactive
formation of CENTCOM were limited attempts to hold our ground. The
formation of CENTCOM raises the guestion of a credible conventional
deterrent to slow Soviet forceful expansion, while assuming that the
Soviets would actively seek to take terrain in Iran.63 While designed
and advertised to halt Soviet aggression, the RDF realistically can only
work against regional threats.
Economically, the major impact was the limit placed on the world
oil supply. Iran suddenly stopped exporting oil. This not only affected
the United States but put severe constraints upon our European allies,
The U.S. also suddenly lost a major importer of arms, linked with a
major market of capital goods and services. In late 1977 the U.S.
Department of Commerce described business opportunities in Iran in
these terms: "Iran's rapid economic growth has established a business
climate characterized by expansion and keen competition, which should
continue for several years to come. United States suppliers hold a
leading position in the Iranian market. , . and excellent opportunities
continue for sales of U.S. capital goods and services to Iran."64 This
loss of market resources eventually affected a growing American
global trade deficit.
Ideologically, there are several facets which can be discerned.
American observers in Washington and Tehran were taken totally by
k3jo3hua M. Epstein, "Soviet Yulnerablities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent", International
Security , 6:2 (Fall 1 981 ), 1 26- 1 58. ; and Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, "From RDF to
C E NTCOM : New C hal 1 e noes ? " , RUSi: Journal of the Ro ual Services Institute for Defense Studies ,
129:1 ( March 1 984)
,
14-17. Both authors discuss and outline the American plan for meeti ng
and fighting the Soviets in Iran to defend the oil interests of the Persian Gulf.
64Reich, 10.
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surprise. They had failed to understand the Shi'ite community's ability
to organize and manage cnisis situation. The Administration had the
tendency to over-estimate the ability of SAVAK to control Iranian
dissent. Our allies, most notably Egypt and Israel, did not suffer from
this same myopia. Israel had warned the Iranian Jewish community far
in advance of what to expect, and to leave the country. 65 However, it
could also be argued that the collapse of the monarchy and the
subseguent hostage crisis was good for America. The hostage crisis,
as religiously reported nightly by the major television networks, served
to coalesce American public opinion. The United States, torn by the war
in Vietnam and ravaged by the Watergate crisis now had a rally point.
From songs on the popular radio stations to bumper stickers on pick-
up trucks, the Iranian crisis served as a focus for American passion. It
was anti-Iran, anti-Khomeini and anti-Muslim fundamentalist, and while
the ethical guestion remains, there was no doubt that it served to bring
America together.
In conclusion, despite the ravages of the revolution and the loss
of American influence, there are several constants which remain. First
is the strategic position of Iran. It remains a key element in the northern
tier eguation. Second, Soviet goals will continue to be interpreted in the
terminology of Marx and Lenin as interpreted by the current
leadership. Soviet resolve will not change, although the time table for
actions may be affected by outside actors. Third, U.S. commitment to
basic goals of peace, stability and maintenance of the status quo
k^Ledeen and Lewi3, 1 3.
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remain the same, although potsntialiy interpreted differently by
subsequent Presidential administrations. We also will seeP. to maximize
our gains economically and ideologically. And finally, at some time in the
future, Iran will need to expand its outside relationships. Iran cannot
always remain an island. With these factors in mind it is possible to
make a comparison of Soviet and US interests in this critical region.
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V. Iran : A Focused Comparison of Interests
Adapting the Nuechterlein method as illustrated in Chapter II and
considering the development of interests as seen in Chapter III, a
comparison of Soviet and U.S. national interests in present day Iran
might best be described using the diagram below. It is necessary to
keep in mind the operational definition of each variable, in order not to
confuse the meaning and'differences between concepts.
Iran
USSR vs.US












A. Defense of homeland
American position)
The operational definition of Defense of Homeland excludes
alliance relationships. Since Iran is not contiguous to the terrain of the
United States, it is difficult to understand how US interest could be
more intense than peripheral. Iran is not vital to the defense of U.S.
territory, rather it is a component of our global strategy of
containment. During the era of detente the significance of Iran as an
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element in American containment policy was overshadowed by our
willingness to establish a 'good guy' dialog with the Soviet Union. This
variable accounts fon the protection of a nation's citizens in the
international realm. In this sense, state sponsored terrorism is an
important consideration. The threat of terrorism goes beyond the pure
interests of protecting the territory of the state.
Given today's international climate, both in terms of our
relationship with the Soviet Union and in terms of the growing threat of
state sponsored terrorism it may be to our benefit to re-establish ties
with Iran. Doing so would first, re-establish the northern tier as an
element in US strategy and by building a friendly relationship with Iran,
potentially offset Iranian support of state terrorism. Following the loss
of Iran as a one foundation of US National Security strategy the
immediate reaction of the Carter Administration and fully supported by
the Reagan administration was to immediately design, build and put into
operation CENTCOM. As indicated above, the utility of this force is in
supplementing local defense efforts against regional threats.
Soviet position j
It is obvious that security of her homeland has been and
continues to be a survival intensity interest for the Soviet Union.
DQfense of the homeland and preoccupation with self protection was a
Uey element of traditional Russian political culture. Despite the Soviet
appeal to a higher order and continued references to 'fraternal and
peaceful relations', the intensity of this variable for the Soviets will
remain a survival issue. This is because of Iran's geostrategic position.
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ThQ Soviets gained in terms of the global correlation of forces by the
American loss of influence in Iran. Some authors hypothesize that the
US move out of Iran reduced the risk of intervention and spurning the
Soviets to invade Afghanistan. The gain in tenms of the correlation of
forces was at a minimum, temporary, and the Soviets will continue to
seek to keep U.S. penetration in Iran limited. Cunnently analysts say that
the Soviet Union's goals ane multi-natuned. The question thus becomes
which, if any goal, takes priority. The Soviets 'want success in all
facets. Therefore, pneoccupation with defense can be considered co-
equal with expansionist goals.
B. Economic Well being
American position;
As illustrated above, the United States has a vital interest in
economic relations, both in Iran and in the region. According to the
framework of this paper, an actor will seek to maximize his economic
conditions. Safe guarding the Persian Gulf, is vital not only to our own
economic interests but to the interests of our allies. US allies depend
on the resources from this region. United States economic
performance is "inextricably intertwined with adequate and dependable
supplies of reasonably priced energy. "^ An additional consideration,
concerns securing the claims of US citizens in Iran. However, these
proceedings are not sufficient alone to consider US interest as vital.
This variable is considered vital to the US mainly due to the value of the
1 U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee of Energy and Natural Resources. Hearing on the
Current State of the World Oil Market . Sen Hrg 98-752. 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 30
January, 1984, 3.
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region's resources, the links of its importance to our allies and the
potential to maximize gain. Risk factors one minimized considering the
support of our allies and the U.N,
Soviet position ;
The Soviet Union's stake economically in Iran is not strong enough
to be characterized as vital. WNIq the Soviet Union does trade with
Iran, these interests qpq light compared to the costs which might be
expected from an overt attempt to penetrate Iran. Essentially, the
Soviet Union's economic interests have not substantially increased
from before the revolution. Iranian natural resources would still make a
good additional support base, but at the present the Soviet economy is
not prepared to handle any additional challenges. It is also possible that
the economic ties between the Iranian economy and the economies of
Eastern European nations could challenge the Eastern European/Soviet
economic relationship in the energy field. If this were the case, then the
Soviets would be interested in down playing the relationship.
C. Favorable World Order
American position :
For the United States maintaining safety, security and order in
the Persian Gulf is a major interest. However the intensity of this
variable is not strong enough to be described as vital. According to the
framework of this analysis, while the United States may deem this to
be an important area it is not critical to the interests of the nation to
take strong measures to counter adverse action. The Carter Doctrine
proclaimed the Persian 6ulf a vital area, but this was following the loss
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of Iran. Safeguarding the world from the throws of Iranian backed and
trained terrorists remains a major interest of the United States, but
not so strong that, given the costs of intervention, we would consider
a major action. Similarly, the continuing Iran-Iraq war destabilizes and
undermines security in the region ana it is a major interest to the
nation to seek to calm the pressures, yet not so strong that very
serious harm would come unless action were taken.
Soviet position ;
World Order- in the Soviet sense-difficult to define. Given
Marxist-Leninist ideology, world order does not convey the same
meaning as to the United States. Since the ideology is essentially in
favor of destabilizing the status quo, then world order to the Soviets
would seem to indicate a goal of gaining power for themselves or
advancing the position of socialism. In this regard, any threat to world
order, in the Soviet meaning and as conditioned by their ideological
view, would be of vital intensity. The Soviets like to consider
themselves and be considered by others as world peacemakers. It is in
their interest to show themselves in favor of developing peaceful
relations and distancing themselves from local destabilizing actions,
except where they can gain an advantage. The Iran-Iraq war and the
Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran can be advertised as reactions to
imperialist, capitalist actions. The Soviets will try to advance their
position by capitalizing on the failures of US and western diplomacy.
D. Ideological interests
Americon position :
To the United States containing the Soviet Union and deterring
aggression is safeguarding our own ideology. Gauging the intensity of
this variable toward Iran, it is difficult to judge it to be a vital issue. In
order for a variable to be 'vital' there must be no ambiguity as to its
definition or question that an actor would resort to conventional
warfare over its compromise. The definition of American ideology itself
is ambiguous at times. There is a proven record that the U.S. will
compromise over an ideological issue. (Why did the US not consider it
vital to bacl-i the Shah with force, given previous announcements by the
President?) Public opinion in the US has such an important part to play
in the making of US foreign policy. The reaction of the public to the
hostage crisis is an important example of the intensity of concern
which can be generated. Since the return of the hostages, however,
the intensity of this variable has lessened considerably regarding Iran,
This variable is a major concern but not strong enough to be classified
a vital one.
Soviet position;
For the Soviet Union, relations with the Islamic Revolutionary
regime must be tempered, considering the potential harm which could
be done. As the revolutionary regime crusades for Islam, it is possible
that problems, in the Soviet Central Asian Republics especially those
with a large number of Shi'a Muslims, might occur. Any compromise of
ideology will not be tolerated by the Soviets. The Soviets, while using
7Q
'peaceful co-existence'" as a veil, strongly believe that Marxism-
Leninism provides them with the advantage of knowing the direction of
history. In knowing this direction, they can plan and guide its course.
Armed with this knowledge, they will be able to eventually triumph over
capitalism. Any attempt to subvert their ideology is a survival intensity
threat. To compromise Marxist-Leninist ideological tenets would
threaten Soviet internal legitimacy. The Soviets will not allow their
values and beliefs to be compromised.
E. Islam
American position;
Given that the US deals in terms of n?a/po//t/A' in the sphere of
international relations, we have been blind to the world of Islamic
ideology. It is difficult for US policy makers to understand the Islamic
world given our different cultural background, the nature of our
political culture and most importantly, our own Judeo-Christian
analytical framework. Ledeen and Lewis pointed out how the CIA and
US decision makers remained unaware of Khomeini's views on Islamic
Government despite amount of readily available material on the
subject.2 The United States remained blind to the rising influence Islam
while there was an effective influence relationship in Iran. Since the
revolution, the US has come a long way towards recognizing the
strength of this nationalist and religious force. There is a steep
learning curve for both the American public and national decision
makers to conquer before fully accounting for this factor. However,
^Ledeen and Lewis, 1 9.
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while somQ progress has been made, it remains a peripheral interest to
the United States.
Soviet position :
A contrast in intensity of interest is the situation for the Soviet
Union. The Soviets manage to cope better with the wonld of Islam.
Soviets like to think of themselves as bastions of defense for the
oppressed minorities. They like to claim that their policies account for,
protect, and secure the rights and beliefs of all peoples. Nationalistic
policies from the time of Lenin's recognition of the Afghan king and the
kingdom of Persia witness this fact. The Soviet Union was among the
first to recognize and 'accept' the post-revolutionary government of
Khomeini. However, while they may claim to favor a position of anti-
imperialism and pro-revolutionary change, in fact, they tend to deal
more pragmatically with regimes in power.
The Soviet Union can not afford to ignore its own Islamic threat,
as the Muslim population in the Central Asian Republics grows at a
faster rate than the Slavic population. Historically, the Soviets have
dealt with these peoples by co-optation, coercion or force, but have
always been successful. The Soviets qpq likely to resort to any one of a
number of strategies to deal with Islam, from co-opting the leadership
to overt repression. The bottom line is that Islam remains and will
continue to grow as a vital issue for the central government, which
can not be ignored.
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V. Afghanistan in the Balance; : A Case Studu
The course of Soviet and American interests in Afghanistan has
a long history that traces back to the legacy of the Great Same.
Compared to Iran, the Afghan case study is somewhat more complex.
Afghanistan carried on a more independent track in foreign policy,
traditionally fighting against British designs of expansion. Afghanistan
has maintained a neutral stance in world affairs, remaining non-aligned
in both world wans and as a member of the non-aligned movement. The
Afghan case study is also complicated by the tendency for civil
disharmony and the lack of a national identity. The United States has
traditionally not had strong interests in Afghanistan when compared to
the British and Soviets. This chapter will highlight the development of
foreign power interests in Afghan. The chronology of this case study is
divided into five periods; 1) The Tzarist legacy and the Great Game. 2)
The inner war, which looks at the post-Soviet revolutionary period
through the Second World War. 3) The Cold War through the
relaxation of tensions during the period of Detente. 4) The end of the
Afghan Monarchy and Communist seizure of powen. And finally, 5) the
Soviet intervention and effects of the war.
A. The Tzarist Legacy, British Power and the Great Game
Afghanistan has occupied a strategic position, as a historic
buffer state between the East and West, for hundreds of years. This
remote, mountainous land has been a meeting point for cultures from
the north, the west and the east as it developed into a cross-roads for
trade and commerce. The 1979 Soviet invasion was only the latest of
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many incursions by outside powers into Afghanistan, These incursions
one chronicled throughout histony. Alexander the Great led the Greeks
to Afghanistan in 32 1 B.C. Nomadic tribes from Central Asia in 50 B.C.,
led by the Kushans, invaded and tooM control. Mongols in the 13th
century were led by Genghis Khan, Hulagu and Tamerlane, terrorizing
the indigenous tribes. Pension Bafavids fnom Inan and Muslim Indian
Moghuls competed fon contnol in Afghanistan in the 16th, 17th and loth
centunies. The Bnitish and Russians in the 1300s and eanly 1300s
played their- pant, attempting to expand into this land at one time on
anothen. Afghanistan, as a nesult of these movements into their
tennitony, Shanes linguistically, cultunally , neligiously and politically with
the nations that it borders. As each invader has cnossed the bonder-, he
has added to the tnaditions and legends of the land. Fon example,
Sunnite Islam, bnought by Anabs fnom the west, had replaced
Zonoastnianism, Buddhism and othen fonms of neligious belief by 900
A.D.
As invadens sought to dominate the anea, Pashtu tnibes fnom the
mountains always seemed to nesist co-optation, much the same as
nebels still nesist the Soviet incunsion. Afghanistan is a country not
easily dominated. This fact applied not only to outsidens but natives as
well. Eanly Afghan dynasties wene hampered in thein effonts to build a
national identity by inten-tnibal and inten-dynastic stnuggles. The
people inhabiting this anea have always been chanactenized as 'fiercely
independent', giving in only to the nulen whose legitimacy was defined
by thein own tnibal code. "Until the beginning of the twentieth century
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the country was mainly a confederation of tribes, held together by the
intrigue and force of the rulers and subject to the machination of rival
chieftains and foreign governments, each trying to control the three
centers of power-Kanahar, Herat and Kabul." 1 It was not until 1747
that the Kingdom of Afghanistan was formed. As the power of the
Persians weakened after the assassination of their leader Nadir Shah
in 1747 and as the Muslim Mogul empire in India began to crumble, a
vacuum of power gave way to Afghan rule in their own land. Amhad
Shah Durrani, noted for his military accomplishments, administration
and ability to organize, is credited with being the first to unify the
Afghan tribes under consolidated control. By 1750, Amhad Shah had
expanded control to an area extending almost to the same borders as
present day Afghanistan.
Under the leadership of Amhad Shah Durrani, the Afghan kingdom
expanded by conguering lands in India and in the Persian safavid
Empire. First, Amad Shah succeeded taking the city of Kabul and
controlling the Kabul River valley. He then forced his Mogul opponent to
yield the northern Indian territories that included all of the trans-Indus
(known today as the Pakistani North-West territories, the Punjab and
the Sind). Having gained control of his southern and eastern flanks,
Amad Shah's next move was to the north and west. He was able to
consolidate control over the city of Herat after a long siege. By 1750,
Afghan control extended to all territories between the Indus and Oxus
Rivers.
1 U.S. Department of the Army. Area Handbook for Afghanistan . Pamphlet 550-65, 4th ed.
1973,33.
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In 1752, Afghan armies took Lahore. In 1756, Amhad Shah pushed
further into India raiding and occupying Dehli. At the time of his death in
1773, the Afghan Empire had expanded to include from Persia in the
east, through all of present day Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and to
the east of the Kashmir and Punjab. Unfortunately, his successors
where not nearly as capable of maintaining control and legitimacy in the
Kingdom as he had been capable of gaining it. His son, Timur Shah
moved the capital to Kabul from Qandahar, but was not strong enough
to prevent the slow erosion of control over all of the Durrani Empire.
The Empire continued to be disrupted after Timur's death by rivalry
and guarrels among his son's. Strife continued among Afghan rulers
until Dost Mohammad ascended to the Afghan throne in 1926.
Therefore, by the time the British in India began their expansion to the
north, and the Russians to the south, an Afghan ruler had already
proven himself an independent and tough fighter. This legacy was to
continue.2
British interests, as those of the Russians, date back to before
the Durrani Dynasty. The British, through the British East India
Company, began looking toward India and Central Asia as early as the
16th century. What began as primarily an economic opportunity,
developed into a passion that cost the British a great deal in terms of
^Numerous sources cover this period in detail. Louis Dupree, Afg hanistan , 2nd ed.
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Pres3, 1 978), 344-360. includes a
comprehensive chart depicting the expansion and disruption of the Afghan empire during the
period from 1 747 until 1 880. Additional detail in W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afg hanistan: A Stud
u
of
Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia . 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1 967) ,47- 69. U.S. Department of the Army. Area Handbook for Afghanistan . 38- 47. and
Lawrence Ziring, Iran , Turkeu and Afghanistan: A Political Chronolog u. 37-41
.
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lives and money. Stanley Vv'olpert describes the rush of European
powers to gain resources and trade opportunities in Asia, India and the
Indies as a "scramble". This scramble was primarily initiated by a small
group of Bnitish merchants and by the end of the eighteenth century,
the British had established an expanding toehold on the South Asian
continent.
The metamorphosis of a small peaceful company of British merchants, residing in the
port cities of Bombay, Macfras, and Calcutta that they had created on the littoral
wilderness, into the rulers of South Asia's subcontinent is one of the most
extraordinary events of recent history. Most amazing perhaps is the speed with which
it was accomplished, for the essential process took less than fifty years. Yet this brief
period at the end of the eighteenth century transformed not only Indian but world
history. It introduced a major new factor into the subcontinent's balance of political
power, which initially destabilized but ultimately re-unified South A3ia.3
The Indian subcontinent provided many fortunes to those Britons
willing to risk all for great gain. Private interests soon expanded and as
the British established the Raj, India took on new meaning to the United
Kingdom. It became the Crown jewel of the Empire. Despite the British
imperialistic goals in South Asia, some good came of their presence. The
old Muslim rule had begun to fall apart, British interest and Bnitish anms
helped to fill the void left behind, To the Hindi population, Bnitish dinect
nule meant liberation from the Muslim yoke. It meant education and the
opportunity for advancement. It meant the establishment of a ondenly
system of administration which still survives in India and Pakistan. At
the idealistic level, "Evangelical missionaries, Utilitarian Positivists, and
laten liberals insisted that British motives were altruistic and gloriously




forgottQn that thQ British goals wQre primarily economic; backed by the
interests or the wealthy and the government, and an opportunity for
expansion. Afghanistan held potential as an extention to the Crown-
jewel and as a buffer from other European power's imperialistic goals
on the non-European land mass.
British power finally closed upon the whole of the Indian
subcontinent and was beginning to expand into the Central Asian
territory by the late 1790s. When looking at the history of this region,
it seems odd that the stimulus which began the 'Great Game' should
have been the potential threat of interference in India by the French.
However, in the early 1800s, the British Government of India sought
out the assistance of Persia. Their goal was to obtain help in protecting
the northern appnoaches to India. Their perceived threat was the
French on any strong Afghan fonce that might seek to invade India.
It is impontant to recall, that Napoleon, at the time, controlled
Fnance. Napoleon, in 1801, attempted to arnange an invasion of India
with Russian assistance. According to W. K. Fnasen-Tytlen, a former
Bnitish Minister to Afghanistan who senved between 1910 and 1941 in
South Asia, Napoleon again in 1807 attempted to move into the Indian
subcontinent.
The peace of Tilsit brought the Tzar Alexander and Napoleon together to concert
measures for a joint invasion of India through Persia, where French influence vas
now predominant. The British Government took immediate, if rather confused, steps to
re-establish their position in Tehran, while at the same time Elphinstone and Metcalf




He continued to describe the state of the Durrani empire at this
time, explaining that, to the ATghans, any alliance with Persia would
have been of little value. The state of disintegration had -made the
Afghans almost "powerless".
The primary British impluse was defensive during the early
1800s. They were more concerned with the consolidation of their gains
in India and offsetting Napoleonic advances, than expanding northward
into Afghanistan. This was probably a good thing for the Afghans, as
their strength was divided by internal disputes and disagreements. It is
also fortunate for the Afghans that Russian power was occupied with
other goals at this time. The Russian drive for the south had "begun
during the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) who viewed expansion
in to Asia as his country's destiny, and the absorption of Turkish and
Persian Khanates on his border as Russia's 'civilizing mission'."6
During the early 1800s the Russians were involved with
pressuring the Persians over Georgia, the Caucasus, and their nights
on the Cospian Sea. In the Centnal Asian and Kazakh Steppes the
Russians wene just beginning to consolidate thein position. After
victory against Napoleon, the Tzan Alexanden I shifted policy towand
the Kazakhs, putting an end to Kazakh independence and gaining total
control. Similarly, a Russian goal was to funthen ties and control over
the Centnal Asian Khanates. "The Russian ministen of Commence, Count
Rumiantsev, dneamed of lange scale economic penetnation into the anea.
Centnal Asian khanates wene visualized as potential countenpants of
6Wolpert, 54.
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what India was for England."'7 Although Russian influgncQ was not yet
in dinQct conflict with British, an Qssgntial change had come about for
Afghanistan, The turn of the century manned the beginning of
Afghanistan's nole as a buffer state between two great empires. As
Fraser-Tytler wrote:
The opening years of the nineteenth century witnessed the passing of the last great
empires of Central and Southern A3ia of Asiatic origin and the rise of two empires in
Asia on vholly European foundations. These two empires, the British and the Russian,
advancing across Asia throughout the century from bases thousands of miles apart,
were driven forward by the necessity which impels civilization ever to press onwards
in its search for a security which will stabilize its frontiers and safeguard its
commerce.8
The British first began to feel the threat of Russian advance into
South Asia in 1828. Persia was forced to sign the treaty of
Turkmanchai after a two year war with Russia, which granted further
commercial concessions to the Russians. The Persians, now squeezed
from further expansion to their north and west and encourage by
advice and support from the Russians, set out to take the Afghan city
of Herat. By 1837 the Afghans, under Dost Muhammad, were being
pressured by the Persians from the west and the Sikhs closing from
the east, having occupied Peshawar. The British, realizing that the
Russians were making advances toward India through the Persians,
sent a mission to Kabul to seek the support of the Afghan Amir (King).
However, Lord Auckland, the British 6overnor-6eneral, following
instructions form the board of directors of the East India Company,
instructed his mission to Kabul not to make any concessions which




might jeopardizQ British relations with the Sikhs. The task of the
mission was to watch the situation in Afghanistan ana take actions
which might counteract the advance of Russian influence while not
compromizing the Sikh relationship.
The British decision to safeguard their alliance with the Sikhs is
criticised by a number of historians, who feel that had the British
supported Dost Muhammad, the Afghan Amir, the numerous losses
during the First Afghan war might have been averted. Dost Muhammad
was characterized as a "problematic" personality, who would have
eventually compromised the relationship. Yet, he was willing to affirm
closer ties with the British to offset Russian and Persian influence in
his realm. In 1338, Dost Muhammad therefore felt spurned by the
British and saw no other choice than to turn to the Russians and
Persians to deal with his most immediately perceived threat, the
infringement of Peshawar by the Sikhs. The British began the First
Afghan War with the goal of replacing Dost Mohammed and offsetting
the Russians. The decision to attack was motivated by the concept of
divide and rule rather than allowing a unified opposition by Dost
Muhammad.
Dupree summarizes the results of the First Anglo-Afghan Wan in
simple terms. ". . .After four years of disaster, both in honor, material
and personnel, the British left Afghanistan as they found it, in tribal
chaos and with Dost Muhammad Khan returned to the throne in Kabul."
Initially, they were successful in driving Dost Muhammad out of Kabul
and replacing him with Shah Shuja, a former Amir, more oriented
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toward the British cause. However, in 1840-41 they found that they
could no longer control the region and "under pressure, the British
signed an agreement calling Top their return to India."9 The withdrawal
of the British garrison fnom Afghanistan became known as the Signal
Catastrophe, with some 15,000 troops and 20 million pounds being lost.
After Shah Shuja was murdered in 1842, Dost Muhammad, the
Amir the British had deposed, returned to the Afghan thnone. In the
years shortly following their tragedy in Afghanistan, the British found
themselves at war with the Sikhs, with whom they had sought to
remain friends at the cost of their relationship with the Afghans. Dost
Muhammad, the Amir who Lord Auckland refused to trust, remained
loyal to his agreements with the British until his death in 1863, even
when asked to join in mutiny against the British by those in India
opposed to the strength of. the Raj. 10 Afghan policies, under Dost
Muhammad, followed two themes . . ."friendship with the Bnitish and
attempts to unity the country".
'
1
The Sreat Same in South Asia had begun. Russian and British
competition continued to grow mone intense. In 1854-55, The British
fought against the Russians in the Crimea, legacy of another area of
Anglo-Russian conflict-the Eastern Question. After returning to Kabul
to wreck retribution upon Kabul, as punishment for the massacre on
the manch out of Afghanistan in January 1842, the British left
9Ziring, 42.
^Patrick A. Macroru. The Fierce Pawns , (NevYork: Lippincott, 1966). A detailed
reconsideration of the events leading up to, the battles and the aftermath of the First Anglo -Afghan
war. Mr. Macro rg offers that the British committed a severe blunder in undertaking to subjugate





Afghanistan. By the terms of thQ peace, settling the CrimQan war, the
British were responsible ror settling disputes between the Afghans
and Persians. The -Russians continued to advance to the south,
expanding into the Khanates of Central Asia. "The 1855 Russian defeat
in the Crimean War spurred the Russian drive into Turkestan in an
attempt to redeem Russian national and military honor and gain
commercial advantages." 12 The Russian expansion, begun after the
Crimean, was slow and continuous.
Russian policy was to slowly yet consistently absorb territory to
the south. "Moving south along the Syr Darya River toward the Kirgiz
Mountains, they took Tomak and Pishpek in 1860, Djulek and Yany-
Kurgan in 1861, Turkestan City, Aulie-Ata, and finally Chimkent In
1864." 13 The Russians handed a "demoralizing defeat" to the 30,000
Muslim defenders of Tashkent in June 1865. They were able to gain a
surprise victory and enhance their prestige by taking the city with
1,350 men and twelve cannon. In 1868, the Russians forced Bukhara to
become a vassal of the Tzanist state. In taking Bukhara, which was
immediately to the north of Afghanistan, the Russians had succeeded in
extending thein influence to the borders of the buffer state,
Afghanistan.
Russian interest in the lands to the south and east can be
analyzed as originating from a number of different roots. In one sense,
it could have been a desine to expand their belt of defenses beyond the





prevent being overrun as earlier in history. But this is perhaps too
simplistic a cause. Realistically, the drive for markets in undeveloped
regions, both to forestall British influence and to protect their own
interests, seems more credible a cause. The Russians. . ."interpreted
the British invasion of Afghanistan 1839-42) as a direct threat to their
interests." 14 Also, following the Crimean war, Russia's prestige at
home and abroad was low. Expansion, eastward and southward,
offered the Russians the opportunity to regain some of their lost
influence. Over the long term, filling the geo-political gap left by the
collapse of the Great Horde offered an opportunity, too choice to be
by-passed. As Russia became a European power, it is possible that
the tzars felt a growing superiority over the Muslim, "barbaric Asians".
This is closely linked to anti-Islamic attitudes, stemming from a
traditional anti-Turkish orientation. It must be remembered that the
1800s was the 'age of European Imperialism', and that as such it was
natural for all the European powers to seek to expand beyond their
borders to lands offering new fortunes. 15
After the First Afghan War the British made little contact to the
north of their Indian conguests. British policies wavered between two
extremes. The British were undecided as to whether to ingore the
north or to attempt to take it over and incorporate it into the British
Empire by force. This second alternative was known as the "forward
1
4
Dupree, 404. States that "Britain's response to Russia's moves in Central Asia
resemble the Monroe Doctrine ,\ n that the British attempted to extend their influence into an area
where their control did not extend. ..In essence, the British, in their two nineteenth century wars
in Central A3ia were fighting the Russians, but it was the Afghans, in reality , who suffered."
1 5Many authors offer their own reasons for Russian expansion. These are mentioned by
Dupree, Fraser-Tytler, and Rywkin.
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school". ThQ British still remained concgrned about Russian intentions
toward the south. In the Anglo-Russian -Agreement of 1873, the
Russians agreed to the Amu Darya River as the southern limit of their
advance in Central Asia and to recognize all the territory to the south
as outside the Russian sphere of influence. 16 British domestic politics
came to affect the competition over South Asia in the Great Game in
1874 and the end of indecision over the course of the rivalry ended.
In 1874, Benjamin Disraeli (later Earl Beaconsfield) became prime minister of
Great Britain,, and the policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
Afghanistan ended. The "masterly inactivity" of the previous decade shifted to the
Forward Policy. . Such rapid shifts in policy confused Sher Ali (Dost Muhammad's
successor) and he greeted these nev British overtures with suspicion. 17
The Afghans continued to feel confused and pressured by the
Russians for concessions and by the shift in British policy as they
began to move further toward the Afghan border, (The British took
Quetta and converted it to a military base in 1876.) Meantime, the
Russians and British continued their competition over the Eastern
Question. In 1377, Russia declared war on Turkey. The British, first
warned, and then sent a fleet to Constantinople to confront the
Russians. No shots were fired but the potential for open conflict
existed. As in the aftermath of the Crimean War, the Tzar and his
close circle felt stifled with their failures in the Balkans. The
successes they had achieved and continued to pursue in Central Asia
were a consolation. VV. K. Fraser-Tytler includes a translation of a
Memorandum from Prince Gorchakov, dated 21 November 1864, which
16Area Handbook, 49. Dupree, 406. Fraser-Tytler, 140.
17 Dupree, 406.
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describes the orientation of Tzarist policy toward Central Asia. In part
it reads. .
.
Our august Master has directed me to explain succinctly, but with clearness and
precision, our position in Central Asia., the interests which prompt our actions in that
part of the world, and the aims which we pursue. The position of Russia in Central
Asia is that of all civilized states which come into contact with half- savage, wandering
tribes possessing no fixed social organization... It invariably happens in such cases
that the interests of security on the frontier, and commercial relations, compel the
more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbors whose turbulence
and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with. . , 18
The Russians felt compelled to continue to push into Afghanistan.
Sher Alij the new Afghan Amir, realizing the Russian intentions, had
requested the British to help guard against the Tzarist advance to the
south. The British, however, using the 1373 Anglo-Russian agreement
as an excuse, did little more than help the Afghans to revamp their
armies. "Sher Ali was able, with British subsidy, to start moaernizing
his army, but Anglo-Afghan relations deteriorated when a political shift
in England inaugurated once again a •"forward policy" of
intervention". 19 Historians differ as to whether Sher Ali asked for
assistance from the Russians after the break down of the Anglo-
Afghan relationship, or whether the Russians forced him to accept a
diplomatic mission headed by General Stolietov. It is generally agreed
that the presence of the Russian mission in Kabul is the reason for the
start of the Second Afghan War. British troops, again, invaded
Afghanistan, crossing the Khyber, Bolan and Peiwar passes. They
quickly occupied the Kurraam and Khyber Valleys. The second war
drove Sher Ali out of Kabul. The British replaced him with Sardar Abdur
18Fraser-Tytler, Appendix II, p319.
19Area Handbook, 49.
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Rahman. Dupree describes the Afghan resistance as light. "In all
fairness, however, it must be stated that, at this time, little unity
existed among the tribal leaders, and resistance against the British
was unorganized and sporadic.""^ j|-ie new leader was forced to
accept an agreement which essentially made Afghanistan an
appendage to the English P.aj in India, allowing internal autonomous rule,
but tethering foreign relations to British wants in a sort of early form
of "Finlandization".
Abdur Rahman was able to transform Afghanistan to a more or
less independent position. Taking advantage of both Russian and British
ties, he ruled by consolidating control and modernizing those
institutions which best aided his maintenance of power. Disraeli's
Party in Britain fell from power in Britain in 1880 and the new
government headed by Lord Gladstone decided to withdraw its troops
from Afghanistan bach to the Raj. Russia moved forward in Central
Asia taking the Khivian Khanate in 1881 and Merv in 1884. In 1885,
Russian Cossacks took Panjdeh. The Russian limit of advance had
moved to within 100 miles of the British Sphere. At Panjdeh Russian
and Afghan troops fought. The Afghans were forced to retreat. At
the news of the Afghan loss. . ."Gladstone rose in the house of
commons solemnly to warn Russia that a march against Herat would
mean war with Great Britain. Two corps of the Indian Army were fully
mobilized, and the liberal prime minister requested immediate
authorization. . .to raise a loan of eleven million pounds to 'protect our
20 Dupree, 409.
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vital national interests' in western Afghanistan, "2 1 Fon Abdun Rahman
this condition was ideal, in that now thQ British proved willing to insure
the integnity of his bondens.
The solution to the 1885 Anglo-Russian crisis was the creation
of a Joint Boundary Commission to establish the boundanies of both the
Russian and British zones of influence. Much controversy oven the
drawing of the bondens continued during the 1380s and 1890s, The
question of the boundary along the Amu Danya continued until 1946. The
Dunnand line of 1 893, delineating a boundary between Raj controlled
India and Afghanistan is still blamed as a false political bonder, which
unknowingly cut Pashtu tnibai areas apart and continued to cause
anti-westenn sentiment among tribal members. The Dunnand line has
been descnibed by many different titles, a "cartographic line of
convenience, a political and ethnic horror"2^ , ."untenable,
strategically, politically, geographically"23, anc| a host of othens. The
Dunnand line continues to be disputed by Pashtun tribesmen in Pakistan
and Afghanistan today.24 The nesult of these borders for the
European powers, while disputed by the Afghan tribes, was the
creation of a line-a defined demarcation-which served to mark
spheres of influence. While Abdun Rahman consolidated power and
2 Vol pert, 64.
22 Rubinstein, 125.
23Wolpert, 65.
2 4s pace precludes a in depth discussion of the border controversy at this juncture. For in
depth analysis see; Akbar S. Ahmed, "Tribes and States in Central and South Asia", Asian
Affairs (Britain). June 1980, 152-1 68.; SeligS. Harrison, "Baluch Nationalism and Super-
power Rivalry", International Security . Winter 1 980-81 , 1 52- 1 63. and for an analysis of hov
these borders impact on the current dispute following the 1 979 Soviet invasion see; Anthony
Hyman, "Afghan /Pakistan Border Disputes". Asian Affairs (Britain) , Oct 1980, 264-275.
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bQgan thQ nation building process in Afghanistan, the European powers
were appeased temporarily in South Asia.
Alvin Rubinstein describes the end of the Great Game as
occurring suddenly in 1907. The Russo-Japanese war in the Far East
had its toll, both on the domestic policies and foreign policies of the
Tzar. "Threatened in the Far East by Japan (by whom it had been
defeated in 1904-05] and in Europe by Germany, Russia decided that
Afghanistan was not worth its jeopardizing the prospect of friendship
with Britain at a time when it desperately needed allies. Uncertainty in
Europe mandated stability along the Central Asian rimland."25 The 1907
Anglo-Russian Convention of St. Petersburg, which formally split up
Persia into three zones, defined Afghanistan as a neutral buffer zone.
Russia agreed to not consider Afghanistan as falling within its sphere
of influence. The Afghans, as usual in the actions of the European
powers in making decisions affecting the outlands, were not consulted.
The fact that they were not consulted before the conclusion of the St.
Petersburg Convention incensed the Afghan Amir, Habibullah, and he
refused to ratify the agreement. For both Britain and Russia, this was
the apex of the age of European imperialism. Both Great powers were
soon occupied elsewhere with the growth of German power.
The causes for the outbreak of the First World War have been
analyzed numerous times. It is beyond the scope of this paper to relook
at the causes of this war, except as they affected the course of
national interests in South Asia. Imperialism, Nationalism, Socialism, an
25 Rubinstein, 125.
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unchecked Arms race, ideological differences between political
systems end the growth of an inflexible alliance system were all
contributing foctons to the course of world events dfter 1307,26 jj-jq
effect in Afghanistan can be discerned from HdbibullalVs actions
following the signature of the 1307 Convention and his refusal to sign
it. Given the possibility for complete independence dnd international
recognition of such, the Afghans looked to other powers for
assistance, including the 'Ottoman Turks.
The rise of nationalistic powers was evident in Afghanistan.
Wolpent writes about the ties between Habibullah and the Pan-Islamic
movement, most strongly felt in the Ottoman Turkish Empire.
''Frustrated in his friendly overtures ond dppeals for modernization,
feeling betrayed by Bnitish duplicity, Hdbibullah looked to the Universal
Brotherhood of Islam fon help in leading his land to a richer, happier
future."27 Habibullah was in powen during a time when the pan-Islamic
movement was gnowing rapidly. Though torn between the Pan-Islam
and Afghdn ndtionalism, when it came to deciding between the two he
choose to stay with nationalistic feelings.
Thnoughout the period just before and after the outbreak of the
war Germany courted Afghdn leaders. It wds their hope to goin
influence with the Amin, end through this contact to offset the British
and Russidn war effort by causing the Afghans to declare jihad, holy
26Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft , (j^y York; Oxford
University Press, 1 983). Craig, Europe: 1815-1914 . YonLaue, Whu Lenin? VVhu Stalin? , and
Jame3 Joll , The Origins of the First World War , (New York: Longman, 1 984). all discuss in detail
the development of the world political system leading up the the war.
2?Wo1pert,72.
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war, against German enemies. British forces in India, the primary
German target, had been depleted by the war effort. Russian forces
continued to be diverted to the European theater. The Germans, in a
draft Treaty of Friendship, dated January 24, 1916, offered
Afghanistan the opportunity for total independence, as well as arms
and support.28 German efforts in Afghanistan were related to their
efforts with the Ottoman Turkish Caliph. Habibullah, feeling that his
forces were not strong enough, even with German aid, declined to
engage the British.
The end of the First World War marked the beginning of a new
era. European imperialism had been thwarted. Britain had begun to
reassess its role in the international environment. In Afghanistan,
following HabibullafVs murder, the state headed toward a more
independent role on it own. Ademec attributes Habibullah's death to the
legacy of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and to his indecision in
declaring jihad upon the British. By remaining to appear loyal to the
British cause, Habibullah had earned the disrespect of the nationalistic
forces at play in Afghanistan. 29 Russia too had begun a new course in
the hands of the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik revolution marked a definite
change in the conduct of Russian foreign policy. It immediately ended
the provisions of the Anglo-Russian Convention, as it ended all treaty
obligations signed during Tzarist times. Bolshevik ideology despised
29Ademec, 43.
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colonialism, evident through Lenin's writings. Lenin judged colonialism
and imperialism to be the "Achilles heel" of the capitalist world.30
At the end of this first period of the development of national
interests in Afghanistan, there are several factors which are obvious.
First, for the United States, there was virtually no interest and very
little contact with Afghanistan, save for independent adventurers.31
The United States was still in the process of developing its self-
identity. By the end of' the age of European imperialism, Russia had
established a secure hold on the Khanates of Central Asia, but had
stopped short because of domestic and foreign policy problems caused
by the Russo-Japanese war and domestic strife.
Russia was spurred on in Central Asia by a whole complex of motives -the quest for a
secure frontier, the provocations offered by unstable neighbors, the fear of being
excluded from the area by England, and the temptations of diplomatic leverage.
economic profit and military glory.32
Defensively for the Russians, it was necessary to offset the
advances of the British into Afghanistan. Later, with the rise of
German power it again became even more complex an issue.
Economically the markets of Central Asia, as those of Persia were
considered a major national interest. In terms of world order, the
nineteenth century provided a different set of values for the world
30 Ularn, Ex pansion and Coexistence . 29.
31 Patrick Macrory writes about "General" Josiah Harlan, an American who went to India
originally for the East India Company. While there, he transferred to the Artillery and then went
to work for the Moghul leader Ranjet Singh in the 1 8303. Later, when 3ent to negotiate with the
Afghans he changed sides. p38. Dupree describes a book Harlan later wrote about his service to
Do3t Mohammad, in which he titles himself "Josiah Harlan, Late Counselor of State; Aide-de-
camp, and General of the Staff of Dost Muhamed Khan, Ameer of Kabul". p378.
^Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva , 1 865-
1924
,
(Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1 968), 23.
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powgrs at that timQ. The legacy of imperialism, meant expansion,
competition, ana suojugation or weaker, less aeveiopea neighbors. The
Russians under the Tzarist leadership felt it their auty to deliver those
"less fortunate" from their cloak of darkness. Ideologically, therefore
they felt compelled to expand their Porders into Central Asia, ana
beyond into Afghanistan. The October Revolution brought about a
fundamental change to Tzarist foreign policy.
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B. The Inner War
The second important time frame to consider in tracing the
development of Soviet and US National Interests in Afghanistan is the
inter war period. During the First World War and in the years
aftenwands, many changes appeared in Soviet and in British foreign
policy toward South Asia. The United States still remained in the cloud
of international isolationism, and U.S. intenests in Afghanistan were
limited. A numben of points are important to consider during this period;
the role of the Afghan Amir in formulating policy, the thira Afghan
war's result on British interests, and the course of Soviet-Afghan
relations. This section will trace the development of interests between
the end of the First World War, through the rise of Nazi power leading
to the outbreak of the Second World Wan, and finally discuss
Afghanistan's position at the end of the Second Wonld Wan.
Duning the intenwan period, U.S. intenests nemained limited
outside the European sphene; although tnaces of intenest were
detectable following the Millspaugh mission to Inan. Fon Afghanistan, on
the othen hand, the attempt to involve the United States in the delicate
balance between the Bnitish in India and the Soviets to the nonth was a
potential alternative to the nising intenests of the Senmans. "Like
Germany, the United States was not a colonial powenj it was
sufficiently distant fnom Afghanistan not to constitute a political
facton, and it possessed an economic and industnial potential which
10.3
qxcqqcIqcI that of any other Western power,"' America was reluctant
to involvQ itsQlf in a region torn between Soviet and British activity.
Afghanistan, at the outset, offered little obvious commercial
value worth pursuing fan the Americans. Additionally, there were
perils in this country which threatened the American government's
ability to protect the rights of its citizens operating in Afghanistan on
business. Howeven, some pnivate American citizens explored
opportunities in Afghanistan. One opportunity was granted to the Inland
Oil Exploration Company, which won an oil exploration concession. The
deterioration of the international political situation in 1938 forced this
corporation to cancel its commitment in Afghanistan. American
interests were not formally established until 1942.
The course of Soviet and British interests on Afghanistan was
more complex and detailed. Afghanistan, a nation of innumerable
internal complexities, was faced with balancing a new, revolutionary,
and expansionist BolsheviU regime to the north with the more
predictable and proven British imperialistic designs in India. In February
1919, Amir Habibullah was murdered. He was succeeded by his son
Amanullah. Amanullah is characterized as having been a progressive
nationalist, anti-British, and, in his later years, a reformist, who urged
the westernization of his country. It was his forced westernization,
leading to changes against Islamic tradition and culture, which forced
his abdication twenty years later. Amanullah is noted for two things;
first, for gaining independence for his country from the spheres of
1 A<femec, 234.
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influgnce scheme as established by the 1907 St. Petersburg convention
between Russia and Britain; and second, establishing relations with the
newly created Soviet Union.
One of AmanullatVs first acts upon coming to power was
declaring jihad-holy war-on the British in India. The initial attack and
subsequent war was short, and became known as the Third Afghan
war. Analysts and historians offer somewhat differing reasons for
AmanullatVs actions. Anthony Arnold states that Amanullah was not
satisfied with the British response to his initial declaration of
independence after having come into power, and that he was backed or
saw the potential for military and financial backing from the fledgling
Soviet Russian republic.2 In a 1966 interpretation, Joseph Collins says
that among other things Amanullah did not wish to follow in his fathers
footsteps and make the same mistakes.3 It is also possible that it was .
.
/'Partly to divert internal discontent toward an enemy and partly
because of his belief that an Indian nationalist revolution against the
British was imminent. . ."4 The former British diplomat, W. K, Fraser-
Tytler hastens to add that Amanullah looked to build religious fervor by
calling for a holy war and "holding out to them (his followers) the fair
prospect of loot which an invasion of India would furnish to his
^Anthony Arnold, Afg hanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective . (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover
International Studies, 1981), 9.
3Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in
Soviet Forei gn Policu . (Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Book3, 1986), 8.
4U.S. Army Handbook on Afghanistan, 52
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followers as it had dono to their forefathers from the days of Mahmud
of Ghazni".5
In the end, the British gained the overall victory in the war,
However, their victory was costly; politically, and in terms of men and
resources lost. England after the First World War was exhausted.
The toll had been paid with British lives, and in influence in India. Muslim
troops in Raj Indian regiments had begun to desert after the start of
the jihad. Wolpert says. . ."Heat stroke and cholera claimed as many
lives in that last part of the Anglo-Afghan wars as Pathan
marksmen."6 The peace of the Third Afghan war was signed at
Rawalpindi on 8 August 1919 and confirmed by treaty several years
later. It was an important step for the Afghans and Amanuliah because
it finally recognized Afghan de facto and de jure independence.
The Third Afghan War had another effect for the British. In the
post WWI era this marked only the beginning of the challenge -to their
dominance over South Asia. Nationalism, as in Europe before the Great
War, became an even increasingly important factor of stability for the
Empire.'7 For Amanuliah, the war brought a wave of popularity which
lasted until his imposition of westernizing reforms in later years.
Newly independent Afghanistan was open to the prospect of
involvement by other outside powers. The Soviet Union was the first




^Wolpert, Chapters 6 and 7 outline the decline of B ri ti s h power and influence leading to
I ndian i ndependence i n 1 947.
106
Anthony Arnold,as mentioned above, alludes to Soviet
'assistance' in Amanullah's decision to initiate the Third Afghan War.
But he also points out that the Soviet Union was involved in a civil war
at home, and almost at wan with the Bnitish. The evidence does not
suppont eithen Soviet militany or financial backing fon the wan. Thene
one sevenal other considerations which make the idea of Soviet intrigue
in Afghanistan's internal affairs at this time an unlikely possibility,
First, the young Soviet state was in a desperate state of turmoil and
flux. Throughout the country there was a spirit of discord against the
Bolsheviks, as well as the Tzarists who preceded them. This extended
beyond the small enclaves of White Generals conducting war against
the Soviets with Allied assistance. Second, financially it would have
been difficult to support the external war cause.8 Soviet resources
were wrecked following the end of the First World War and the
Russian Civil War. It is doubtful that they would have been able to
muster sufficient capital and resources to provide any form of
assistance.
The Soviets considered the British the main colonialist power in
the region. Idealistically, the young and inexperienced leaders of the
Soviet Union were anti-British, and against any and all forms of British
imperialism. Supporting revolution against imperialists was in line with
the ultimate goal of ridding the world of capitalists. Therefore,
supporting the Afghans in their fight against the British imperialists
was a plus for the flegling Bolshevik cause and the ideals of the
;%no1d, 10-12.
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Socialist rQvolution. However, the Afghan orientation was not Marxist-
Leninist or even socialist. Supporting the Afghan people in their fight
was in the best interests of drawing down the enemies of the Soviet
state rather than forwanding the cause of socialist revolution. It was
also in the interests of the young Soviet state to attempt retribution
against the British for their part in the ongoing Russian Civil War.
Suppont of the Afghan position weakened English ability to continue to
wage war in the minds of Soviet leadens.9
The Soviets today pnovide a diffenent perspective from the
nealpolitik situation that Lenin faced. The Soviet position today is that. , ,
'Although Soviet-Afghan nelations developed in conditions of acute
stnuggle against the intnigues of Bnitain and othen imperialist powers,
the friendship and co-operation of the Soviet and Afghan peoples
passed the test of time and are a model of nelations between countries
with different social systems." 10
Beyond the Soviet opportunity to disrupt the British position, it is
important to examine the position of the Afghans and the state of
disarray in the Soviet state. Before the success of the revolution in
1917, it was Lenin's belief that one of the major keys to the success of
world wide revolution was the support of the peoples of the Orient.
One way to win the support of these peoples was to play upon the
9Ulam, Ex pansion and Coexistence , 1 23; Hammond, 7. and Richard Pipes, The Formation
of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism . (Cambridge Ma,: Harvard University Press,
1954), 180.
1 fllvan Kovalenko, Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security , (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1976), 21.
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downtrodden position dealt by their colonial legacy by forwarding the
concept of self-determination. As Helen d'Encausse wrote. . .
When he took power in a multi-national state, Lenin knew that he would encounter
special problems, those dominated by nationalities, the solutions put forward by the
new regime were largely conditioned by the situation which faced it in October, the
state of quasi -secession of the non- Russian peoples of the Russian Empire. . 1
1
Lenin went to great lengths to gain the support of Eastern
peoples living in the former Russian Empire. Richard Pipes explains the
situation by considering- Lenin's faith in the importance of national
movements among the colonial peoples and their role in world wide
revolution. He wrote:
This faith- strengthened rather than weakened after Lenin's advent to power- explains
the great lengths to which he and his regime were willing to go to win the sympathies
of the Eastern peoples residing in the Russian Empire. Pan-lslamism, Pan-
Turanianisrn, religious orthodoxy- all these sensitive areas of Moslem consciousness
were played upon by the Soviet government during the Revolution in order to gain a
foothold in the Moslem borderlands and to penetrate the Asiatic possessions of the
West. Early in December 1917 the Soviet government issued, over the signatures of
Lenin and Stalin, an appeal to Russian and foreign Moslems in which it made
extremely generous promises in return for Moslem support 12
For the Afghans, under Amanullah, Lenin's concept of self-
determination offered a new possibility. Amanullah pictured a great
Central Asian confederation incorporating the old Russian territories
of Khiva and Bukhara. There were a number of advantages to such a
union in Amanullah's eyes. Primarily, and beyond an economic
advantage. . ."the formation of a Central Asian Confederation, with
Kabul the dominant power. . .would have provided an excellent buffer
against Russian encroachment from the north as well as furthering
1
1
Helene C. d'Encausse, Lenin: Revolution and Power . New York: Longman, 1 982) , 1 02.
1
2
Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union . 1 55.
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Afghanistan's awn pan-Islamic aspirations."'^ SomQ fertile ground
a Iready existed in the Central Asian territory.
Resistance to Russian expansion had been established as early
as the sixteenth century. Bennigsen and Broxup identify three major
categories of resistance to absorption by the Russians. (1) Armed
resistance against 'Infidel' rule, undertaken under the auspices of
jihad-directed by Sufi brotherhoods and revolts by Muslim feudal lords,
(2) Preservation of Islam from the challenge posed by rival ideologies,
like Christianity, Buddism and Marxism. (3) Temporary co-operation
with 'Infidels' while hoping to re-establish lost power. While these
methods had been used for some time, the Basmachi movement offered
the greatest challenge to the Soviets in Central Asia. 14
The Soviets began an armed attempt to quell opposition in the
Muslim borderlands. The dissatisfied native Muslim population took to
partisan warfare to fight back. The movement began in the Ferghana
valley and moved outward, until it finally extended to all of Turkestan.
This included Khiva and Bukhara. Pipes calls the Basmachestvo
resistance movement "perhaps the most persistent and successful in
the entire history of Soviet Russia." Its members were called Basmachi.
They began as ordinary bandits, whose targets were throughout the
countryside, and the Tzarists "had never been quite successful in
suppressing them". This force slowly gained strength after the
Provisional government took control in 1917. The Koland government in
-'Arnold, 1 1 . Hammond, Red Flag Over Afg hani stan . abo discusses Amanullah's
aspirations.
1 4Bennigsen and Broxup, 62-37.
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1918 co-operated with thQm and managed to make one of thQ Basmachi
leaders a captain of their troops. According to Pipes, when that
territorial government fell to the Soviets many Muslims connected to
the autonomous government and area residents went over to the
Basmachi and disappeared into the mountains to join them. The
Basmachi after this point were viewed as "protectors and liberators'"
"The principal weakness of the Basmachi; movement was its lack of
unity." 15
In a number of ways the basmachi movement resembles the lack
of unity and independent control visible in Afghanistan's current
resistance movements. Their problems of command and control,
communication and co-ordination are easily compared. The Soviet
advantage then, as today, was in better organization, control of the
urban centers and lines of communication. This movement became a
new type of fight for the Soviets. The Soviets were reguired to devote
a great deal of money and manpower to stop the movement. The
Basmachi in later years were able to cross the Amu Darya into
Afghanistan to find sanctuary, a situation analogous to their
descendents today as they cross into Pakistan to seek security and
support. 1 6"
The possibility for a great Central Asian Confederation never
materialized for Amanullah. Although the Soviets at the Third Congress
of the Soviets in January 1918 adopted the Declaration of the Rights of
^Spipes, Formation . 1 78
1
^This to Pi c * s covered in limited fashion by Collins, Ch 1 ; Hammond, Ch 2; Rwykin,
pp34-44; and Pipes, Formation 174- 184.
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thQ Working and ExploitQd Masses , which stated that; "All the nations
have the right to decide, if and on what Dasis they could participate in
the federal government and the other federal Soviet institutions",
policy was overcome by realpolitik. ' ? Internal opposition continued and
the Soviets needed to take action to consolidate their position. The
expected world revolution that the Soviets had been waiting for failed
to materialize. Under pressure to survive, and facing opposition from
within, as well as from without, in 1921 the Soviets began to normalize
relations beyond their borders. In Central Asia, the Soviets furthered
their recognition of Afghanistan with a formal Treaty of Friendship on
28 February 1928.
This Treaty served both the Bolshevik cause and Afghan
interests. For Afghanistan , the treaty provided for badly needed
subsidies. Soviet assistance was delivered, although never in the
quantities which would have been sufficient for their cause.
Afghanistan used Soviet military assistance to help suppress a revolt in
1924.
For the Soviets, normalized relations with Afghanistan provided
several advantages. The Soviets hoped for a base from which to
further their revolutionary cause. Afghanistan could, theoretically,
provide such a base to the south. Ideologically, the treaty was
consistent with Lenin's statements concerning Nationalities policy.
Kovalenko confirms this position quoting the text from the agreement. . ,
"The High Contracting Parties, recognizing their mutual independence
1
^d'Encausse, Lenin . 1 04.
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and binding themselves to respect it, now enter into regular diplomatic
relations." This QssQntially meant that the Soviet state recognized the
sovereignty of the Afghan state. Adding the statement. . ."The RSFSR
and Afghanistan pledged 'not to enter into any military or political
agreement with a thina State which might prejudice on of the
Contracting Parties." 18 . . . the Soviets hoped to consolidate and secure
their position by eliminating the possibility of an offensive coalition being
formed by Afghanistan with any other party. While preventing either
party from entering into external alliances, and thereby, effectively
establishing Afghanistan's role as a buffer state, this treaty also
formalized Afghanistan's commitment not to aid Basmachi insurgents
seeking support in Afghan territory.
The Treaty of Friendship was a cause for happiness initially after
its signature in 1921. However, AmanullalVs elation was not to last long.
He began to doubt the sincerity of the Soviet commitment to the
agreement. Fears stemmed, at first, from Muslim suppression in the
Soviet Central Asian Republics. These initial fears were aggravated by
an infusion of refugees to Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. Here,
again, is a situation analogous to the flow of refugees from
Afghanistan to Pakistan since the 1979 Soviet invasion. Amanullah's
dismay was exacerbated following the first Soviet invasion in 1925.
Although by today's standards this incident was small, it was to be the
catalyst for reduction of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The
controversy centered over a small island in the center of the Amu
18 Kovalenko,20.
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Darya River, which had never been definitively identified as either
Soviet or Afghan. "Uzbek! refugees from Soviet Central Asia moved to
the island, including some Basmachi, who used it as a base for raids
into Soviet territory." 19
As the Soviets attempted to consolidate their position within the
fonmer Russian Tzarist Empire, they turned their policy from world
wide revolution to building communism within one country. In
Afghanistan, the age old problem, between the central ruler and tribal
disunity continued. Afghan-British relations wene hampered by Kabul's
inability to settle the Pathan tribal attacks on British interests in
India.20 In 1327 and 1928, the Amin undertook a trip to Eunope, seeking
support and developmental assistance. While the excursion was the
opening of Eunopean interest in Afghanistan's future, it marked the
beginning of the end of Amanullah Js rule. As Adam Adamec writes, the
domestic drawbacks in the end were ultimately greater that the
foneign policy advances.
Assessing Amanullah's visit to Europe is difficult. Economically the visit would have
been beneficial, even though immediate expenditures probably exceeded the gains; in
terms of foreign policy, the visit was an unqualified success; but in terms of domestic
policy, it was no doubt as important factor in strengthening Amanullah's opposition,
contributing to hi 3 downfall some 3ix months later.21
Returning home fnom Europe, the Amin began a senies of reforms
that could easily be intenpreted as westernizing the country. The
situation was similar to some of the later changes made in Iran by Reza
Shah. Changes affected finance, education-especially the rights of
1




military studgnts to religious education-and the status of women in the
society. His reform measures earned Amanullah the distrust of many
segments of the society. The majority of Afghans did not have the
same commitment to westernization and reform as the Amir. As such,
he lost popularity and legitimacy. When the ulema began to seep,
change, hostility against the nulen set in. By January 1929 general
revolt broke out against the Amin.
This situation was a challenge to Soviet intenests. As the leader
of a World nevolutionany movement, ideologically, it was in their best
interest to aid the rebellion. Politically, it was a challenge to the status
of the Soviet state because since their recognition of the primacy of
the interests of the Soviet state in 1921, state to state relations had
taken priority over ideological interests. Unofficially, the Soviets
decided to assist the falling regime. Hammond compares this decision to
previous Soviet resolutions to intervene in Turkey and Iran. His position
is that since the communist movements in these nations were
nonexistent or weak the potential for communist government was also
weak. But since each of these nations were headed by men who were
against the British influence, it was more pragmatic to support the
anti-imperialistic position. "The cause of world revolution was
subordinated to the national interests of the Russian state."'22
Hammond calls the Soviet decision to aid the restoration of
Amanullah to the throne the "Second Soviet Invasion" of Afghanistan.
Other authors, Adamec and Dupree in particular, do not interpret the
22Hammond, 15.
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Qvent Qxactly in thQ same fashion. ThQ precisg dQtails of this incictent
are not known, but what appears to have occurred is that the Soviets
allowed a force of insurgents— either Afghans living in the Soviet Union
or Uzbeks of similar appearance—under the leadership of the former
Ambassador to Moscow, to cnoss from Soviet Central Asia into
Afghanistan. The objective of this force was to attempt a counter coup
to restore Amanullah to his throng. Their effonts were cut short when
the Amir abdicated his throne and left the country. AmanullatVs
brother assumed the throne, but only remained a matter of days
before following him out of the country. With the Amin and his brother
gone fnom the country, thene was no longen any reason for Soviet
suppont. The disputed force withdrew in June 1929.
Amanullah's abdication left a TadjiM rebel leader, Bacha-i Saqqua
to begin a harried and short period of rule. He was only temporarily
able to remain a legitimate and effective leader. His rule was
challenged from the beginning by various groups attempting to restore
Amanullah to power. By the end of October 1929 he was forced out
and eventually executed. Nadir Khan, a member of the Afghan royal
family was clear to come to the throne, his effort supported mostly by
his family and Pashtun tribal confederation. 23 Nadir Khan is known for
pacifying the tribes of Afghanistan and thereby consolidating his
23Variou3 historians differ in their interpretations of whether or not the Britain
supported Nadir Khan's assumption of power. Newell in The Struggle for Afg hanistan saus that
Nadir "seized the throne with the support of the British, who feared tribal uprisings on their
Indian borders." [p38] John C. Griffiths, in Afg hanistan: Ke u to a Conti nent ( Boulder , Co:
Westview, 1980,51. states that Nadi r Khan came to power solel g bg the actions of the tri bes
that supported him on both sides of the Durrand line. Most other writers tend to agree with Mr.
Griffiths.
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position. He was able to win their confidence by returning to Islamic
practice, moderate leadership and avoiding Amanullah's mistake of
forced westernization. Nadir Khan believed in social and economic
development, but without forced measures. Tribal unrest in India
figured into the equation of how much support the British could be seen
giving the new Amir of Afghanistan.24 Relations vis-a-vis the Soviets
returned to a more or less normal stance.
Under the tutelage of Nadir Khan, Afghan foreign relations could
best be described as pragmatic. He is described as more oriented
towards the British than Amanullah. However, relations with Moscow
nemained on a relatively friendly basis. The Soviets were again the
first nation to recognize Nadir Khan and his government after his
assumption of power.25 Anglo-Afghan relations centered upon the
continuing tribal problems along the Indian Northwest frontier, while
the Basmachi problem in the Soviet Central Asian Republics complicated
Soviet-Afghan relations.
The 1926 Soviet-Afghan treaty had helped bring the Basmachi
problem under control in the Central Asian Republics, along with
intense efforts by the Red Army. Michael Rywkin writes that a
combination of domestic polices in these republics helped bring the
basmachi challenge into check. These domestic efforts included; land
reform, a Communist Party organization, offers of amnesty to those
24Adarnec, 1 75. States that the British were ambivalent in their position towards Nadir's
assumption of power. Their primary concern according to this author was not allowing Nadir Shah
to be viewed as having accepted aid from the British. British fear was that if Afghans perceived
that Nadir Shah was pro- British, then he would not be accepted as Amir.
1
25rjollins, 1 2 and Adarnec, 1 34. Again Newell disagrees with their analysis stating that
Soviet. -Afghani relation were not friendly from this point onward.
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members of the BasmtichQStvo willing to change sides, allowing
concessions concerning the practice or islamic traditions, such as
religious schooling and shaniat courts, and finally the effect of the long
wean down of the general populace making the resistance effort seem
futile. Additionally the New Economic Policy, which loosened
constrictions on private trade and food nationing, helped reverse the
anti-communist sentiment of the population, However, in 1929, the
beginning of forced collectivization helped to briefly revive the
movement.26
In 1930, one of the Soviet chief concerns along the Amu Darya
border with Afghanistan was eliminating the basmachi resistance
crossing the international border on raiding actions. Basmachi raiders
continually sought refuge in the northern areas of Afghanistan,
frustrating Soviet Army attempts to pu-t a stop to their actions.
"Finally, in June 1930, the exasperated Soviet forces crossed the Amu
Darya and pursued Ibrahim Beg (a basmachi leader from the early
1920s who fled to Afghanistan in 1924 and neinitiated rebel stnil-ies in
1930) for about forty miles into Afghanistan. They failed to capture him,
but the invasion naturally alarmed the Afghan government.
"
2?
Afghanistan, alarmed, responded by sending a force north across the
Hindu Kush mountains to pursue the basmachi leader. This situation led
26Ruwkin, 43.
2 ?From Hammond, 1 2. also see Pipes, Formation
.
256-260. Dupree, 460-461 . and
Adamec, 202. Hammond calls this cross border hot pursuit the "Third Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan". Fraser-Tytler, 230, on the other hand states that "This was the first and so far as I
know the last occasion on which Soviet forces have violated the northern boundary of Afghanistan
since it was laid down." Note that Fraser-Tytler was a member of the British diplomatic staff from
1 91 0- 1 941 in India and Afghanistan.
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to the Soviet-Afghan 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression, a
renegotiated version of the 1926 Treaty, by which both sides promised
to respect each others neutrality, prevent activities causing political or
military injury in the others territory. They also promised not to engage
in any form of secret pacts with neighboring powers. The Soviet goal in
this agreement was to offset the activities of any partisan force
operating against their government in Central Asia.28
The principle significance of the 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and
Nonaggression perhaps was not the immediate result of quelling the
Basmachi movement's operations from inside Afghanistan. KovalenUo,
writing in the Soviet perspective, says "it envisaged the adoption of
necessary measures in event of a threat to Afghanistan from British
imperialism and attempts to use Afghan territory for provocations
against the Soviet Union."29 Beyond this, the treaty was used as
justification for Soviet demands on the Afghan government to expel
Nazis during World War II and to limit relations with the United States
during the post-war period. The agreement, though at first for the
Soviets only a defensive accord, became an instrument by which the
Soviets could legalistically control the foreign relations of Afghanistan
by prohibiting alignment with the west.
Nadir Shah's rule did not last long. Like so many of his
predecessors he was assassinated. Nadis Shah's death brought his
son Mohammad Zahir to the throne. Mohammad Zahir is characterized




important to notQ that during the early years of his reign, ana until
arten the second World War, his policies were controiiea by his
uncles. This is normal in Islamic, societies; something that westerners
often do not realize.30 Afghanistan's pnoblems during the years leading
up to the Second World War continued to be dominatea by tribal
disharmony. These problems were especially acute along the Indian
border. Domestically, during the early years of Mohammad Zahir's
reign, unrest was the result of policies which stressea Pathan
nationalism. These measures included institutionalizing the Pashto
language as a vehicle of mobilization as opposed to the traditional use
of Persian.31 Afghan modernization continued to be an important
aspect for the new regime. In order to accomplish modernization, some
source of external assistance was necessary.
A key priority was the creation of a sophisticated military establishment.
Development programs also involved the construction of irrigation facilities,
educational institutions, and modern medical installations. . The government needed
external assistance for all these undertakings. Hashim Khan (the Prime Minister) did
not want to commit himself to a single regional country, or to countries that appeared
to have an interest in Afghan affairs. He therefore avoided offers by the Soviet Union
and Britain and turned instead to Germany. Germany in 1 935 v/as dominated by Adolf
Hitler. . as Hitler endeavored to spread his influence into the Middle East and South
Asia, Afghanistan's request for aid was quickly acknowledged.32
At the outset of the war Afghanistan stood challenged to remain
non-aligned and neutral on face loss of sovereignty by invasion and and
possible partition by the Soviets and British, fighting against the Nazis.
30Dupree, Ch 22 discusses the benefits of this type of rule and particularly how it
applied to Mohammad Zahir's reign.
*« Interview with Professor Eden Nabi, 1 8 March 1 986. Prof. Nabi discussed how Ethno-
Linguistic polices in Afghanistan have plagued various leaders and how the Soviets have used
Nationality Policies to co-opt various groups to support or at least not challenge their position in
Afghanistan si nee 1979.
32Ziring, 50.
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FacQd with undesirable alternatives, it was an easy matter for the
Afghan government to expel all German citizens when demanaed.
In summary, the inter war yeans fon Afghanistan manked the
nations emergence fnom the isolation of the 'Great Game' played by the
Russians and the Bnitish. Amenican intenests nemained unmoved
towands a land, distant and isolated, which offened few opportunities,
The Soviet Union's intenests toward Afghanistan duning this peniod
wene dominated by thein own intennal challenges of consolidating gains
and 'building communism in one nation'. Joseph Collins describes
Soviet-Afghan nelations during these yeans as "cordial, pragmatic,
state-to-state nelations, guite obviously oniented toward keeping the
southenn bonden fnee of tunbulence and instability, while keeping Gneat
Bnitain fnom using Afghanistan as a base fon operations against the
USSR."33 Thene is little evidence duning this peniod to make one believe
that Soviet intentions long tenm were to dominate and launch a
campaign of wonld domination fnom thein southenn flank. Soviet
intenests throughout this time frame wene primarily defensive in
nature, conditioned by their experiences duning the Russian Civil War
and in Wonld War Two. And finally, Bnitish intenest had taken on a
totally new character, driven primarily by their loss of influence in India
by the fonmenly unchallenged Raj.
While during the Second Wonld War Afghanistan gave into the
wishes of the Allies by expelling Nazis, Afghan isolation was a
pragmatic course that guaranteed neutnality during the war.
33Col1ins, 13.
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Neutrality in South Asia was critical to both the Soviet Union and
Britain who were more than sufficiently occupiea with fighting
elsewhene. Afghanistan did not play a similar role as Iran in the
resupply and maintenance of lines of communication because of its
nemote geographic position. However, had Afghanistan gone to the Axis
powens and had the Axis powens been able to use Afghan tenritony fon
an operational base, the history of British India and Soviet Centnal Asia
might have been quite different.3 **
The Second World War is an important peniod to this study
because it marhs the end of American isolationism and the beginning of
a new era in American interest in World Onder issues. As a measure
of war time expansion onto the world scene, an Amenican diplomatic
legation was established in Kabul in 1342. It was subsequently upgnaded
to the status of an Embassy in 1948.35 Unlike the history of Iran in the
Second Wonld Wan, Afghanistan seems to have stood still duning this
period, emenging into a diffenent type of wonld power balance often the
wan. As the United States and the Soviet Union dnew the battle lines of
the 'Cold Wan', Afghanistan netunned to its nole as a buffer state
between new powens playing a new 'Gneat Game'. The next section
will examine the development of Soviet and American interests in
Afghanistan duning the cold wan period.
34ln reality, it is quite doubtful that the Afghans would have been able to support Axis
presence early in the war because of the vigilance of the British and Soviets. This fact is especially
obvious, once the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran is considered. This invasion and the
subsequent stationing of allied troops, virtually cut Afghanistan off from the rest of the world.
Adamec, Ch 8, discusses the WWII period and Afghan capabilities.
35Adamec, 263.
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C. From Cold War to Detente: Afghanistan in the Balance
The end of the Second world. War Drought with it the greatest change
in United States Foreign policy and position on the international scene
in history. No longer was the US to hide behind the isolation of the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Instead the US would assume a role as a
leaden in Wonld Politics. The end of the wan also manUed a major'
change in South Asia. Gneat Bnitain, suffening fnom the losses it
incunned duning the wan and pnessuned by the voice of nationalism,
withdnew fnom the extension of the empine it had built in the 1800s. In
1947, Gneat Britain formally necognized the independence of its South
Asian holdings. India was pantitioned into a Hindu and Muslim homeland.
The end of the Second Wonld Wan also henalded the end of the Brand
Alliance between the Soviet Union, Bnitain and the United States. This
section will tnace the development of US and Soviet Interest in
Afghanistan fnom a peniod of intense conflict duning the Cold Wan to
the nelaxation of tension duning the ena of Detente. Since 1945 the
conflict and confnontation between the United States and the Soviet
Union has nemained a centnal issue of intennational politics. Against
this bacUgnound on the wonld scene, Afghanistan stnuggled to maintain
its national integnity.
The post wan peniod neveals thnee main goals of Afghan foneign
policy; non-alignment, independence and development. 1 Afghanistan's
foneign relations were complicated, as in the past, by internal politics
and tnaditional disagneements oven hen eastenn bondens. Innedentism
'Collins, 17.
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oven tho newly-created North West Frontier ProvincG in Pakistan,
and the fate of those Pathan tribesmen residing there, ractored into
the course of external relations throughout this period. As with so
many other nations in the post war world, development figured to be a
major goal for Afghanistan. Development meant catching up with the
rest of the world; be it east or west did not matter to Afghanistan's
rulers. Development meant relations with the north- the Soviet Union-
and this in turn led to the infusion of unwanted Marxist Socialism as a
new form of political expression.2
An analysis of the chronology of Great Powers relations with
Afghanistan during this era reveals four distinct periods: (1) 1345-47; a
period of idealism following the defeat of the Axis forces. (2) 1947-53;
drawing the Cold War battle lines and Afghanistan's exclusion from the
Western camp. (3) 1953-63; a distinct period of tilting to the Soviets,
and (4) 1963-73; A continued struggle for independence but a period of
inclusion into the Soviet sphere. The evolution of Soviet influence in
Afghanistan could be described as setting the hook between 1953-63
and snagging the fish between 1963-73. In 1973, a military coup
against the constitutional monarchy marked the beginning of the end of
Afghan independence.
During the period from the end of the wan until the pantition of
India in 1947, US policy toward Afghanistan was chanactenized by the
idealism of the post war era. Immediately after the war the US was
concerned primanily with reconstnuction and consolidation, pnimanily in
2Adarnec, 263.
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Europe. Afghanistan was too far away and of little significance. For
instance, the Now YorW Times Index for 1345 shows no entries at all
fon Afghanistan. The Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine, instruments
of US concern for the post-war world dealt with Europe and the
Northern Tier. Afghanistan was at the extreme eastenn edge of the
Northern Tier and in US eyes retained its former position as a buffer
state. 3
Afghanistan, idealistically, saw the United States as a new
powen capable of influencing its relations with both the Soviets and the
British. This was the era of the idealism; the formation of the United
Nations was supposed to pnevent another great wan fonm occurring.
Afghanistan petitioned the United Nations fon admission in July 1946.
US sounces chanactenized this nequest as "just noutine because of hen
pivotal position in the land defense of India. . .and because of the
cunnent battle fon influence between Bneat Britain and the Soviet
Union/' The British wene concerned, as they had always been , about
the state of Soviet-Afghan nelations following a minon settlement
between Afghanistan and the Soviets oven water nights.4
Afghanistan's leadens believed in the philosophy embodied in the newly
cneated United Nations. So much so that in August 1946, the Afghan
Pnemien, Mahamoud Khan Ghazi, is quoted as saying. . .
I am convinced that America's championship of the small nations guarantees my
country's security against aggression. . America's attitude is our salvation. . .For the
first time in our history we are free of the threat of great powers' using our
3 Kuni holm, 299.
4
"Afghanistan Asks Admission to UN", New York Times . 6 July 1 946, p3.
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mountain passes as pathways to empire. Nov/ we can concentrate our talents and
resources en bettering the living conditions of our ovn people.
^
The Soviet Union duning this period was occupied by a series of
seemingly more important tasks. First, the need to rebuild, after years
of war, took intense effort and became the Soviet priority. Most of the
Soviet Union's attention in the foreign policy realm was directed
towards the countries of East Europe, where the process of building
Peoples Democracies was underway. Soviet attention was focused at
transforming the countries where it had occupation forces.
Furthermore, the they came into conflict with the United States over-
Greece and Azerbaijan in the Northern Tier, leaving Afghanistan on the
peripheral edge of concern. Under Stalin the Soviets adopted a 'two-
camp- theory. This theory assumed that Afghanistan, as one of the
independent states of Asia and the Middle East, was a puppet of the
imperialist Western powers and not able to formulate its own policy.^
Since Soviet attention was focused elsewhere, Afghanistan continued
a course of friendly, yet cautious relations with the Soviet Union.
Afghanistan was content to try for the attention and assistance of the
west in its development scheme.
After the start of the Cold War, the idealism of the early years
following the end of the Second World War faded. The partition of
India marked the end of British influence in South Asia. The legacy of
the British Raj remained prominent on the Indian sub-continent, but
their presence was gone. America, as the first super power, stood
5
"Afgh8n Premier to reduce Army", New York Times . 9 August 1 946, p5.
6Co11ins, 18.
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needy to 5tep into the vacuum of British influence. As such, the United
States took up a policy to "contain the expansion of Soviet and
Communist influence on a global basis. Containment policy, as adopted
by the United States, meant drawing the line beyond which Communist
influence would not advance. The objective was to restore the balance
of power and status quo throughout Europe and Asia.
There were two ways to accomplish the objectives of
Containment policy, One way was to establish a so called ''''perimeter-
defense" which held all "rimlands" in equal importance. The other
method, as George Kennan suggested, was a strongpoint defense. A
strongpoint defense meant that the US would actively employ limited
defense resources "where they can serve most effectively to bring
production, fneedom, and confidence back to the world". A strongpoint
defense required that the Administnation make important decisions
about where the most critical need existed. It assumed that all
American intenests are not equal and that the US "could tolerate the
loss of peripheral areas provided that this did not impair its ability to
defend those that were vital." Kennan indicated that the main method
for deciding vital from peripheral intenests . . ."was, of counse, the
pnesence of industnial-militany capacity, togethen with necessany
sounces of raw materials and secure lines of communication."7
In implementation this policy nequined that US priority go to the
pnotection of Eunopean and Japanese neconstnuction effonts, since
that is whene the potential was located according to the
7-John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical A p praisal of Postwar American
National Securitu Policy
.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1 982), 56-60.
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Administration, With the exception of US efforts during the Azerbaijan
Crisis, under the auspices of the United Nations, American priority
remained in these areas. Since most of South Asia did not meet the
Administration's definition of a critical area, the loss to Soviet control
was not viewed as an immediate danger to US security. US point
defense in Asia centered on "selected island strongpoints-Japan,
Okinawa, the Philippines- while avoiding potentially debilitating
commitments on the mainland."8
US interests were furthered challenged by the start of the
Korean War. The Nonth Korean attack served to awaken the
Administration to the need for an all out perimeter defense. But the US
for the time being was occupied with another war. N5C-68, while
effectively changing the strong-point defense concept, did not change
US commitments toward Afghanistan.
Afghanistan fell outside an area of interest, since it was a buffer
to the Soviet Union and in the undeveloped area of South West Asia. In
the former British sphere of influence, the United States only
pretended to fill the vacuum. Despite the American lack of interest,
Afghanistan sought to develop relations with the United States.
America was the first country approached for military assistance
after the war. Newell writes that the US turned down the bid because
it might have been a provocation to the Soviet Union,9 an excuse that




Meantime.. traditional problems took precedence over
international politics. Afghanistan was the only member nation of the
United Nations to vote against Pakistan's admission to the United
Nation on the grounds that. , ."the people of the North West Frontier
Province had not had a fair plebiscite to determine their relationship
with the new Moslem state. . .they had lacked an opportunity J free from
shy kind of influence' to choose between independence or becoming
part of Pakistan" 10 Although a plebiscite was allowed in the NVVFP. it
concerned whether the province should become a member of Pakistan
or remain an Indian State.
On Afghanistan's part, it appeared that the West and especially
the United States was a preferred partner to the Soviet Union. Afghan
leaders viewed the United States as the most reliable partner. In 1948,
Kabul placed $30 million worth of construction contracts for roads and
dams with an Idaho construction firm. Contrary to a popular belief in
the United States at the time, this was done without the benefit of US
Post War Relief funds, as in many other nations. Kabul paid for most of
its improvement projects through the sale of karakul sheepskins,
leading to the conclusion that. . ."the country's financial position as
analogous to that of a poor man who lives within his income and has
money in the bank. In other words. . .the country is a good risk." 1 1
According to the same report Afghanistan was also characterized as
not being a receptive climate for communist ideology and her relations
with the Soviet Union as guarded and on an extremely practical basis.
I
°"Pakistan, Yemen Admitted To U.N.", New York T1rne3 . 1 October 1 947, p5.
I
I
"Afghan Sentiment Said to Favor U.S.", New York Times , 27 November 1 949, p 8.
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LatQr reports discussed Soviet pressure on the government of
Afghanistan as subtle and difficult to detect. 'While Soviet propaganda
continued to be intense in the European sphere, it was obvious that
Asia was also a target of expansionist aims. At one point it was
rumored that the Soviets were applying pressure to Afghanistan to
admit just as many Russians as Americans to their kingdom . ] 2
Soviet interest, after their forced withdrawal from Azerbaijan,
was mostly directed toward the Pushtunistan issue. In 1349, the issue
of autonomy for the 6 to 7 million Pathan tribesmen living in the
Pakistani North West Frontier Province began to heat up. This issue
dominated reports on Afghanistan and Pakistan in US news sources.
The Soviets were interested in supporting a separatist movement. As
such, they began to develop relations with the Afghans, offering them
a four year trade agreement. After Pakistan closed the Afghan-
Pakistan border, Afghan leaders had no other avenue to development
than to the north-the Soviet Union. According to Thomas Hammond. . .
This has often caused Afghanistan to seek Soviet aid. The Soviets have, of course., been
happy to support Afghanistan against Pakistan since Pakistan is a friend of the United
States. After border clashes in 1950, Pakistan closed the frontier.; during the next
five years, trade between Afghanistan and the USSR increased by 50 percent. This
turn toward the Soviet Union gained further impetus when the United States refused
to give arms to Afghanistan, but chose instead to send military aid to Pakistan. . . ' 3
The year 1953 marked a distinct change in the policy of the Soviet
Union towards Afghanistan. Two events, which heralded this change,
were the death of Stalin and King Zahir's appointment of his cousin and
brother-in-law, Daoud, as Prime Minister. Stalin's death meant the end
12NewYorkTime3 . 29 October 1947,p22and 25 October 1948, pi 0.
^Hammond, 24.
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of thQ Two-Camp theory in relations with Third World nations.
According to Adam Ulam, Stalin's foreign policies had "created an air of
tension" and that his successors felt that a new series of policies
were needed. ^ His death therefore marked the emergence of a new
period in Soviet foreign relations. Daoud, on the other hand, is
characterized as an efficient, "enlightened, forward looking
administrator who built up the economy and expanded education".
Under his guidance, Afghanistan turned to the Soviet Union and
"established closer ties economically and militarily. The aim of these
actions was development. In 1954, Afghanistan appealed again for US
military assistance. Kabul was refused, and this triggered a set of
circumstances which were to ultimately bring Afghanistan into the
Soviet sphere. 15
In Washington, the strategy of containment had turned to the
age of coalitions. In April 1954, the US signed mutual defense pacts with
Turkey and Pakistan. The South East Treaty Organization (5EATO) was
established in September 1954, and included Pakistan. The objective of
this treaty was to stop Communist gains in Southeast Asia through
mutual aid. In 1955, the Baghdad Pact was created, seeking a
defensive agreement in the Middle East. Turkey and Pakistan both
joined. The Baghdad Pact later became known as CENTO (Central
Treaty Organization) and was supported by the United States.
Afghanistan was not a member of any of these organizations.
First, because any outside treaties were prohibited by the 1931
1 4Ulam, Ex pansion and Co -existence . 543.
15Hammond, 25.
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Nonaggression Treaty with the Soviet Union. Second, due to
Afghanistan's position in South West Asian politics. As described by
Alfned Monks. . /'This strengthening of Pakistan (referring to Pakistan's
inclusion in the US scheme of Mutual Defense Treaties) was viewed in
Afghanistan as weakening Afghanistan's power, which, in turn reduced
the possibility that Pakistan would come to terms with Afghanistan
over the border question." 16 When Pathan tribesmen on the border
began to agitate for reform, Pakistan responded by border closure
across the NWFP and Baluchistan. With the border closed and
Afghanistan's major route to the ocean and export facilities eliminated,
the only option was to turn to the north for assistance. The Soviets
gladly responded.
It would be totally unfair to the US position to not examine fully
the issue of aid. While the Soviets stepped in with a series of
programs, the United States still continued to provide some assistance,
primarily economic in nature. In 1954, Afghanistan concluded a $5 million
deal with Czechoslovakia for cement plants, a textile mill, a leather
processing plant, and road building equipment. Kabul also concluded
agreements with the USSR for grain elevators, oil storage tanks, road
building equipment, concrete mixing facilities and hydroelectric stations.
US programs were initiated under the Mutual Security Program and
were designed for Education, Agriculture, Community Development,
and Health (in order of funding for FT 1955). 17 The tables below
1 6Alfred L. Monks, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
.
(Washington DC: American
Enterprise I n3titute for Public Policy Research, 1981), 12.
1
^Charles Wolf, Jr.. Foreign Aid: Theory
,
and Practice in South Asia
.
(Princeton, M.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1960), Tables 19, 24, 27, and 33.
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compare US to Soviet bloc aid programs and show the trends of US
assistance to Afghansitan compared to other South West Asian
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DQspite American limited efforts to provide developmental
assistance funds, Afghanistan remained on the outer edge of US
national secunity efforts in the Middle East or South West Asia. The
Soviets provided equally appealing long term loans, in greater quantities
and nepayable in tenms of Afghan agricultural produce. According to
Alfred Monks, Afghan acceptance of Soviet aid in large quantities led to
an opinion in the United States that Afghanistan had become a Soviet
satellite. Speculation extended to the political onientation of Afghan
militany officens tnained in the Soviet Union. Afghanistan continued a
non-aligned, neutral line of foreign policy. "Yet, the American concern
was justified, since Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan during
that period was extensive; by 1973 it amounted to about $1.5 billion, far
surpassing that fnom the United States to China." 18
Bu 1961 the issue aaain became a concern between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. It continued for eighteen months with sponatic fighting
and ambushes along the borden between the two states. Depending
upon the sounce, the Pnime Minister. Daoud, was eithen dismissed or
resigned in an effont to resolve the border dispute. The King felt that
with Daoud in control, Afghanistan had tilted too close to the Soviets,
and had come too close to beginning a wan with Pakistan oven the
Pushtunistan issue. In Manch 1963, Daoud was gone, and Afghanistan
nonmalized nelations with Pakistan. 19 Howeven, Daoud did initiate
1 8Monks, 1 4.
1
^Dupree, 554. j$ the strongest supporter of Daoud's actions as Primer. While Collins,
23. Hammond, 25 and Rubinstein, 1 32. are less inclined to give Daoud credit for progressive
actions in the interest of the Afghan nation. Dupree reports more from first hand experience,
havi rig written extensivel y on Afghanistan from 1 950 -1971.
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extensive development plans, domestically and open ties with the great
powers, especially with the Soviet Union. Moscow's policy of Peaceful
Co-existence with states of differing political systems eased the way
for the opening of relations.
Soviet policy during the 1953-1963 time frame had achieved its
goals. Afghanistan had remained outside the Western camp and had
become increasingly dependent upon Soviet sources, In the
Constitutional Monarchy time frame which followed, when Afghanistan
attempted to be more western in orientation, Soviet-Afghan ties
continued to be important. Soviet leaders could point to Afghanistan,
proudly, and use it as an example of how Third World nations could
profit by relations with a communist nation. "Indeed, from Moscow's
perspective. . .Afghanistan was a showplace for Soviet salesmanship in
the Third World. . .and Afghanistan's heavy dependence on Soviet
economic, technical and military assistance permitted a degree of
penetration unmatched anywhere else in the Third World, without
seeming to jeopardize its independence."2°
According to Joseph Collins, the most successful aspect of
Soviet policy in this period was public relations. Soviet leaders couid
brag about how closely they related with Afghanistan's leaders and
how the Afghans shared the Soviet line of thinking on international
tensions. When the Shah of Iran decided in 1 962 not to allow the US to
base missiles in his country, "An Izvestiia correspondent with a talent
for exaggeration even attributed the Shah of Iran's decision. . .to a visit
20 Rubiristeiri, 133.
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the Shah made to Afghanistan, 'he was able to see, . .the fruitfulness of
that country's good-neighbor relations with the Soviet Union and to
ascertain that the- policy of peaceful coexistence. , .is bolstered
everyday. . ."21 Afghanistan was compared to Finland in its wisdom of
maintaining a policy of good relations with its nonthenn neighbor,
Soviet policy tended to remain guiet and discrete about action in
the South West Asian region. The Soviets preferred to be seen as a
fniendly and honorable neighbor. When Pakistan went to war with India
in 1965 and 1971 the Soviets preferred to be seen as the peacemakers,
inviting the combatants to Tashkent for negotiations. When
Afghanistan suffered internal problems after the king issued a
constitution in 1964 and through the series of internal riots, and five
prime ministers, the Soviets stood by the sidelines guietly biding thein
time. It was critical to the Soviet position to remain guiet because of
the continued trouble with China after the Sino-Soviet rift, the series
of mutual defensive alliances the US had created in Asia and the Middle
East, and because of their own fears, having not yet achieved nuclean
parity with the United States. Even after achieving nuclear parity,
noughly in 1965, the Soviets nemained guiet on the Central Asian fnont.
Their fears were exacerbated and attention diverted by the 1 969 Sino-
Soviet border clashes and 1972 Sino-US rapprochement.
Soviet-Afghan relations continued to grow warmly, even though
the king pneferred the United States. Soviet assistance projects and
military training of Afghan officers in the Soviet Union increased.
21 Collins,25.
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Additionally, Afghanistan and thQ Soviet Union SQQmQd to agree on
intennational issues. "During the period 1963-1973, the Afghans voiced
support or concern at one time on another for: general disarmament,
the progress of de-colonization, Soviet policy toward the Vietnam war,
and Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute."22
In stark comparison, US interest in Afghanistan continued to
nemain distant. Assistance programs increased after the Mutual
Security Pact period in 1962 and in the early stages in the Foreign
Assistance Act, (see figures above) but, as Vietman increasingly
occupied the minds of US decision makens, assistance guantities began
to slow. From the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, through the
commitment of US combat troops in 1965 and the 1968 TET Offensive
and turbulent domestic unrest in America, US policy slowly began to
change. Under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, US policy
had tended to take on global commitments and become universalistic.
The change of American interest in global commitments, so intensely
shaped by the Vietman war, was announced by President Nixon, in July
1969 in his Suam speech. 23 The Nixon Doctrine held that the US would
maintain all treaty obligations and provide a nuclear umbrella, but at
lower levels US troops would not be committed in favor of economic
assistance. In South West Asia this meant that Iran would be the





ThQ US intgrQst towards Afghanistan remained oriented only
toward humanitarian cousqs. It was gGnQrally recognized that
Afghanistan had a relationship with the Soviet Union which inhibited
American interests from developing further. According to the US
Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert 6. Neuman. .
,
The United States has long understood that Afghanistan has had little choice but to have
close relations with the Soviet Union. Among the factors are: the long border, the
slowly developing desire to transform the economy and concomitant need for massive
economic assistance; the decision to have a modern military force; and the
intermittent preoccupation with its quarrels with Pakistan. The Soviets responded to
these opportunities and since 1 953 they have assiduously exploited the situation and
developed a strong position here with considerable and growing influence and
leverage.24
In relations with the Soviet Union, under the Nixon Administration,
a distinct change came about with the advent of Detente. To the
American administration, Detente supposedly meant the relaxation of
international tensions, specifically with the Soviet Union, and
specifically with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I] as a
background for reducing the proclivity for going to nuclear war, To the
Nixon Administration, relations with the Soviet Union and building upon
the "restraint, reciprocity and rhetoric" encumbent in the process of
Detente, became an important, if not over-riding, goal.25 Whether or
not Detente was the major goal of Washington's "Sovietocentric"
policies during the Nixon/Kissinger time frame is not the subject of this
argument. However, it is important to recognize that the strategy used
by the Administration was an attempt to deal with the Soviets on the
basis of negotiations, which would convince the Soviets to modify their
^^Airgram no. A- 71 from Kabul to Department of State, 26 June 1971, p 4-5
concerning the Ambassador's Annual Policy Review. Quoted in Hammond, 27.
25Adam Ularn, Dangerous Relations
.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1 983) , 1 40.
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behavior.26 jj-jq effoct of this strategy on US interosts in Afghanistan
is two fold. First, sinco Afghanistan remained beyond the direct sphere
of US influence, American concerns were peripheral. Second, if a Great
Power controversy over this area did occur, the US tactic would have
been to attempt to talk the Soviets into a solution rather than by any
action, further evidence of the non-vital nature of Afghanistan in the
eyes of the Administration.
This period in the history of Afghanistan's relations with the
great powers closed in 1973 with the end of the constitutional
monarchy. In summary, there are several factors which standout
during this time frame. First, for Afghanistan, the legacy of turmoil in
domestic politics continued as it had since the creation of an
independent state in the 1700s. In her foreign relations, irredentism
over the issue of Pushtunistan or the Pakistani continued. The primary
Afghan interest throughout these years continued to be that of
development, while retaining a non-aligned, independent position vis-a-
vis the international political situation. Catching up meant just
developing to the level of the Second World, not the Western
mainstream. Conditions being what they were, once the door to US
assistance, which the Afghans believed to be the best way up, was
closed, there was little hesitation about accepting closer ties with the
Soviet Union.
From the Soviet perspective, the policy of peaceful co-existence
and cordial relations with Third world nations allowed aid to flow
26Gaddi3, 298.
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unQncumbered by any idQological ties. It was sufficient fan the Soviets
to lure Afghanistan away from the Western "imperialist''' camp. There
would be sufficient opportunity for ideological orientation at a later
time. Fnom the Afghan perspective this was a distinct change from the
immediate post war ero, when "a community of interest existed
between Afghanistan and the United States; both powers wanted to
see the Soviet Union contained."^ During the Daoud era the spark of
development had lit a desire to be like the nest of the wonld. The source
of aid mattened little.
Fnom the US perspective, despite Afghanistan's geographically
strategic position, this nation continued to remain on the fringe of
American interests. In the immediate post war era, America was
concerned with idealism and the formation of the United Nations to
insure world peace. As the superpowers drew the Cold War battle
lines and two great coalitions were formed, the United States showed
little interest in Afghanistan —even when Afghanistan attempted to
draw closer to the United States. Only when it appeared that
Azerbaijan was about to be absorbed into the Soviet Union did US
concerns fon Iran become important. But Iran was a separate case
from Afghanistan. The Truman Doctrine did not apply as far east as
this nation. US policy, to contain the Soviets, changed in form several
times in the post war era. Each change saw no improved position for
Afghanistan. In terms of defense, economic and world order level
interests, Afghanistan never figured into any American equation. The
27Adamec,263.
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US extended assistance to Afghanistan only in hope of forestalling any
tilt toward the Soviet camp. Whether one analyzes Afghanistan's
position using the orthodox on revisionist argument fon the post-wan
orientation of US national security policy, both frameworks lead to the
same conclusion in this case. Afghanistan was a peripheral interest for
the United States.
The Soviet position was perhaps the most opportunistic. As
Afghanistan tilted toward the Soviet camp, Soviet interests were
secured. Defensively, a non-aligned Afghanistan was the perfect non-
aligned neighbor. Once initial economic links were established the
Soviets derived the benefits that aid created. Aid was a cheap source
of influence, and the Soviets benefitted from a source of import for
natural gas and produce. In terms of Soviet ideology, Afghanistan
provided the perfect example for the Third World of the advances to
be made by relationships with a socialist nation. Legally, Afghanistan
had no option other than maintaining relations with the Soviets as
dictated by the 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression. The
Soviets were therefore in the best position to gain from a relationship.
After the Sino-Soviet split, and especially following the outbreak of
hostilities in 1969, Afghansitan became more important to the Soviet
Third World position and the Soviets sought to guard their gains in
Afghanistan.
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D. Death of a Monarchy and the Communist Seizure of Power;
1973-1978
By 1972 King Zahin's attempts at developing an effective
democratic constitutional monarchy had reached their limits. A series
of governments under various Prime Ministers had come to power and
failed. Even though the new constitution, signed into effect in 1964,
allowed greater freedoms for political activity and freedom of the
press, competition for power had "created a variety of political groups
with conflicting conceptions of a desirable political order". 1 In
December 1972, King Zahir installed the fifth Prime Minister in a series
since Daoud's departure, Moosa Shafiq. He was believed to be the
King's last and best chance at making the new system work. But the
new leader's actions were too little, too late. On 17 July, 1973 Daoud
returned to power via a military coup, supported by a band of leftist
military officers. c' For the superpowers, this was the beginning of a
new era of competition in the grand old legacy of the 'Great Game';
whether or not they wanted to play. This section will trace the
development of American and Soviet National Interests in Afghanistan,
from Daoud's coup in April 1973 until after his fall from power by
another in the long series of forceful takeovers in Afghanistan's
history.
The goal of Daoud's return was, in his words, to establish "a
republican system, consistent with the true spirit of Islam. . .to




^Henry S. Bradsher, Afg hanistan and the Soviet Union
.
(Durham, N.C.: Duke Press Policy
Series, 1983), 52-57.
144
establish a real democracy to serve the majority of the people, . ,", to
rid the society of the king's "corrupt system. . .based on. . .personal and
class interests, intrigues and demagoguery"3 According to Dupree,
one of Daoud's main goals was to save the nation from economic ruin.
Even though many of the Traditional religious leaders may not have
completely believed in the coup, they did respect Daoud for his previous
performance as the Prime Minister from 1953 until his dismissal in 1353.
Like religious leaders in Iran, Afghan Modernist and Traditionalist
religious leaders were weary of outside influence in their country and
Daoud offered some hope that these influences would be lessened and
that he would be able to rectify the deepening economic problems.4
Daoud's return could be called a classic example of a military coup. A
series of elements existed which almost predestined success:
"disaffection with the existing regime by hey elements of the
population, his own correct perception of the government's
vunerability to overthrow, secure advance planning by the
conspirators, and assurances by the military that the nations armed
forces would either remain neutral or support the coup."5
There were a number of factors which helped Daoud in his bid
for power. First, the overall weakness of the 'democratic' regime.
Second, the lack of any real option for the Afghan people in the way of
political parties or cross-cultural/cross-tribal organizations, by which
the people could have developed any "appreciation of truely national
^Hammond quotes a series of statements, messages and Press interviews in which Daoud




problems and inculcated in the pqopIq loyalties beyond tne immediate
calls or family and tnoe." Afghanistan remained a society dominated by
tribes witn little or no nationalistic base. And third, Daoud was carried
to power by the support of two critical groups; young military officers,
some or many of whom had been trained in the Soviet Union and a
coalition of factions of the Communist party of Afghanistan, the PDPA
(Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan).6
Daoud was highly regarded by the armed forces because of his
concern for the nation, for his support of the Baluch and Pashtu
nationalists in Pakistan, and for his initiation of economic development
projects. The members of the Perchamis and Khalg, the factions of the
Communist Party, looked favorably to Daoud because of his increased
volume of military and economic relations with the Soviet Union,
combined with his attitude toward economic development and support
of the public sector of the economy.7 It was his connection with the
Communist Party which raised the gneatest amount of speculation that
the Soviet Union was behind the destabilization of the Afghan
Constitutional monarchy. Speculation also extends to the Soviet role in
the entire coup, but allegations are difficult to prove except to note
that the Soviets were the first foreign government to acknowledge the
new Afghan government.
Although Anthony Arnold traces the PDPA movement back to the
late 1930s and 1940s during the days of the 'Young Afghan Movement',
^Arnold, 56-58. On this topic Arnold agrees with a number of other scholars, unlike
some of the other issues he discusses in his analysis of the Soviet Perspective of the Afghan
Invasion. Al 30 see Dupree, 753-768. Brad3her 53-59
^Negaran, 1 73.
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the party did not get its start until 1963, under the guiding hand of Nur
Mohammed Taraki. Taraki would later have a key part to play in the
April Revolution which ousted Daoud. The PDPA was officially formed
in 1365. Again, speculation exists as to whethen Daoud was chosen Py
the PDPA factions to Pe their figurehead leaden, on, in nevense,
whethen it was Daoud's scheme supported by middle ranking-military
officens who wene also PDPA members.8 The Khala and Pencham
factions angued that Afghanistan's economic pnoPlems wene caused by
''hen feudal economic stnuctune and concentration of wealth in the
hands of the Landlords and capitalists". Therefore, they felt the only
possible solution was a proletarian revolution. The concept of Class
struggle also extended to the global level, the US being identified as
leader of the capitalist camp. The DPM (Democratic Party of the
Masses or Khalgj argued that Afghanistan should continue to side with
the Soviets.9 Despite speculation among analysts, the PDPA did help
bring Daoud to power and maintain legitimacy-domestically and
externally with the Soviets-at least during the first two years of his
regime.
The support of the PDPA later factored into Daoud's downfall.
Two years later, in 1975, Daoud began to replace op shuffle leftist
officials with memPers his family and officers loyal to himself. This, in
turn, caused the PDPA to seek Daoud's removal. A numPer of additional
y Negaran, 1 73 charges that "Like Egyptian officers in a similar situation, the Pe re ha mi
and Khalqi officers apparently selected a suitable figure head for their coup. A number of other
scholars including Bradsher and Collins believe that it wa3 the other way around, that the PDPA
members happened to support Daoud who had masterminded the operation through series of
'seminars' he had led 31 nee hi 3 1 963 departure from government.
9 Negaran. 173.
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considerations may have figured into the equation for the successful
Communist seizure of power. Thomas Hammond argues that abolishing
the monarchy was a fatal flaw, 'TJaoud became founder, President, and
Prime Minister of the Republic of Afghanistan. Abolishing the monarchy
may have been a fatal mistake on Daoud's part. The masses were
accustomed to having a king, and the monarchy was one of the few
unifying forces in the diverse, loosely organized country." 10 Another
possible irritant was the nature of Daoud's regime. He is characterized
as an extremely autocratic leader, who refused to allow any
disagreement with his track of development. Daoud became
increasingly unpopular.
In his foreign policy after the overthrow of the monarchy, Daoud
continued cordial relations with the Soviet Union for at least two
years. The Soviets hoping to build the bond be-tween the two nations
gave the Afghans $437 million in economic credit in 1975. This was
quickly followed, in 1976, with a trade agreement which called for a 65
percent increase in trade by the year 1980. The table below indicates
the trade flow between these two nations between 1975 and 1977.
Soviet exports consisted of machine and industrial equipment, oil and
petroleum products, rolled steel, wheat and sugar. Soviet imports from
Afghanistan consisted of natural gas (which decreased from 64.3
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Source: Collins , The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan ,p40
Although polations wqpq fairly good up until 1977, following
improvQmQnt in tigs with Pakistan and Iran, potQntial for a switch
QxistQd which causQd conconn in thQ Soviet camp. In 1974 thQ Shah of
Iran tQmptQd Daoud with $2 billion of Qconomic aid to be disbunsQd ovon
a ten yean pgniod . ,
.
which would have made Iran Afghanistan's biggest aid donor, replacing the USSR. The
most important item of aid was to be the construction of a railroad from Kabul to Iran,
which eventually would have provided Afghanistan with a trade route through Iranian
ports, thereby decreasing Afghan dependence on Soviet trade. '
'
In 1975, thQ Shah of Iran offQPQd to Ignd, at Qasy tQnms, up to
$400 million for a sqpjqs of small projQcts. Qthor regional actors also
bQcamQ involved; Saudi Arabia grantQd $10 million and promised a $55





loans. However, by 1977, Iran was over-extended financially and had
to cut back on all aid programs. Any doubts in Moscow of Afghanistan's
dependence on the Soviets should have been cast down by this time. '2
The issue of irredentism over Pushtunistan again briefly rose to
prominence after Daoud's return to power in Kabul. Daoud was noted
as an outspoken supporter of the independence movement in the
Pakistani North West Frontier movement. In 1973, revolts began in the
Pakistani province of Baluchistan. Pakistan sent in several Army
Divisions to try to quell the disorder and calls for Baluch separatism.
Daoud allowed both Baluch and Pathan dissenters to find sanctuary in
Afghanistan, with refugee camps just across the border and leaders
using Kabul as a planning center, In February 1974, in a French
newspaper interview, Daoud argued that. . ."Baluchistan and Pakistan's
North West Frontier Province had 'always been an integral part of
Afghanistan'. The British, he insisted had severed these regions from
Afghan control and sovereignty through unjust and unequal
treaties." 13 However, Daoud came under pressure from Reza Shah
and the Soviets.
Both the Soviet Union and Iran had separate but justifiable
reasons for seeing Daoud silenced on the Baluch and Pushtu separatist
issues. The Shah of Iran was interested in eliminating a source of
tension which could launch troubles among the Baluch tribesmen living
in his own country. The Soviets, on one hand, were concerned about




American ally. During this critical time the Soviets dia not wish to
further complicatQ a difficult situation.
The extraordinary burst of Soviet activism beginning with the October 1973 Middle
East var and culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan was responsible, more than
any other factor, for American disillusion merit with detente and the subsequent broad
decline in U.S. -Soviet relations. 1
4
And, on the other hand, since Brezhnev's 1969 Asian Collective
Security scheme, the Soviet plan had been to soft pedal separatist
issues, hoping to compete with China for regional influence in South
Asia. One additional facton added to Daoud's final decision ../'Daoud and
his advisers finally accepted the fact that it was not in Afghanistan's
power to dismember Pakistan ana that by pressing the issue they
'played into Soviet hands by increasing Afghan dependence on Soviet
aid'". 15 By 1977 Daoud had tilted away from the Soviets and was
seeking a relatively more non-aligned approach in Afghan foreign policy,
In his domestic policy, Daoud was slowly loosing legitimacy and
suppont by purging members of the left who had supported his bid for
power. Members of the PDPA began to plot against Daoud. Additionally,
the nation continued to suffen majon internal economic problems that
added to his unpopularity. An estimated 300,000 workers left
Afghanistan to find work in other countries. As one author noted, the
number of Afghan wonkens finding employment in other Gulf States may
have been a blessing in disguise, as their wages, transferred back into
1
^Francis Fukuyarna, The Militar y Dimension of Soviet Policu in the Third World . (Santa
Monica, Ca: Rand Paper Series, February 1 984), 1
.
1 5 Rubinstein, 1 47. For an in depth analysis of the Baluchistan issue centered from the
Pakistani and Iranian viewpoint, see Selig 5. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow. Baluch
Nationalism and Soviet Ternptationa
.
(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1 981 ), pp 39, 81 , 1 41 - 1 48. Also see Zi ri ng 93- 96 and Bradsher , 62- 63.
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Afghanistan, helped thQ balance of payments problems by several
hundnea million dollars per year. ie By 1370 Daoud had lost the support
of most political gnoups in the nation and his own party, the National
Revolutionary Party, had built up virtually no populan following.
In contrast to the domestic nightmane that was developing,
Daoud was working hand to open up options fon Afghanistan in the
non-aligned world. By the beginning of 1978, Daoud had settled the
Pushtunistan issue with President Zia-ul-Huq of Pakistan. He had
traveled to Yugoslavia, Egypt and India for talks about the non-aligned
movement. He had opened and sought good relations with Saudi Arabia.
Both Arnold and Bradsher describe an incident which supposedly
occurred in Januany 1977, while Daoud was on a trip to Moscow. "In a
brief hostile exchange, Brezhnev suddenly challenged Daoud to 'get rid
of all those foneign advisors in your country'. Daoud replied coldly that
when Afghanistan had no further need of advisors, they all -would be
asked to leave". . .and added, "Afghans ar-e masters of their own house,
and no foreign country could tell them how to run their own affairs."
After seeing the look on Brezhnev's face, an aide supposedly
whispened that "Daoud had just wnitten his own death warrant". 17
Shortly after a trip to Saudi Arabia in Apnil 1973, Daoud was
oventhnown in one of the most bloody coups in Afghanistan to date.
On 27 April, 1978 a coup d'etat liquidated the entine Daoud family
and heralded a new era in Afghan politics. In contrast to Daoud's coup,
in 1973 that could be described as relatively bloodless, the Apnil
1 6 Negaran, 1 73.
1 7 Bradsher, 66. Arnold, 64. Also see Hammond and Collins for various Interpretations
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Revolution was "perhaps on of the most violent uprisings in the less
industnialized world. The fighting lasting fon 36 nouns/' 18 Rather than
the traditional fonm of one man, stnonganmi tactics, a quasi-communist
coalition came to powen. Analysts differ in describing the new negime.
Arnold, taking the hand line, called it Soviet nule by Communist Party
proxy. Othens, as Dupree, Bradsher and Newell, called it a nationalist
rather than communist coup. Gulam Munadov, a Senior Research
Associate at the Institute of Oniental Studies of the USSR Academy of
Sciences, explains it as the natural and inevitable course of events in a
society which denied basic human rights to its members and suffered
from corruption, lawlessness and violenceJ ^ An Armed Fonces
Revolutionary Council, led by Nun Tar-aki and his Marxist faction-the
Marxist Democratic Party of the People (DPPl-headed the new
government. Tanaki took the pnemien's position, and quickly denied any
rumors that he nepresented a Moscow controlled government
Moscow, as duning other- Afghan governmental overthrows, was the
finst to necognize the new Afghan regime.
Consistent with the tnend of Afghan politics, factional in-fighting
among the members of the governing panties soon broke out over the
distribution of power and orientation of policies. Taraki quickly began to
transform the government and military. Through purges, he brought
party supporters into powen. The new regime also began to implement




Gulam Muradov, "National -Democratic Revolution in Afghanistan: A Soviet View",
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies . VI: 1 . (Fall 1982), 58. for Arnold, Bradsher,
Dupree, and Newell see above.
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cancQllation of debts, land reform, marriage laws and government
expansion into the public sector of the economy.Su The regime,
however, was unable to stabilize the conflict in the long nun, The PDPA
split into factions. The two major groups were the Perchamis, pro-
Soviet and led by Babrak Karmal, and Khalq, more independent with
Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. The Khalq faction took control; members of
the Perchamis were send away.
Soviet sources explain the failure of this first phase of the April
Revolution as the fault of a new and inexperienced regime in power.
As emphasized by the PDPA Central Committee in April 1980, the PDPA lacked the
veil established traditions of democratic centralism and collective leadership so vital
to the partg under the new post revolutionary conditions. As a result, crucial
decisions were quite often passed without essential careful preliminary
preparation. 21
The communist PDPA, splintered and divided, faced challenges
from internal opposition, Tribal conservatives, who disliked any form of
centralized control, reacted strongly to the .regimes efforts to control
the countryside. According to Alfred MonMs, "the rebellion against
Taraki's government was fueled by the DDP's own totalitarian and
ultra-left policies." The new regime sought to institute policies that
caused further disruption in the country side. Monks elaborates;
In the name of modernization, nomads were settled on land that could not support
agriculture; told to dig well3, they were provided with no tools. A3 part of the land
reform program, individual villagers were given individual deed3 to land that was
formerly shared. Devout Muslims were made to attend classes in which their religion
and tribal customs were insulted and so on.22




Internal unrQ5t continued to mount. The leading Khalq faction, in
turn, relied more and more on external assistance from the Soviets,
based on a 20 year treaty of friendship and co-operation, similar to
those between Eastern European nations and the Soviets.53 The
Duerilla war began to develop in earnest. Afghan Army units deserted
and joined the resistance. By early 1979 the mounting opposition began
to threaten the regime, In Herat groups of Pushtus and Shias took
over. During the three aays the insurgents managed to hold the city,
they hunted down and murdered Khalq officials and all Soviet residents.
The city was retaken only by heavy fighting with armored and air units.
Herat was the first urban action conducted by the counter-
revolutionary forces.24 Tensions between the USSR and the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan began to deteriorate.
TaraUi was replaced and subsequently murdered, by his fellow
Khalq comrade-Amin, who installed himself as- Premier. 25 Amin and his
government of "national deliverance", organized to rekindle and stay
the flame of the revolution, sought even greater quantities of military
assistance from the Soviets. Some 5,000 Soviet Advisers, serving in
positions down to company level, were in place. Additionally MI-24
helicopter gunships and MI5-23 fighters were added to build up the
combat punch of the forces.26 Afghanistan was beginning to be an





25Collins, 59-69. also see Hammond, Monks, Bradsher for excellent descriptions.
26Nevell.87.
.SS
At this point, the April revolution had passed its apex. From the
United States standpoint, the situation remained the same. From 1972
until 1978, US interest in Afghanistan was constant. America had no
important trading program with Afghanistan. There were no significant
US trade routes which passed through or near Afghanistan. This
nation provided no source of strategic metal, nor was it a source of oil.
It did not Pelong to any defensive alliance which obligated US interests,
America had no treaty ties with Afghanistan. There were no significant
facilities, US or Allied, which reguired American attention. In short,
there was no American direct interest. A Soviet intervention, if there
was to be one, would, of course, be clearly against the US interest as
a factor of Soviet expansionism. But at this stage, American analysts
saw little possibility of a direct Soviet strike against the Afghans.27
In 1977, as Daoud attempted to expand his global ties to set a
more independent course from the Soviet Union, the Carter
Administration hoped to have Daoud visit Washington. Visits were
planned but cancelled or delayed due to technical difficulties. According
to Bradshen, "The United States was expected to voice support for
Afghan non-alignment and to make at least a gestune of increasing the
long-dwindling level of aid."28 But it appeared that in Washington there
would be no change and that Afghanistan would remain a "political
backwater".
Even after the April Revolution and the growing internal unrest in




events as critical. A number of factors are relativQ. First, the political
agenda of US policy makers was heavily burdened with other events
during this time frame. The Middle-East peace process was in full
swing, Sadat had visited Jerusalem, the Camp David agreements had
been signed, and finally in March 1979, an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
signed. The Middle-East Peace process was an important item for the
Administration. Second, there was some remorse over the US loss of
influence with the Soviet assumption of relations toward Ethiopia. In
Asia, Vietnam had invaded Kampuchea, which in turn had triggered a
Chinese punitive invasion of Vietnam. These events had linkage to the
Sino-Soviet and Sino-American triangle. The final version of SALT II, a
NATO long term defense program and the normalization of relations
with China were in progress. Carter, obviously, wanted to managed
this situation carefully. In January 1979, the Shah had left Iran. Iran had
been the Island of Stability for US interests in the Gulf. The Gulf, more
properly, Persian Gulf oil linked to our relations in Europe and NATO. In
general, the Administration's calendar of world events was full and
complex.29
Added to the complex nature of American interests on the global
scale, was the bureaucratic hesitation of the Department of State's
South Asian officials to call the Saur (April) Revolution, a Communist
revolution. Calling the Revolution a Communist controlled event would
have raised a red flag. The United States had already recognized Soviet
29p.obin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Polic y : The Brezhnev Years , (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1 983). discusses the chronology of events. Also see Ularn, Dangerous Relations
,
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interests as vital and American as limited. 30 |t a |S0 would have
required the total cut off of thQ moagsn amount of US AID funds still
flowing into the country-a last form of American influence. However,
the entine situation changed radically on 14 February 1979 when thQ
US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolphus Dubs, was kidnapped in
Kabul. Dubs was the former State Department South Asian Analyst
who had called Afghanistan a quiet situation and, later, had urged for
contingency planning should the Soviets launch an invasion.
Ambassador Dubs was killed in a nescue attempt by Afghan
government forces. Although several authors allege that the Soviets
may have been involved, there is no conclusive proof. The result of this
tragic occurrence was the Carter Administration's sudden and total
cut off of all forms of American aid, the pull out of all US dependents
and the reduction of the Embassy staff to a skeleton. 31
From the Soviet perspective, the situation in Afghanistan was
evolving into a serious challenge. Daoud's regime had included a
number of pro-Soviet leftist officers. After the first two years of his
regime, Daoud began moving the pro-Soviet members of his
government to backwater positions or out of the country. Daouds
shift to the right, away from the Soviet Camp, was cause for concern.
Pubinstein offers that Soviet decision makers may have wondor-Qd if
Afghanistan was headed in the same fundamentalist direction as
3ClHammond, 41
.
31 Collins, 58. and Bradsher, 99. suggest that the cut off of fund3 had little effect, since




Iran.° c Finally, Daoud QmbarrassQd the Soviets on issues of foreign
policy. Daoud's growing involvement in the non-aligned movement, after
Afghanistan's attempt to block Cuba's bid for leadQnship of the non-
aligned movement and criticism of Soviet actions in the Ogaden, may
have peaked Soviet tolerance with Daoud's regime.33
Leadens of the April Revolution at first claimed to be nationalist
rather than communist. However, the thin curtain of camouflage quickly
fell. In a number of ways, the Afghan Communist seizure of power-
matches the seizure of power of Communist Parties in the Eastern
European, People's Democracies.34 Specifically, similarity exists in the
form of camouflage portrayed to the outside world. The regime initially
claimed to be nationalist. Additionally, the ruthlessness which the
PDPA used to achieve its ends was similar to the takeover tactics
used in Europe. The PDPA also claims to have planned and practiced
the takeover, thus eliminating any chance for failure. Unlike some of
the communist seizures of power elsewhere in the world, the April
revolution did not require outside force to be effective. In this sense,
the "Afghan case is the one that most clearly resembles Lenin's own
Bolshevik Revolution, which was really a coup."35
The success of the April Revolution was fated for failure by the
same factional politics which have been present in Afghan politics for
some time. Resistance to the Communist party's efforts to consolidate
^Rubinstein, 151.
33 Bradsher, 66-67.
34"rhoma3 T. Hammond ed., The Anatomu of Communist Takeovers . Nev Haven Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1971). 1-46,638-644.
35Bradsher,81.
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power, coupled with unpopular domestic changes in a Muslim society,
led to "rising alarm and indignation among many leaders and rank and
file members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and also
of non-party patriots from all sections of Afghan society. . ,"36 As a
result, widespread repressive measures were enforced, as evidenced
in the Herat incident. The Soviets were drawn increasingly into a
difficult position from which they could not withdraw. Defensively,
Soviet interests lay in protecting the lives of Soviet citizens in
Afghanistan. Economically, they were threatened with potential loss of
an import source for natural gas, cotton, wool and various agricultural
products. They were also challenged with the loss of their investments
in Afghanistan's development projects.
The costs of the degenerating situation in Afghanistan can also
be classified in a world order sense and ideologically. In a World Order
sense, Afghanistan may have degenerated into a form of anarchy.
Traditional control by a Wing had been abolished, Tribal rule was the
only possible fall back to a successful reinforcement of the Communist
government. Such measures could not have guaranteed a settlement to
Afghanistan's problems. Ideologically, the situation in Afghanistan was
developing into a failure of Marxist principles. Following the Soviet
invasion the PDPA Central Committee admitted to the failures of the
party in effectively controlling the situation. 37 To allow such a failure
would be a blow to Marxist-Leninist ideology on the whole, and this




Soviet interest by US policy makers was developing into a
circumstance neauiring action. By mid-August 1979, it was obvious to
the Soviets that something would have to be done.
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E. intervention and the Unwinnable war
Depending upon your perspective the Soviet actions on 27
December 1979 in Afghanistan could be termed either rendering
fraternal assistance to a friendly socialist neighbor in need, or a
ruthless, overt invasion. The facts are that the Soviet Union,
perceiving the need to intervene in the domestic upheaval in
Afghanistan, did so. This action and the subsequent seven years of
quagmire which have followed, have caused unmeasured damage to the
Soviet Union's relations in Asia and the world. The intervention has
caused the United States to re-evaluate its interests in the South
West Asian region and Persian 6ulf, and change its plans accordingly.
This section will examine the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, and the
effects of it on the national interests of the United States and the
Soviet Union.
Jiri Valenta, in a Fall 1980 article in International Security,
compared the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan to the 1968 intervention in
Czechoslovakia. In both cases Soviet decision makers saw the potential
failure of a Marxist regime and deemed it critical to the interests of the
Soviet Union to invade.
The decisions to intervene in Chechoslovakia and Afghanistan had many motivations,
the most important being Soviet perceptions of both regimes' instability end
unreliability. Domestic and strategic considerations followed. In the Soviets' view,
Alexander Dubcek and Hafizullah Amin were charting independent courses in domestic-
politics in disregard of Soviet counsel, and future developments in both countries
were a3 unpredictable as they were dangerous. 1
Whether the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan
was motivated for the defense of the fatherland, as suggested by
1 J1 ri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul", International Securitu
. 5:2, (Fall 1 980), 1 1 5.
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GGorgQ Kennon, or whether it was to establish a better geostrategic
position from which to further the ancient Tzarist goal of expansion, as
suggested by Richard Pipes, seems a secondary justification,
forwarded by western analysts, when you consider the actual
conditions sunnounding the invasion.2 Soviet sources do not agree with
either thesis. Several factons indicate that the urgency of the
situation., as seen from Moscow, dictated the actions taken. From mid-
summer 1979 until the actual invasion in December, the domestic
political and military situation in Afghanistan became increasingly
chaotic. The April Revolution had failed to bring about expected
changes as factional politics had divided the PDPA. Amin, either by
choice on necessity, tunned incneasingly to nepnession in order to
control the population, Resistance to Amin's regime, or for that
matten, to any central authority-communist on otherwise-was a
cultunal tnait in Afghan society. Thnoughout the histony of Afghanistan,
nulens have only been able to consolidate contnol thnough coalitions
with the suppont of the local tnibal leadens.
Duning the summer of 1979, Afghanistan was in the middle of full
scale tnibal revolt. Additionally, the Afghan Army was decimated by
defections to the nebel cause. The Centnal Afghan Government
controlled only Kabul, the capital, and the major cities. Rebels had tal-ien
several provincial capitals and had mundered a large numben of Soviet
military advisers and civilians. The members of the leading Khala faction
seemed to be out of touch with the situation, realizing neither the
2
"Hov Real is the Soviet Threat", US News and World Report . 1 March, 1 980, p33.
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seriousness of domestic upheaval nor the concern of their Soviet
benefactors. According to Mark Heller. . ,
Khalq leaders were serious about their revolution, and they were intent upon a
forced- pace transformation of Afghanistan from a traditional -feudal society into a
socialist society, bypassing the capitalist stage of development. They were not much
concerned about the costs or instability resulting from such a policy, nor did they
much care that the Soviets were concerned about the widespread instability in a
country that up till now had caused no trouble. They therefore began to implement
such measures as the redistribution of land, the cancellation of debts, the repression
of Islamic institutions and dignitaries, limitations on forced marriage and bride-
price, and the introduction of compulsory political -education classes under the guise
of an anti -illiteracy campaign.3
The first Soviet attempt to rectify the deteriorating situation
was to replace Amin. In September, Taraki was on his way back to
Afghanistan from a meeting of the non-aligned movement in Cuba. He
stopped in Moscow for consultations. During Taraki's visit, the Soviets
assured him of their 'all-round' support and warned him of their
concern for the degenerating scene in his country. When TaraW
returned to Kabul, "the Soviets appear to have organized and/or
supported an anti-Amin coup on September 14-15, their objective being
to establish a Khalq-Parcham (Perchamis) coalition government led by
Taraki and Karmar4
Kanmal had been the victim of an earlier purge, and had been sent
to Czechoslovakia as a representative of the Afghan Government. The
Soviets apparently thought he was a trustworthy replacement. At the
same time the Soviets transported a 400 man airborne unit to a critical
airbase not far from Kabul. This may have been to support the coup. In
any case, whether forewarned or not, Amin intercepted the attempt.
•^Mark Heller, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan", The Was hi nqton Quarterl u .
(Summer, 1980), 37.
fyalenta, "From Prague to Kabul", 1 30.
164
Kabul Radio announced on 16 September that Comrade Taraki had
retired from public service for reasons of 'III health' ana that Amin was
assuming fuil powers. For the Soviets, this made the situation worse,
because Amin now held the reins without any moderating influence of a
thind panty. As fan Taral-ii, "it guickly became obvious that Taraki's
'illness' was caused by bullet holes in the body/'5
The actual date of the Soviet decision to intervene remains
unknown. Various scholars put it in the late summer, others in
November and December, while still others say that it had always been
the Soviet intention to forcefully expand their empire to the south.
Thene is no direct evidence to support any Soviet intent to intervene.
Only circumstances point to their intentions. As Soviet aid increased
during the fall, Amin increasingly became unable to suppness the rebel
forces. To the Soviets this was a mone dangerous scene than in
Czechoslovakia. The regime itself was increasingly unstable. On the
diplomatic front the Soviets began to test the waters in the United
States, seeking to gauge American Administrative reaction. They began
to pronounce support for the Iranians, who under Khomeini, pushed
against American influence. Between March and December, a numben
of Soviet General officens made extended visits, possibly to measure
the potential of a successful intervention. These included; Army
General A. Epishev, director of the Main Political Administration of the
Soviet Armed Forces in April; General I. Pavlovski, Deputy Minister of
Defense and Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces (who
5 Heller, 38. Also see Bradsher, 100- 125 and Collins, 65-69.
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also happened to have bQen the Commander of the forces that invaded
Czechoslovakia eleven years earlier) from August to October.: and Lt
General V. Paputin, the finst deputy minister of the interior on 26
November, 1979.6
In September, the US Embassy reported increasing unhappiness
on the Soviet part with the Afghan government/ In October, Soviet
pilots were flying combat missions for the Afghan Army against rebel
tangets. Reserve forces began to assemble in the Central Asian
republics. More and more Soviets were used as advisers" at company
level in the Afghan army, while the guerilla detachments of the
resistance spread actions throughout the countryside with increasing
effectiveness. By the end of Octoben the Afghan Anmy was judged to
be totally ineffective against opposition. In November it appears that
the Soviets began using fonms of Maskirovka— strategic
deception/camoflague— to cover their intentions. Soviets also began to
position troops and intensify their pro-Khomeini/anti-American
propaganda. In the beginning of December, five Soviet Motorized
Divisions were mobilized on the Afghan borden and three battalions,
consisting of upwards to 1,500 men, were flown in to secure airbases
at Kabul, Bagram and Shindad. With troops in place the Soviets
effectively controlled the major road networks into and around Kabul.
Refugees began to stream into the North West Frontier Province of
Pakistan at an increasing rate. Diplomatically, the Soviets again began
^Heller, Collins and Valenta all cite these visits and allude to the possible intentions of the
General officers during their stays.
7Collins,67.
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hinting to US sources at better managing the US-Soviet relationship. By
the 20th of December the trap was set; careful preparation would
ensure success.8
The actual invasion was anti-climatic. On Christmas eve, AN- 12
and AN-22 aircnaft began ferrying members of the 105th Airborne
Buards Division into the region of the capital. By the 26th, better- than
5,000 troops were on the ground. Combat operations began on the
evening of the 27th and by morning the Soviets had secured all major
initial objectives in the city. Amin was held, and with members of his
family, executed on the morning of the 28th. Later that day Babral-!
Karmal was installed as the new General Secretary of the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The Soviet perspective on the
invasion reads;
Analyzing the situation arising in Afghanistan and on its southern borders due to the
activities of the armed counterrevolutionary gangs penetrating the country from
abroad, many observers and scholars came to the conclusion that Amin was posing a
growing threat not only to the future of the April revolution, but to the unity of
Afghanistan as well. . .The discontent with Hafizullah Arnin's activity and mass
repression staged on his orders was widespread. . On December 27, 1 979, the
patriotic and sound majority of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, of the
Revolutionary Council and the armed forces of the DRA overthrew the Amin Regime. . .
The events of December 27-28, 1979 mark the beginning of the new phase of the
national democratic April Revolution.9
The original goal of the Soviet intervention was four fold. First, to
eliminate outside interference and to ensure that it did not return, in
code to stop the rebel fighters moving across the Pakistani and Iranian
borders. Second, to contain those resistance fighters operating from
within Afghanistan. Third, to buy time for the installed regime to
'^Numerous sources detail the Soviet plans. This description compiled from Heller,
Yalenta, Collins, Brad3her, Arnold and Monks.
^Muradov, 64.
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QliminatQ thQ disunity within the PDPA and re-establish a worMIng
government And finally, to PQmove Amin from thQ seat of power, and
eliminate "a cunning individual with an inordinate lust for power." The
Soviets insisted that they were requested by the Afghans to come to
their assistance, and that their stay in Afghanistan is only "of a limited
nature". American imperialism, in collusion with Chinese designs, is
repeatedly blamed as the cause for continued resistance activities. lu
Rather than accomplishing the first two priorities, resistance
after the invasion only became more fervent and committed. The effort
by the rebels caused the Soviets to call in reinforcements, which began
to arrive on 1 1 January 1980. Estimates held that troop strength was
between 85,000 and 100,000 by the middle of January as the Soviets
extended their fight out of the cities and into the countryside. 11 By
1986 it would seem that Afghanistan is the unwinnable war. The
resistance is too weak to push the Soviets totally out and the Soviets
have far too much at stake in the conflict to give up.
Despite multi-lateral talks, bi-iateral talks, efforts by United
Nations Commissions and numerous private citizens of all nationalities
to bring an end to the conflict, no solution has been reached to date.
Alvin Rubinstein tells a story about a conversation heard at a
conference of Soviet and American scholars in Washington, early in
1983. Two participants, a Soviet and a Japanese, were discussing
'Gpravda, 2 July 1980, p4 cited i n Current Digest of the Soviet Press . 30 July 1980.
and Victor Sidenko, "Two Years of the Afghan Revolution", New Ti mes . no 1 7. April 1 980, 20-22.
11 Heller, 41.
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Soviet policy in Afghanistan. The Soviet strongly upheld the his nation's
position.
He told of being asked by a Japanese official why Soviet troops were in Afghanistan and
countering by asking why American troops were in Japan. 'They are here in
accordance with the United States- Japan security treaty,' said the Japanese official.
'We have a treaty with Afghanistan. And Soviet troops will remain in Afghanistan as
long as American troops remain in Japan', W8s the retort-an unmistakable message to
the Americans and the conference. 12
This brief conversation illustrates the position that perspective
plays in understanding the relative intensity of national interests in the
Afghanistan case study.
US Perspective
The US position towards the Afghanistan invasion is an example
of how quickly the perspective of a nation can change. In the years
leading up to the invasion, Afghanistan was only a minor concern to
American policy makers. To the American nation, Afghanistan was a
distant land. In short, Afghanistan was termed a 'backwater'. When, in
the 1950s and 60s, US Containment policy involved building a defensive
belt of mutual defense treaties on the periphery of the Soviet Union,
Afghanistan was omitted because it was too distant. It is easy to say
that the interest of the United States did not involve Afghanistan
because the 1931 Soviet-Afghan Treaty was in effect, and that
Afghanistan was a traditional enemy of Pakistan. However, at a more
basic level, Afghanistan did not fit the American need. What then
caused President Carter to declare Afghanistan a vital interest to the
United States?
1 ^Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union and Afghanistan", Current Histor u. (October,
1983), 338.
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In August 1979, ZbigniQW Brzezinski, the President's National
Security Adviser, warned the Soviets not to take any actions towards
the Afghans 1 3. Throughout the fall, US intelligence analysts realized
that changes were pending in Afghanistan as they carefully watched
the strategic build up. However, in November the overriding concern of
the Administration turned to the Hostage crisis in Iran. Another aspect
according to Mark Heller was the position of those analysts involved in
forecasting Soviet intentions. The problem for analysts, sifting through
the information forwarded, was interpreting the data. By December
21st, officials noted the presence of troops along the northern Afghan
border but declined to detail such to the Press. The Administration was
divided over the significance of the build up. Once the massive airlift
began some of the guestions were answered. But the most prevalent
belief was that the Soviets were going in to assist Amin rather than to
overthrow him. According to the State Department, technically, the
Soviets were not the aggressing, "but only what Hodding Carter, at
the State Department Briefing on December 26, called 'blatant military
interference in the internal affairs of an independent sovereign state'
» 1 4
US reaction took several days to develop. President Carter
guickly went on television and announced that the invasion was "a
grave threat to peace". By the end of the month the reaction was
stronger as he called the Soviet explanations of the intervention
"completely inadeguate and completely misleading". . ."not telling the
1 ^ New York Times




facts correctly". After New Year's, Carter sent a mission to Europe
to consult with the allies. The American Ambassador to the Soviet
Union was recalled from Moscow. Actions were begun in the UN to
discuss the Soviet actions. Canter announced that the Soviets "could
not violate wonld peace without paying sevene political conseguences."
Canten reauested to delay debate oven the SALT II tneaty in the Senate.
On 4 Januany, he again went on television and outlined a series of
steps to punish the Soviets. These included: renewing cancelled military
assistance pnognams to Pakistan; limiting high technology and strategic
equipment sales to the Soviet Union; actions to cancel on nelocate the
upcoming Olympic Games, cuntailing Soviet fishing nights in US waters,
limiting deliveries of grain already sold to the Soviets; and cutting back
the scheduled flights of Aeroflot. 15
The President's actions culminated in the State of the Union
Address on 23 January, 1380. This annual address usually sets the
tone for American National Intenest, as the President presents his
view of the needs of the American people. Carter's 1980 message was
overwhelmed by two events, the Hostage Crisis in Iran and the Soviet
Invasion of Afghanistan. Canter began by describing the situation
America faced. "These two acts —one of international terrorism and
one of military aggression— pnesent a serious challenge to the United
States and to other nations of the wonld. Together, we will meet these
1 ^Heller, 42. Bradsher 1 89- 1 99. Also see Christopher Van Hollen, "Leaning on
Pakistan", Forei g n Polic y, 38 (Spring 1 980), 35-50. Lawrence Ziring, "Political Dilemmas and
Instability in South and Southwest Asia", Asian Affairs
.
(Spring 1 983), 37-47. And for the
impact of the Olympic boycott Laurence Barton, "The American Olympic Boycott of 1 980: The
Amalgam of Diplomacy and Propaganda in Influencing Public pinion", (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston
University, 1983).
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threats to peace." According to the President, the Soviet Union and its
actions remained a critical intenest fan Americans, 'Mow, as duning the
last three and a half decades, the relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union is the most critical factor in determining
whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in global conflict".
The Soviets actions in Canter's view were naaical and aggressive. As
such Canter let it be known that he considened the American duty to
pnotect the negion.
The implications of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious
threat to world peace since the second World War. . .Let our position be absolutely
clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled
by use of any means necessary, including military forceJ »
To meet the direct military challenge perceived by the
Administration, Canter called fon the nevitalization of American forces
oriented toward the Persian Gulf region. The result was the creation
of the Rapid Deployment -Joint Task Force (RDJTF), whose mission was
to actively fight the war and deter aggression. The Reagan
Administration, later realizing the limited capability of such a force to
handle diplomatic and economic aspects, bolstered the force to a
Unified Command better capable of handling long range demands. ' 7
To build up a credible defense in the region, after having lost Iran
as an 'Island of Stability', Carter turned to Pakistan. In November 1979
mobs of Islamic students had sacked and burned to US Embassy in
1 ^President Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Address", delivered to a Joint Session of
Congress, Washington, D.C. 23 January, 1 980. text i n Vital Speeches of the Dau . (February 1
,
1980), 1.
1 7 Lt. Gen. Robert Kingston, "From RDF to CENTCOM: New Challenges?", RUSI: Journal of
the Roual Services Institute for Defense Studies . 129:1 (1 March 1984), 14-17.
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1 1 <-:
Islamabad, killing two Americans and faun Pakistani nationals. The riots
wQng sparked by rumors of American involvement on the Grand
Mosaue takeover in Mecca. This had been preceded by the cutoff of
virtuolly all forms of assistance, military and economic, as required by
the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistonce Act and Carters
concerns for supposed human rights violations of the Zia-ul-Hua
regime in Pakistan. Immediately following the Soviet invasion, Carter
set aside all concerns about human rights, nuclear nonproliferation and
the Embassy bombing incident and "executed a remarkable about face
in a head long rush to embrace (Pakistani President) Zia". 18 Carter
assured Zia of US support in assisting Islamabad counter the Soviet
threat from Afghanistan, including armed forces if necessary. Zia, in
turn, rejected Washington's $400 million in aid terming it 'Peanuts'.
Pakistan did not accept any US offers until the newly inaugurated
Reagan Administration made a more generous $3.2 billion offer in June
1981, It appeared that Zia's restraint was due to fear of Soviet
reprisal. 1 9
Among the arsenal of tools that the President hdd hoped to use
against the Soviets was the support of World allies. While many
nations —even some socialist and closely tied to the Soviets— did
react in some form, there was reluctance to react as strongly as the
US. Yugoslavia and Rumania showed the disapproval in the United
Nations. Rumania even went so far as to sign a joint declaration with
1 8Van Hollen, 38.
1
^David Ignatius, "US Aid to Afghan Rebels Restrained by Fear of Soviet Retaliation in
Pakistan." Wall Street Journal
.
9 April 1 984, 33.
17.3
Sreat Britain criticising the intervention. Great Britain noted the lack of
prion coordination among the allies prior to initiating economic
sanctions. West Germany, while supporting the boycott of the
Olympics, increased its exports to the Soviet Union by 3 ! percent for a
period. Among Islamic nations there was a strong neaction against the
Soviets initially, especially from Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
However, in the long run, with the exception of boycotting a meeting of
the international Islamic Conference for 1980 in Tashkent, criticism did
not last long. In the United Nations, after months of discussion and
countering moves by Soviet supporters, in November 1980 there was
finally a vote in the General Assembly for an immediate withdrawal of
foreign troops from Afghanistan.20
In general, while the protests and sanctions led by the United
States initially were guite vocal, within the year most relations had
returned to normal. The Allies supported political sanctions but were
slow to support economic sanctions with the same fervor. An
interesting aside is the reaction to the Olympic boycott. While the
United States led a contingent of 36 nations in the boycott of the
games, most of the participating nations still attended, including Puerto
Rico. According to Laurence Barton the Olympic boycott did manage to
perhaps dent Soviet prestige and public relations goals. It also gave the
United States the opportunity to take charge on a global protest
against a communist regime. But it did not place enough pressure on the
Soviets to withdnaw from Afghanistan, non did it nally enough support
20Bradsher, 199- 204. Collins, 85-89.
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to pressure the International Olympic Organizing Committee to cancel
or change the location of the games, nor was it a comprehensive
pnopaganda victory for the West —even considering the number of
nations that did pull out.21
Since President Carter's strong actions and words in January
1980, puPlic sentiment in the United States and Administration actions
have not shown the same intensity. The Reagan Administration did
upgrade the capaPility of the RDF by creating CENTCOM and Pakistan
did accept a comprehensive assistance package to help develop their
well trained Army. The questionable commitment of the Administration
and Congress to hold Afghanistan as a vital intensity interest led Selig
Harrison to question. . ."Are We Fighting to the Last Afghan?" As
negotiations continued in the United Nations, Harrison believed that. , .
"Despite formal statements of support, the Reagan Administration has
done little to further the faltering United Nations mediation effort on
Afghanistan." This was because an agreement meant that Pakistan
would have recognized a Communist regime in Kabul. When Harrison
objected to an intelligence official that the US position amounted to a
policy of "fighting to the last Afghan", the response he received was
that "the Afghans love to fight."22 In contrast to Carters declarations
about taking any measure to halt Soviet aggression in Afghanistan,
President Reagan has focused more on domestic problems and the
impact of Soviet support for Nicaragua's Communist regime.
21 Barton, 127-147.
22se-lig Harrison, "Are We Fighting to the Last Afghan?", Washington Post , 29 December,
1983. A17.
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In his 1985 State of the Union Address, President Reagan only
briefly mentioned Afghanistan. Aften commenting at length about the
growth of the economy, SDI, and the virtues of freedom, his comment
on Afghanistan was. . .'And we must not break faith with those who
are risking their lives —on every continent, from Afghanistan to
Nicaragua— to defy Soviet supported aggression and secure rights
which have been ours from birth."23 in 1986, the Presidents remarks
again extolled the virtues of the American dream. In light of the recent
Space Shuttle disaster he focused on the challenges of transforming
technology to help build better lives. He talked about controlling or
eliminating nuclear weapons and controlling the budget, all important
themes. But nelative to Afghanistan his comments were. . .
To those imprisoned in regimes held captive, to those beaten for daring to tight for
freedom and democracy -for their right to worship, to speak to live and to prosper in
the family of free nations-we say to you tonight: you are not alone freedom fighters.
America will support you with moral and material assistance, your right not just to
fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom -to win freedom in Afghani start;
in Angola; in Cambodia; and in Nicaragua. . ,24
From the above remarks it is difficult to judge Afghanistan as a
vital US interest. This is especially true when the President continued
to speak only about the importance of Nicaragua as a critical interest
to peace and national security in the western hemisphere, foresaking
other global conflicts. As noted in a recent Congressional Research
service paper by Richard P. Cronin, there is still no consensus about
what US goals should be. Varying positions are debated. One group
^President Ronald Reagan, "State of the Union Address", delivered to Congress 6
February 1 985 . Vital Speeches of the Dau
,
15 Feb. 1985.
24President Ronald Reagan, "State of the Union Address", delivered to Congress 4
February 1 986, Vital Speeches of the Dau . 1 March 1 986.
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maintains that aid to the resistance should be limited "aimed of delaying
the consolidation of Soviet strategic advantage while not overly
exposing Pakistan to Soviet Pressure on military retaliation." Still
othens fonwand the position that US policy goals should be mone
aggnessive. . ."with mone effective aid the nesistance can extract a high
enough price to cause the Soviets to seek a negotiated withdrawal."
And a third group believes that the United States should pnovide a
greater level of aid to the resistance.
, ."on ideological and moral
grounds regardless of the prospects."25 It is generally agreed that the
only effective assistance which can be rendered by the United States
is to support the nationalist resistance. In doing so the cost of Soviet
efforts in Afghanistan is raised.
US assistance to the Afghan nationalist resistance is limited,
Most overt aid goes to supporting Pakistani efforts to solve the
refugee problems in the North-West Frontier Province. Covert
assistance is supposedly on the rise. Estimates vary as to the exact
amount of aid funneled to the Afghans. In January 1980 the Carter
Administration supposedly provided $30 million, which grew to $80
million by 1984.26 In 1984, another source said that Congressional
pressure had pushed to figure the $280 million for 1985. 2 -7 Still another
source put the amount at $470 million, charging that 50 percent or
Lj Richard P. Croriin, "The United States, Pakistan and the Soviet Threat to Southern Asia:
Options for Congress", a paper for the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Washington D.C.: September 1985, 13.
26 lqnatius. Wall Street Journal , 9 April 1984.
27 Les1ie H. Gelb, "US Aides Put '85 Arms Supplies to Afghan Rebels at $280 Million",
New York Times
.
28 November 1 984. pi
.
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mopQ of all covont aid is skimmed off by the Pakistani military,23 While
the credibility of these reports should be subject to scrutiny, they
emphasize that the US has committed itself to support the rebel cause.
Soviet Perspective
Fop the Soviet Union the war in Afghanistan has become a dismal
reality. There have been economic costs to pay in this conflict. But
more than the limited effects on the Soviet economy, the cost to Soviet
foreign policy efforts in the Third World and the limited possibility of a
painless withdrawal is a difficult barrier to overcome. Selig Harrison
put it this way; "While the Soviet Union cannot be forcibly dislodged
from Afghanistan by resistance forces, neither is it likely to consolidate
a communist regime there in the foreseeable future. Moscow no longer-
attempts to conceal this dismal reality. . ."23 j\ number of analysts try
to foresee an Afghanistan without Soviet forces. Since Daoud's coup
abolished the Monarchy and the April revolution totally negated the
possibility of a non-communist regime, the Soviets are faced with an
enormous task of reconstructing a legitimate and sovereign
government. Since the April revolution, Soviet specialists have been
increasingly involved in running the government. Bradsher describes it
as a vicious circle. "Soviet advisers run everything to an extent that
discourages Afghans in the regime from doing much more than shuffling
papers. There is a vicious circle: The Soviets trust few Afghans, and
^"Pakistan: Leaks in the Pipeline", Ti me . 9 December 1 985, p50.
29se1ig S. Harrison, "A Breakthrough in Afghanistan?", Forei g n Polic u. (Summer,
1983), 6.
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fow Afghans are willing to take nisl-is in working for thQ SoviQts".30
This leads to Lenin's often repeated question, 'What is to be done?''.
ThQ basic components of SoviQt Afghan policy have changed very
little till today. The oniginal plan called for controlling critical urban
centers of administrative importance, controlling communication
between these centers and eliminating resistance. This plan was
supposed to give the PDPA time to consolidate and educate the
population, thereby developing support of the revolution. This plan had
wonted well in Czechoslovakia and acconding to Soviet estimates
should have worked In Afghanistan. However, it backfired with the
protracted resistance of the guerilla counter—revolutionaries,
Numerous efforts to enlist the support of the population, ranging from
force to reward have been attempted. Reminiscent of the creation of
Eastern European People's Democracies after World War II, the
Soviets formed a 'National Fatherland Front' as an umbrella
organization in June 1981.^1 Its goal was to mobilize the population at
local level, but has accomplished almost nothing.
Yuri Andropov continued Brezhnev's programs; at one point
telling a Western press source, "By helping Afghanistan, we defend
our national interests. . .", The Soviet position remained firm; in January
1983 Pravda declared. . ."The revolutionary process in Afghanistan is
irreversible, the Afghan people have reliable friends."32 Under




Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union and Afghanistan", 321
.
32 Bradsher, "Afghanistan", 43-44.
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Andropov, military policy expanded to the use of a strong stats
security wing, the KHAD was modeled on the KGB and attempted to
infiltrate and demoralize the resistance. When Chernenko succeeded
Andnopov he inherited the formers pnognams. Soviet press stressed
the 'continuity of the foreign policy course'. The only innovation in
military strategy duning Chennenko's bnief period in power was the
creation of an Afghan people's militia besides the regular army. It is
possible that this tactic may have been oriented towards 'Afghanizing/
the war.33 This illustrated a policy similar to the Amenican strategy of
'Vietnamization' as the US attempted to turn the war over to the South
Vietnamese.
Mikhail Borabchev's assumption of power brought a new face to
Soviet foreign policy. Although he was a new face, it did not
necessarily mean that there would be a new foreign policy. Gorbachev
did step up initiatives in Afghanistan. On the diplomatic front,
Gorbachev made known his intentions for a negotiated settlement. But
pnoposals were merely vague rhetoric. In his 1986 report to the
Central Committee during the 27th Congress of the Communist Party,
Gorbachev called Afghanistan a "bleeding wound".
Counterrevolution and imperialism have turned Afghanistan into a bleeding wound. The
USSR supports that country's efforts to defend its sovereignty. We should like in the
near future to withdraw the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan at the request of its
government. Moreover, we have agreed with the Afghan side on the schedule for their
phased withdrawal as soon as a political settlement is reached that insures an actual
cessation and dependably guarantees the no n- resumption of foreign armed
interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. IT IS IN
OUR VITAL, NATIONAL INTEREST (capitals added) that the USSR should always have
3 3Z ho res A. Medvedev, Gorbachev
.
(New York: Norton and Company, 1 986), 234.
good and peaceful relations with all its neighbors. This is a vitally important objective
of our foreign policy.34
Gorbachev looked further toward settling the conflict by
creating a Ministry of Islam Affains. "The newly established Ministry of
Islam Affains sought to neduce the conflict between Manxism and Islam,
councils of eldens wene ne-established in tnibal aneas. . ."35
Domestically, in the Soviet Union, it was impossible to continually
nepness the neponts of -wan casualties. Since the 1379 invasion US
sources estimated 10,000 Soviet deaths and 20,000 wounded. To build a
consensus of suppontive public opinion at home, the Gorbachev initiated
a "second fnont. . .to manshal patriotic suppont fon his country's
longest war." Reports in the media companed the actions of Soviet
tnoops in Afghanistan to those of thein fathens in the Gneat Patriotic
Wan. . /'high-lighting the counage, determination and sacrifice of Soviet
fighting men in Afghanistan, a campaign touching the emotions that nun
deep in a nation that reportedly lost some 20 million sofdiens and
citizens in World Wan ll."36 Diplomatic and political effonts diffened
considerably from efforts in military strategy.
While maintaining a constant level of political rhetoric, the
Soviets stepped up their military efforts after Gorbachev became
General-Secretary. If there is a benefit to any majon gnoup in the
Afghanistan conflict, it is the Soviet militany which has gained valuable
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev,
"Political Report to the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union", delivered 25 February. 1 986. New Ti mes . 9:86, p38.
^Medvedev, 234.
36 Nicholas Da nil off, "Afghan War Finally Hits Soviets' Home Front", US News and World
Report, 1 6 December, 1 985, p41
.
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experience in fighting with counter-insurgency methods. The costs,
both economically and in human lives, is little compared to the gains in
experience fon the Soviets. Tactically, Soviet troops began adjusting to
the demands of counten-guenilla warfare. On the ground, they used a
mone effective fonm of hit-and-run commando tactic. "'Most effective
one ambushes by Soviet special forces — the Spetznaz— armed with
silencen-equiped weapons."3 -7 The Soviets also expanded their security
belts anound cities and army bases, making it more difficult for rebel
forces to strike, In the am, they began more effectively employing their
combat helicopter resources, adopting swift strike tactics. To cut off
guerilla forces from outside support, the Soviets stanted heavily
covering in and out noutes with air dnopped mines. Bombers were also
used in a scorched eanth type tactic, designed to disrupt rebel support
in local villages. A bonus effect of this tactic was the renewed
pnessune exented on Pakistan by an intensified refugee flow. Estimates
on refugees nange from 3 to 4 million since the beginning of the wan.
Fighters also continued to suppont ground forces with air-ground
strikes and by flying missions along the Pakistani border threatening to
strike cross bonder guenilla strongholds.38
One additional aspect which some analysts point to is the
nationality pnoblem. As Amin punged qualified Afghans fnom the civil
senvice stnuctune of the Afghan government the Soviets were
^Edvard Giradet, "Behind New Soviet Tactics in Afghanistan", US News and World
Report, 20 January, 1986,p39.
38 liedvedev, 235. also see Gi cadet, US News and World Report 20 Jan. 1 986. and "US
Doctors Leave Afghanistan", TheSundau Herald , 1 3 October 1 985. p9A; "Pakistani Fighter Jets
Shoot Down Afghan MiG- 21", TheSunda u Herald , 1 8 May, 1 986, pi
.
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required to provide more and more resources to fill the void. One
possibility was that a spillover effect might reach the Central Asian
populations to the north.
James Critchlow, in a Spring 1980 article, wrote about the
significance of ties between Afghan tribal groups and Soviet Central
Asians. He noted that "russocentric societal norms prescribed from
Moscow only reinforce Central Asian hostility to the Kremlin." Central
Asian Muslims are gradually becoming more conscious of their ethno-
linguistic ties with Muslim populations throughout the Middle-East and
South-West Asia. "With respect to the Muslim populations immediately
bordering the USSR, however, they share proximity and historical
experience." This has tended to cause the Soviet Central Government
to refrain from using Central Asians in jobs allowing for contact
between Soviets and Islamic nations. But Afghanistan was an
exception, in that a large number of Central Asians were used as
civilian advisers and military personnel in Afghanistan before the
invasion. Whether to attempt to quiet the Afghans or for some other
unknown reason the Soviets sent a Muslim Tartar (Fil-irat A. Tabeevj to
Kabul as Ambassador just prior to their invasion. "The Soviet Muslims
have had extensive opportunities to interact with their co-nationals in
the Afghan population, which consists of more than four million Uzbeks
and three million Tajiks, plus smaller numbers of Turkmens,"39
As noted by Wimbush and Alexiev in 1983, following TaraUfs
ascent to power in 1978, "a considerable number of Soviet Central
3 9James Critchlow, "Minarets and Marx", The Washington Quarterly, (Spring, 1 980),
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Asians were sent to Afghanistan —as interpreters and technicians
—
to service the new round of USSR-Afghanistan contracts initiated at
that time. . .Soviet Central Asians moved into critical sectors of the
Afghanistan bureaucracy, the universities and institutes, and into
other key political, social, economic, and cultural issues. . ,".40 The
result of this infusion of Soviet Muslims was at times less than
successful, Afghans resented the infusion of Soviet Muslims, especially
Uzbeks in a predominately Pashto majority bureaucracy. Moscow did
not realize the strength of ethnicity in Afghan society.41
This issue is a double-edged sword for the Soviet Central
government. On the one hand, they must be concerned with the flow of
ideas from Afghanistan to their own Central Asian Republics. The
legacy of the Basmachi revolts still exists. Furthermore, Central Asian
soldiers were charged with co-operating with the rebels — selling or
giving away their weapons. On the other nana, ignoring the multi-ethnic
composition of the Afghan state, with the diversity of tribes and
languages, would lead to the same unsuccessful results they had on
first sending Central Asians into Afghanistan. Under Gorbachev, the
policy has been to recognize the significance of Islam in both Soviet and
Afghan society, and to attempt to deal with it. In dealing with the issue
of Islam, the Soviets can only strengthen their own position in Central
405. Ender*3 Wlmbush and Alex Alexlev, "Soviet Central Asian Soldiers in Afghanistan",
Conflict: All Warfare Short of War: An International Journal, 4 ( 1 983), 329.
41 nterview with Dr. Eden Nabi . 1 S March 1 986.
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Asia, in Afghanistan under a Marxist regime and quite possibly gain tane
advantage of the disharmony of a divided resistance; movement.4^
In conclusion, the Soviets are in a difficult position. Their number
one stated goal is security of their southern borders from what they
believe to be foreign intervention. From the Soviet perspective this is a
real concern, Since the invasion they have not accomplished their goal
of eliminating the resistance to an Afghan Marxist regime. As Flora
Lewis noted the Soviet position in Afghanistan is perhaps more critical
than the US position in Vietnam at the end of the war. She believes that
a Soviet withdrawal would leave Afghanistan in a political vacuum. "In a
way, their situation is worse than America's in Vietnam because there
is no Hanoi to move in and let them off the hooU, even in ignominy, An
unprepared puliout would leave chaos, not a new Soviet order,"43 In a
way, this is America's problem too, at least in a humanistic and monal
sense.
^Medvedev, 236. and Flora Levi 3, "No Easy Way Out", Nev York Times . 29 November
1 985, p25. For a comprehensive discussion of the significance of the Islamic factor, especially
among the resistance, see Oliver Roy, "Afghanistan: Islam and Political Modernity", JPRS Near
East/South Asia Report JPRS-NEA-85- 11 6; 11 September 1 985.
45Nev York Times , 29 November 1985, p25.
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VI. Afghanistan; A Focused Comparison of IntQrgsts
.
Using the method developed in Chapter ll and considering the
development of interests in Chapter V, a comparison of interests in
Afghanistan toddy is best described using the illustration below. The
intensity of interest is a subjective judgement based upon the relative
position of each actor. It is necessary to keep in mind the operational
definition of each, as you consider individual variables.
Afghanistan
USSR vs.US












A. Defense of homeland
American positionj
Afghanistan is not today, nor has it even been, a component in
American national security plans. It is not contiguous to US terrain.
Contacts between the US and Afghanistan have been limited. The
United States recognized Afghanistan as part of a Soviet Sphere of
influence. It has never been included as an American ally, been a factor
in US policy except for assisting Pakistan, or even been a signatory of
a US treaty. Following the loss of Iran as the hinge-pin of US South
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West Asian containment policy. President Carter dQdared this region
a vital interest. Carter considered the Soviet Invasion a thPQat to the
balance of power. However, Afghanistan still did not figure into
American plans. Afghanistan was, and remains, a peripheral intensity
interest to American defense of homeland. The one advantage to the
current Soviet guagmire in this nation is that it diverts Soviet
resources and attention from other parts of the world., providing an
advantage to US policies. This has been especially true in the third
world.
Soviet position :
From the Soviet perspective, involvement in Afghanistan is a
survival intensity interest. Afghanistan is contiguous to the Soviet
borders. Security of the southern flanh is a strong, historic and
continuing Soviet fear. It closely coincides with Soviet national goals.
Following the Inanian revolution, Soviets felt that the United States
would invade Iran to protect Amenican interests. Extending from the
political culture of Tzanist Russia through the Soviet Union today and
conditioned by their experiences in the Second World War, Kremlin
leaders are constantly aware of the thneat to their tenrain. Secretary-
General Gorbachev expressed his concern for the situation in
Afghanistan at the most recent Congress of the Central Committee of
the CPSU, calling his nations involvement in Afghanistan critical. The
primary goal of the Soviets is to stop the resistance. No cost
—
economic, political or personal— exceeds the value of defense of the
Soviet borders
1S7
B. Economic Well being
ArnQhcgn position ;
ThQ United States has no economic interest in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan pnovides no product on resource to US markets. The only
possible significance, that Afghanistan might play for the United States
economically, is the threat which might be perceived by a Soviet
expansionist move toward the Persian Gulf oil lanes. If such threat
were to materialize, then the intensity of US interest might increase,
but not in the economic sense.
Soviet position ;
The Soviet Union has important economic interests in
Afghanistan. Since the end of the Second World War the Soviets have
been Kabul's main benefactor. They have installed facilities and made
investments which they expect to pay off. Natural 6as is a major
import fnom Afghanistan. While the Soviet Union has sufficient
guantities of this resource at home, it is cheaper and easier for them
to impont natural gas fnom Afghanistan than to transport it from their
own stocks. Natural gas is used fon industry in the Centnal Asian
Republics and is impontant fon the expansion of those industries. The
loss of their Afghan source of natural gas would severely constrict
Central Asian industry, limiting development.
ida
C. Favorable World Order
American Position :.
America's strongest intensity interest in Afghanistan is the
desire to see a favorable world order, American's regard it as their
duty to protect the interests of the oppressed, the weak and the poor.
American's perceive their role, as a great world superpower, to be the
maintenance of the global status quo, As such, following the Second
World War the United States adopted a policy of containment. Soviet
global expansion is a threat to the status quo and world peace when
looking through an American lens. President Carter's reactions to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the example of the intensity of
American resolve. Unfortunately, world public opinion, like American
public opinion, does not last indefinitely. Public Opinion is molded to a
certain extent by the .media. The media operates on the new and
sensational. After seven years of occupation, Afghanistan is neither-
new nor sensational news. Public outrage over the Soviet invasion has
decreased accordingly.
Soviet position ;
The Soviet perspective is that their actions in Afghanistan were
justified to maintain a balance of power, which suited their
interpretation of the status quo. Afghanistan was already a Marxist
regime, before the Soviet intervention to stabilize and provide fraternal
assistance, , The Soviets saw it as their duty to prevent the PDPA
from being replaced, or allowing the gains of the revolution from being
manipulated by a 'cult of personality' in the person of Amin. Before
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attempting the intervention, the Soviets fully QxpgctQd it to have been
like Czechoslovakia in 1 368, a short and succossful action. Had they
known the strength of the resistance movement they now face, it must
be seriously guestioned whether they would have undertaken the
aaventure. Afghanistan has placed Soviet policy throughout the Third
World in jeopardy. It therefore is in the Soviet interest to keep talks
alive in the Unitea Nations to divert attention from the real issues.
D. Ideological interests
American position;
The United States has a strong ideological ana moral interest in
Afghanistan. This interest has developed intensity since the Soviet
invasion. Next to providing for a favorable world oraer, iaeological
interests are of major importance. Proviaing humanitarian and military
assistance to the Afghan resistance movement is consistent with our
own American belief and value system. The United States is concerned
for the freedom, welfare and right to self-determination of the Afghan
people. The United States is also concernea for the continued
credibility of our position in South West Asia; if America were to stop
showing concern for the Afghan cause, then a strong signal wouia be
sent to American allies.
Soviet position ;
One of the most intense issues at stake in the Afghan crisis is
the irreversibility of the revolution. Lenin believed that revolution would
come to societies when they reached an appropriate stage. It is
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questionable whether or not Afghanistan was this stage, but the fact
that revolution came cannot be doubted, From the Soviet penspective,
there can be no compromise. To allow a compromise would be to
confess that Marxism-Leninism is not infallible and inevitable, and that
the very foundation of the Soviet nation is rotten. The fundamental
prestige of the system rests on the credibility of Marxist-Leninist




The impact of Islam in Afghanistan is basically different from
other South West Asian societies. Islam is a traditional and underlying
component of life at the tribal level. Americans have a fundamental
misunderstanding of Afghan politics; part of this problem is that we fail
to fully comprehend the nature of Afghan culture and society.
Americans, due to the environment in which we develop, tend to
overlook the significance of Islam and the tribal structure of Afghan
society. American interest in this variable remains as before, a
peripheral intensity interest.
Soviet position :
The Soviet Union, like the United States, failed to fully realize the
nature of the Afghan state before their 1979 intervention. Afghan
rulers have always required the consent and recognition of the tribes
in order to be legitimate. The line of legitimate Afghan leaders ended in
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1978 with Daoud's departure. The imposition of central rule by an
unpopular revolution will not successfully consolidate the Afghan state,
The Soviet Union is proud of its nationalities policy. But it is obvious that
they failed to account for the specific nature of Islam and tribal
structure in Afghanistan. An example might be the movement of Soviet
Muslim Central Asians into the Afghan bureaucracy. Whether on
purpose on accidental, this policy earned the Soviets the resentment
ana indignation of the Pashto majority in the cities. The Soviets see the
Central Asian nationalities as a living testimonial to the success of the
Leninist nationality policy. In this Soviet view, Soviet Rule proaucea a
nation out of what were little more than tribal structures a generation
ago, Gorbachev's initiatives indicate Soviet recognition of the
significance of Islam in Afghanistan today. This variable is a vital
importance to Soviet success in their Afghan policy.
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VII. Conclusion
The objective of this analysis is two-fold. First, to develop a
framework by which to compare the national interests of the Soviet
Union and the United States. This analysis an effort to develop some
common ground for comparison and contrast. Second, having developed
a framework for analysis to apply it to the Southwest Asian region.
The framework adapted here seeks to examine the perspectives of
both actors, while avoiding the problem of mirror-imaging. Mirror-
imaging the perspectives of Soviets and Americans tends to obscure
the real issues at hand. Societies differ, therefore, their perspectives
of reality differ and so will their ways of handling challenges to their
respective positions in the international environment.
The Southwest Asian region provides an interesting environment
to apply this model. South West Asia was selected because of the
significant challenges to both the Soviet and American positions in light
of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,
Soviet and American interests compete head to head in this critical
region. The events of 1978 and 1979 were great challenges to the
positions of both the United States and the Soviet Union, in terms of
international prestige and implications to their respective foreign
policies. Therefore, South West Asia was an excellent region to select
for study.
A. Limits of the Model
The model developed in Chapter II is not a universally applicable
framework. There are several limits which must be considered. First,
193
the concept of 'notional interest' is difficult , if not impossible, to define.
This is complicated by the sparse amount of theoretical literature in the
field on the concept of the 'national interest' and the loose usage of the
term by many sources. This analysis provides a definition, which while
useful in this study, may not be suitable for all similar case studies. The
socio-economic-political systems of the Soviet Union and the United
States ar^> diverse and differ in many aspects, it is a difficult task to
provide an operational definition which can compare and contrast the
interests of both without mirror-imaging one nation against the other.
This framework measures only the intensity of variables. It
does not prescribe a course of action, or policy options, for decision
makers. Furthermore, this model cannot predict the use of force or any
other instrument of foreign policy. However, in providing a
measurement of relative positions, it may be possible for policy makers
to determine more effective strategies of action. There is some utility
to a model which remains explanatory rather than prescriptive, in that
it provides a more complete framework to fully understand the various
facets of a particular problem.
Another limit of this model is its difficulty in use. It is a
complex task for an analyst, using the framework of analysis described
in this study, to totally divorce himself from his own cultural bias. If you
are an American, then you tend to view the world from an American
perspective. Likewise, if you gpq a Soviet, then you tend to see things
in light of your own Soviet cultural and political perspective, An Analyst
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using this method must take care to ensure that he continually asks
himself ir he is considering Doth sides or an issue.
This analysis is further limited in terms of its scope. Due to the
limited space and time in which to prepare this study only case studies
of Afghanistan and Inan wene undertaken. To fully understand the
significance of Soviet and American interests in this region would
require examination of interests in the surrounding region. Significant
changes might be observed if case studies of Pakistan, India, Iraq,
Turkey and Saudi Arabia were considered.
Variables selected in this study may not be all inclusive, Others
using this model may desire to add additional variables to explain
particular issues relevant in a specific area. In this case, Islam was
chosen as a variable which accounts for the dominant religious and
nationalistic force in South West Asia. In South West Asia, not
considering the impact of this variable could result in some of the same,
myopic judgements both Soviet and American decision makers have
been accused of in their policy actions relating to the region. Likewise
the individual variables are not necessarily mutually exclusive.: to a
certain extent bleed-over occurs and each variable has an effect upon
the others.
B. Strengths of the Model.
The primary strength of the paradigm developed in this thesis is
the definition of a concept for National Interest. The concept of
National Interest, as presented in the literature, is somewhat
ambiguous and multi-faceted. The operational definition offered in this
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analysis may not be all inclusive, but it does attempt to develop a model
which better explains the concept. By combining Alexander George's
method of 'Focused Comparison' with Nuechteriein's variables of the
National Interest, a systematic method which considers the
perspectives of both actors results. The paradigm developed in this
analysis allows interests to be compared without mirror-imaging
perspectives, the hazards of which have already been pointed-out. As
such, this model allows the analyst to isolate various facets of the
collective national interest and ask specific questions about those
variables. The paradigm developed here is flexible and useful.
Comparing the positions of the Soviet Union and the United
States in this region, there are a series of key factors which are
obvious and necessary to keep in mind. First, the National Interest is a
function of a specific time period. Likewise, time is critical to the
intensity of an interest. For example, public outrage over the Vietnam
war, Iranian Hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
the United States is less today than yesterday. At the same time, as
seen in the Soviet Union, Afghanistan is becoming a growing concern as
the Gorbachev regime attempts to motivate public sentiment for the
Soviet position. National Interest, therefore, fluctuates. While a
specific type of interest will always exist; the intensity of a given
variable will fluctuate with time.
Another factor is the comparison of stated policies or courses of
action with observed results. The National Interest in not necessarily
what the national leadership says it is at any given point in time. This is
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^specially true of vital issues. As an example; After the Iranian
revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; carter's declaration
that South West Asia was vital interest may have been a function of
current situation, losses in other regions, and his own personal
commitment, rather than an actual vital National Interest to which he
would have committed troops. This inconsistency is not limited to the
United States. Likewise, while the Soviets say they ar^ willing to
disengage, how close will they actually come to actually doing so? Or
when the Soviets say that their policy is self-determination for
nationalities, how much of that policy is actually allowed to become
reality?
The national leadership and the media or^ instrumental in
formulating public support or non-support for particular issues of
interest. Whether it is called black or white propaganda or just media
hype, the fact remains that the public opinion can be modified, at least
temporarily. In the United States, this is evidenced by changes of public
opinion with Presidential Administration changes. A comparable
persuasive role of the Press may not be possible in Soviet Union
because of the nature of Soviet political system. However, it is obvious
from recent coverage of Afghanistan in the Soviet Press that the
media is considered instrumental in modifying Soviet public opinion.: in
this case to support the objectives of the invasion.
National Interest is a function of perspective. . .in other words
where you sit is where you stand. In the sphere of international politics
this observation is especially apparent. Analysts cannot afford to
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ignore the rQspgctive positions of thQir notion, nor con they afford to
ignore the relative position of the other powers. Analysts must 0e
centain to make policy recommendations, which while considering the
opponents perspective, ane in the best interest of the nation— Soviet
on Amenican.
A final facton concenns the relative relationship among variables.
While Nuechteriine's moOel accepts no pnionity among variables [Ch2,
note 13] it is impontant to necognize the significance of a nation's
defense of homeland. Any thneat against the home land of an acton
could be judged a survival intensity thneat In this sense, it is opponent
that the Soviet Union has an intense intenest in those actions which
occur* on hen bondens. The United States is eaually concerned, but has
no histonical expedience with strong direct threats on the sovereignty
of hen bonOens. Fon the United States, Soviet histonic preoccupation
with security provides a factor which might be exploited in dealing with
the Soviet Union.
C. Lessons for Policy Makers.
While this model attempts to measure the relative intensity of an
actor's interest, the most important lesson of this analysis deals with
how an actor 'will react to secure his interest. The most important fact
is that an actor will always seek to maximize his relative position vis-a-
vis others. The concept or operational definition of a National Interest
may differ, either internationally or within each nation. However, this
does not change the maxim that each actor will seek to make the best
of his respective position. In the South West Asian region the interests
1 Qft
of the Soviet union are seemingly more intense because or historical
experiences, and because of the geostrategic position of both man ana
Afghanistan.
it is important to consider the historical context of Soviet and
American interests in this region. Up until 1945 Russia, followed by the
Soviet Union competed for influence in this region with Britain. The
United States, consistent with its role in international politics, remained
disinterested in this region, except for some limited economic ties, until
after the initiation of the Cold War. From 1347 the primary facet of
American interest in this region was its significant geostrategic
position as a component of US global containment strategy. A second
interest, but not nearly as strong as the containment role, was the
significance of Persian Gulf oil to the economies of Europe and the
United States. In this light, Iran developed into an important trading
partner, as it sought outside assistance to develop.
Afghanistan has always been a distant interest for the United
States. Afghan attempts to develop ties with the United States were
not reciprocated by the United States government. As such,
Afghanistan, under the guidance of Premier Daoud turned to the
Soviets for developmental assistance in the early 1960s. Afghanistan's
goal, consistent with their historically independent position vis-a-vis
Iran, was primarily to catch up with the developed world. US policy
makers failed to take any major interest in Afghanistan until the murder
of the American Ambassador. President Carter reacted with intense
interest only following the Soviet invasion in December of 1979.
1QQ
American primary interest in the current plight of the Afghan people is
humanitarian ana in tenms of American concern for the ability of
national self-determination.
The Soviet position is often difficult for- Americans to understand.
Given the political culture of Soviet decision makers, it is easy to
understand their intense preoccupation with survival and defense of
homeland, when analyzed from their perspective. In both Iran and
Afghanistan, the Soviets say that they were afraid of Western
influence creeping into their sphere of supremacy. Both Iran and
Afghanistan and contiguous to the Soviet Union and in Soviet
perception, albeit paranoid, prime territory for the flow of counter-
revolutionary ideas into their system.
For the Soviets, primary interests in both Iran and Afghanistan
are defense of homeland and challenges to their ideological positions,
Economics and World order interests opq less intense, In both case
studies, the Soviets have only recently awaUened to the significance of
Islam. Comparatively, the United States has little interest in the
defense of homeland aspect. In Iran, American interests were spurred
by containment first, and then by the significance of Persian 6ulf oil.
Since the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Afghan invasion, US
interests have been primarily oriented toward maintaining the world
status quo of power and American traditional interest in national self-
determination. The United States too, is slowly awakening to the
significance of Islam and ethnicity in this region.
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In summary thQ South WQSt Asian region illustrates the
importance of a region distant from the United States ana not so
distant from the Soviet Union which challenges the prestige of each in
the international realm. It is a region, with historic significance, which In
the past has been overlooked and misunderstood all to often by both
the European Breat powers and the post World War II superpowers-
Policy makers of both the Soviet Union and the United States have
difficult choices to make in relation to the risks and costs versus
benefits of options in South West Asia. This analysis has sought to help
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